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Abstract 
Traditionally, employment advice and guidance services in the UK have 
occupied distinct realms despite government efforts to align and integrate the 
education and skills and welfare-to-work frameworks. Conceptually, studies of front-
line service delivery have often adopted a street-level perspective. This study offers a 
governance approach that focuses on how adviser behaviour is steered through 
managerial methods and how advisers steer user behaviour through the use of 
discretion and trust. The study explored how advisers mediated the tensions between 
managerial concerns and user needs to achieve policy goals, among others to turn 
service users into more active citizens. Based on 38 semi-structured interviews with 
service managers and advisers in combination with service characteristics and policy 
aims, a service typology was developed which was then applied to eight case study 
services. The analysis showed that employment advisers in the different service types 
applied very diverse strategies to achieve an outcome for the service user, but that 
within service types the strategies were similar. Due to the different service structures 
and advisers’ varying ability to apply discretion, various kinds of trust could be 
established, which potentially allowed the advisers to influence a change of service 
user behaviour. This could range from highly coercive methods to empowering 
individuals. The findings showed that advisers were subject to similar pressures as they 
applied to service users when mediating managerial influences. There was evidence 
that ability to use discretion was a vital pivot point in how advisers mediated tension 
between the service demands and user needs. This in turn was related to the adviser’s 
ability to achieve sustainable outcomes for the service user.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 2 
There has been a worldwide drive towards increased productivity in order to 
maintain and advance economic competitiveness. Supra-national organisations like the 
OECD, the World Bank and the EU have strongly encouraged national governments to 
increase economic activity through a series of strategies and reporting mechanisms, 
such as the European Employment Strategy (Bruttel and Sol, 2006, Mosher and 
Trubek, 2003). The key to global success is conceived according to neo-liberal 
principles such as maximising paid employment within the working age population in 
order to support top-heavy demographic profiles (see for instance European 
Commission, 2005). Successive UK governments have been particularly concerned with 
raising employment levels overall to 80 percent, including the raising of employment 
rates of lone parents, the ill or the disabled and older workers to unprecedented levels 
(DWP, 2006a).  
However, relatively little attention has been paid to how this might be achieved 
in practice. Transitions into employment have become a key focus of state 
intervention and it is the advisers providing information, advice and guidance who are 
charged with achieving these ambitious aims. Front-line advisers are expected to 
confront citizens with new expectations about the terms of their engagement with the 
state as they mediate transitions into employment. 
Knowledge of regulations, access to resources, and regular contact with service 
users have established advisers as a focal point for informing and influencing people’s 
behaviour (Jewell and Glaser, 2006). Politically, the role of advisers has been seen to 
have much greater influence. “It [employment advice and guidance] operates at the 
interface between the individual and society, between self and opportunity, between 
aspiration and realism. It facilitates the allocation of life chances.” (Watts, 1996: 351). 
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As a result, employment advisers have been portrayed as mediators of inequality, 
ascribing to them the power to bring about changes in people’s behaviour as well as 
socio-economic status. 
In the UK, employment advice has been delivered in two largely separate 
frameworks: the welfare-to-work framework and the learning and skills framework. 
Each framework has had its own legal context, separate service delivery structures and 
separate policy making institutions. Academically, each framework has had a strong, 
separate research tradition (see for instance Bimrose, 2006, Clasen and Clegg, 2006, 
Barker et al., 2005, Bennett and Millar, 2005, Sol and Westerveld, 2005a, CeGS, 2003, 
Finn, 2003, Mosher and Trubek, 2003, Goul Andersen, 2002a, Sarfati and Bonoli, 2002, 
Considine, 2001, Gati et al., 2001, Lødemel and Trickey, 2001, Rees et al., 1999,). A 
starting premise for this study is to consider which services would be available to 
individuals when faced with unemployment, redundancy, returning to work or a career 
change in the UK. For the purpose of this study, therefore, employment advice services 
are all those services which offer advice and support to adults in order to mediate 
transitions between different labour market statuses (Frade et al., 2006). 
Under the New Labour government (1997–2007) services in the welfare-to-
work framework, determined at UK level, followed a strict ‘activation’ rationale that 
connected the rights to Jobseekers’ Allowance with the responsibility of actively 
looking for work, or with threats of sanctions if service users did not comply with this 
condition (Finn, 2003). The aim of programmes, such as the New Deals, was to help 
people (back) into work as quickly as possible based on the underlying rationale that 
the “best welfare policy of all is work” (DWP, 2006a: iv). The main programmes were a 
series of New Deals supplemented by, Employment Zones for example, which focused 
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on people with multiple barriers to work. These initiatives were complemented by two 
strategies ‘making work possible’, which focused on removing barriers to work such as 
the provision of childcare and ‘making work pay’, which provided incentives for people 
out of work in the form of tax credits to top up insufficient wages and the introduction 
of a minimum wage (Bennett and Millar, 2005, Millar, 2002). These programmes were 
delivered by a network of Jobcentre Plus offices in combination with contracted 
provision by private and voluntary and community sector providers (DWP, 2006a).  
Services within the learning and skills framework fell under different 
jurisdictions, because the policy area of education and skills was devolved. Whilst 
there were separate policies and services in Wales and Northern Ireland, the study 
focused on service delivery in England and Scotland. Devolution had progressed the 
furthest in Scotland and there had been substantial policy developments in the area of 
learning and skills, whilst English policy fell under Westminster jurisdiction (Watts, 
2006). Policies in both countries focused on the development of skills and the 
promotion of lifelong learning to match the demands of the global economy (Scottish 
Executive, 2001, DfES, 1998). However, while services in Scotland were delivered 
through an integrated service open to people of all ages and qualification levels and 
funded by the Scottish government, the delivery landscape in England showed 
diversified contracted provision and a segregation by age (Mulvey, 2006). Due to the 
complexity of service provision in England, this study focused on advice and guidance 
services for adults only. 
However, a common concern for programmes in both frameworks was their 
mediation of labour market transitions and encouraging participation in the labour 
market. Additionally, there was an underlying economic rationale which was fuelled by 
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the impact of globalisation, the need to stay internationally competitive and the gap 
between the demand and supply of a highly skilled workforce (Bimrose, 2006). 
Moreover, advisers in both frameworks were charged with enacting policy and in so 
doing had significant responsibility in supporting the government’s ambitions for an 
‘active’ society. 
The unique contribution of this study is the adoption of an integrated view of 
both delivery frameworks as it would be presented to a person out of work or at risk of 
unemployment. Moreover, it examines the adviser’s role in mediating the competing 
demands of government policy and service user expectations and how these 
relationships are governed.  
Conceptually, this study is interested in exploring how policy is enacted at the 
front-line. It is strongly influenced by Lipsky’s (Lipsky, 1980) theory of street-level 
bureaucracy. This literature characterises the front-line worker as an administrator 
who, influenced by work and task pressures, has developed coping mechanisms which 
ultimately change policy (Brodkin, 2005, Wright, 2001, Sandfort, 1999, Lipsky, 1980). 
While this may still be the case to some extent, this study takes into consideration the 
changing policy context of contracted service provision and the expanded 
responsibilities of advisers in the delivery of personalised services. The study thus 
adopts a governance perspective, where governance means  
“the ‘steering’ of the subjects’ behavioural practices towards particular 
social and politico-economic goals via a set of institutions and processes 
that aim to maintain or change the status quo” (Carmel and 
Papadopoulos, 2003: 32).  
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The study investigates how the contractual provision of services, strongly 
influenced by performance measurement and the provision of incentives on an 
organisational as well as an individual level, have ensured compliance with intended 
policy aims which are often enforced by the threat of sanctions (Clarke and Newman, 
1997, Martin, 1997). However, there were also less stringent means to ensure 
compliance such as the building of a trusting relationship (Newman, 2001). In their 
new role, advisers were thus supposed to reconcile rights and responsibilities, support 
and control through their actions and mediate the tensions that would arise between 
adhering to programmatic requirements and to provide a service targeted to the needs 
of the user (Rosenthal and Peccei, 2006).  
This study has been developed to offer a unique insight, examining how 
governance mechanisms operate at street-level. Moreover, it is designed to develop 
an understanding of how governance has shaped adviser-user relationships and how 
advisers are influenced by governance mechanisms in their work with service users.  
Research questions 
The aims of the research will be achieved by answering the following questions: 
- How do advisers in different kinds of services deliver employment 
advice to service users? What are the similarities and differences? 
- How do managerialist methods control and steer advisers’ work? What 
are the differences and similarities? 
- How do advisers use discretion and build trust with service users? What 
are the similarities and differences? 
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Chapter outline 
The first chapter provides the policy context within which employment advice 
and guidance services are delivered. It outlines the developments of the two 
frameworks within which these services existed over the recent past. Policy 
developments under the Conservative governments (1979–1997) and more recently 
the New Labour government (1997–2007) have been taken into consideration. The 
focus on contracting out to a pluralist provider base has strongly influenced service 
delivery. 
The second chapter provides an insight into the governance of service delivery 
by examining the literature. Recently the governance of employment services has 
received more academic interest, which has allowed a deeper insight into how 
governance frameworks influenced service delivery. Although a variety of governance 
frameworks were operational in UK service delivery, managerialism was considered 
the predominant form that governed the contractual relationships with service 
providers. The chapter also provides a discussion of some of the elements of 
managerial steering and control mechanisms, such as performance evaluation and 
incentive payments, because they have a strong influence on front-line personnel. 
The third chapter examines the literature on the ‘softer’ factors influencing 
how advisers can deliver services. These included the use of discretion, the building of 
trust with the service user and methods to change behaviour. This was of particular 
interest, because the achievement of policy and service objectives required service 
users to change their behaviour. Thus, advisers had an important role in mediating 
these behavioural changes in their interactions with service users. 
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The methodological aspects of conducting this research are then taken into 
account. This included the justification for selecting a case study approach as well as 
the advantages of using a typology for the further analysis and presentation of the 
data. The chapter also provides a reflective account of the challenges faced during the 
research process, focusing in particular on data collection. 
The next three chapters are concerned with the analysis and findings of the 
study. The selected case studies were introduced first to provide an insight into the 
variety of services available in the UK and secondly to give some contextual 
information for service delivery. Based on these case profiles, the typology was 
consequently developed and introduced.  
In chapter six, the adviser-user relationship is analysed. This provides deeper 
insight into how advisers have used discretion to respond to user needs and built trust 
with service users. Ultimately, advisers were trying to achieve a behaviour change in 
service users to fulfil the aims of specific policies. In the last part of this chapter, this 
nexus of contextual factors, and the use of discretion and trust in attempting to 
change service users’ behaviour are explored. 
The last analysis chapter explores how advisers mediated the managerial 
framework within which they were operating. It analyses how performance 
measurement was used to shape adviser behaviour and how incentive pay was 
employed to reinforce or discourage certain behaviours. As with the adviser-user 
relationship, the elements combine to provide a picture of what kinds of trust were 
placed in the adviser and how this influenced their interactions. 
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Chapter 10 discusses the findings in the wider research context. It specifically 
examines the conditions and implications of a ‘missing’ service type in the UK context 
and explored the congruence of the developed typology with other guidance 
typologies. Lastly, it discusses the mechanisms of how advisers mediated competing 
policy and service user demands. 
The conclusion reviews the findings in relation to the research questions that 
have guided this study. It provides an update on the changing policy context in the UK 
and suggests issues for further investigation which the study has raised. 
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Chapter 2 
Policy context 
 11 
Introduction 
There has been a global drive to increase competitiveness and productivity 
through an expansion of economic activity, which is strongly supported by several 
supra-national organisations, e.g. the EU or the OECD. Underpinned by neo-liberal 
principles, national governments are strongly encouraged to maximise paid 
employment to support top-heavy demographic profiles (Bruttel and Sol, 2006, 
European Commission, 2005). Facilitating labour market transitions is therefore a vital 
strategy to support these aims. The initial premise for this study is the consideration of 
which services would be available to someone when faced with unemployment, 
redundancy, a career change or a return to employment. In the UK, this need for 
advice would be covered by services operating within two distinct policy frameworks. 
One is the welfare-to-work framework and the other is the learning and skills 
framework. Employment advice service provision has changed substantially over the 
last two decades with the Conservative government (1979-1997) and the New Labour 
government (1997–2007) imprinting distinct features onto these frameworks. This 
chapter provides the policy background for the remainder of the study. In particular, it 
contextualises the environment in which employment advisers act as mediators 
between the goals of government policy and the service user. It locates the concept of 
activation in combination with its changing conception of the working citizen in 
international context. The chapter introduces the two service frameworks, welfare-to-
work and learning and skills respectively, focussing on their underlying rationales and 
funding arrangements. Following this, the political influences of the Conservative 
government as well as the New Labour government are discussed.  
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Frameworks of UK services 
Employment advice and guidance is a wide and diverse field in the UK. Indeed, 
the definition of what could be classified as information, advice and guidance during 
the period of study was not unanimous (see for instance the definitions used in 
CEDEFOP, 2005, Council of the European Union, 2004, DfES, 2003). There are two main 
frameworks for delivery. The first is the learning and skills approach which focuses on 
guiding the individual user towards education or employment. Due to devolution, 
there have been different approaches in England and Scotland within this framework. 
The second is the welfare-to-work perspective which takes a more ‘active’ approach in 
moving the user towards returning to work. Social Security is not a devolved policy 
area and the same policies apply throughout the UK.  
When New Labour took office in 1997, the labour market was buoyant. 
Throughout the first years of the new millennium, unemployment was consistently at a 
comparatively low rate of approximately 5 percent. However, long-term 
unemployment (18 months or longer) was considered a problem (DWP, 2008c). In 
comparison to the rest of Europe, the employment rate was extremely high at well 
over 70 percent (ONS, 2010). In the two decades prior to 1997, employment levels of 
highly qualified workers had remained stable. However, the employment levels of 
people with low skills or no skills had fallen (Trickey and Walker, 2001). This can be 
seen in the context of an overall shift from a manufacturing based economy to a 
service and knowledge based economy and an increasing flexibilisation of the labour 
market in general (Evans and Williams, 2009).  
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Welfare-to-work and activation 1997-2007 
In a climate of increasing labour mobility and job insecurity combined with a 
buoyant economy and low unemployment figures, New Labour set out to reform the 
welfare system in the UK (Walker and Wiseman, 2003). Part of this reform was a shift 
towards welfare-to-work policies based on the ideological belief that “the best welfare 
policy of all is work” (DWP, 2006a: iv) and a focus on “matching rights with 
responsibilities” (ibid). The link between rights and responsibilities was part of a bigger 
agenda to transform the conception of citizenship, which focused on activation, self-
responsibility and most importantly, labour market participation, which will be 
discussed further below. The reforms carried out under the New Labour government 
focused on a ‘new welfare contract’. It was built around labour market participation as 
the centre-piece and offering “work for those who can; security for those who cannot” 
(DSS, 1998).  
This formed the basis for activation policies. The aim of these policies was to 
end the ‘benefit dependency culture’ by encouraging, supporting or compelling people 
to find work in an effort to reduce public spending on social security benefits (DWP, 
2006a). This was part of an overall reform agenda that set out to end child poverty and 
tackle social exclusion, that was also supported by offering tax credits to subsidise 
those with insufficient incomes and the introduction of a minimum wage to ‘make 
work pay’ (Bennett and Millar, 2005, Walker and Wiseman, 2003). It is questionable 
whether these policies had the intended incentive effects or whether they contributed 
to their overall aim of avoiding in-work poverty (Hirsch, 2009, Harker, 2006). Hyde et. 
al. (1999) warned that the emphasis on the responsibilities of individuals and 
compulsion of these programmes underlined existing economic and social divisions. 
Elsewhere, Gardiner and Miller (2006) for example, showed that people in low wage 
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jobs, which were the more typical job outcomes for those moving from benefits into 
work (Gray, 2001, Tonge, 1999), sometimes employed other strategies to avoid 
poverty, for instance through employing family support to reduce living costs.  
The underlying rationale of this reform is that of ‘activation’. This is a 
contentious concept because of the different meanings assigned to it by different 
parties and contexts. It could mean a systemic activation which focuses on the wider 
issues such as changing the conception of citizenship to a more active one (see later in 
the chapter). Alternatively, it also can refer to activation of the individual, which has 
been the main concern of welfare-to-work policies, although both conceptions are 
closely linked. Activation in its widest sense meant that unemployment benefits were 
made conditional on job searching efforts, and thus followed a ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ approach (Clasen and Clegg, 2006). However, this can be accomplished 
by different means, as positive and negative activation depending on different 
ideological orientations (Barbier, 2004, Gilbert and Van Voorhis, 2001).  
Positive activation revolved around the use of a period of unemployment to 
readjust a person’s skills to the ever changing demands of the labour market (Clasen 
and Clegg, 2006). This approach was most common for instance in Denmark, where 
programmes emphasised training measures, participation in which was a citizen’s right 
and duty (Goul Andersen, 2002b). Strongly influenced by US coercive ‘workfare’ 
approaches (Handler, 2004) activation, within the UK context, was conceptualised in a 
negative fashion emphasising compulsion and job-search requirements.  
This development could be traced back to the Conservative era (1979-1997) 
where the ‘stricter benefit regime’, introduced in 1989, increased the conditionality 
upon job-search activities to those receiving benefits and being available to work (Finn, 
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1997). It threatened sanctions in case of non-compliance and coincided with a gradual 
reduction of positive training measures (Blackmore, 2001). In 1996 this was followed 
by the introduction of Jobseekers Allowance, which replaced unemployment benefit 
and income support (Finn, 1997). Jobseekers were now required to sign a contract, the 
Jobseekers’ Agreement that outlined precise steps to be taken in the return to 
employment and allowed the advisers to mandate users to follow specific activities via 
a Jobseekers’ Direction. Activation under New Labour (1997-2007) maintained the 
elements of coercion and threat of sanctions as set out by the preceding Conservative 
governments by following a ‘work first’ approach, which signalled an important cross-
party consensus (Bryson, 2003, Theodore and Peck, 1999). However, the New Labour 
governments located this work first approach within a wider strategy to remove 
barriers to work and to make work pay (Millar, 2002).  
The shift towards activation policies, namely the contractual obligation of 
people receiving unemployment benefits to look for paid (or sometimes voluntary) 
work (van Berkel and Borghi, 2008a) was, as the above discussion suggested, by no 
means a development unique to the UK. Since the late 1990s, activation policies have 
developed rapidly throughout Europe, Scandinavia and the English-speaking countries 
(Barbier, 2004, Handler, 2004, Goul Andersen, 2002b). The character of activation 
policies in these countries developed in relation to the mix of punitive and enabling 
elements, building on existing welfare traditions (Gallie and Paugam, 2000). Policy 
development was encouraged and mediated by the strategies of supra-national 
organisations such as the EU (via the European Employment Strategy) whose use of 
discourse and intervention to influence activation policy as a means to deal with wider 
societal problems (Bruttel and Sol, 2006, Mosher and Trubek, 2003) was considered by 
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some commentators as controversial and problematic (Crespo Suárez and Serrano 
Pascual, 2007, Serrano Pascual and Crespo Suárez, 2007).  
The UK, along with the US and Australia, was at the forefront of promoting 
‘work first’ active labour market policies (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008, Bruttel and Sol, 
2006, Finn, 2001). The main activation policy in the UK was a series of ‘New Deal’ 
programmes (beginning in 1997) which focused on population groups which were 
considered more difficult to help, including lone parents, young people, the long-term 
unemployed (18 months or longer), the disabled and older workers. These 
programmes offered personalised support that was attached to strict conditionality 
and the threat of sanctions if genuine employment offers were refused (Finn, 2003).  
Increasing conditionality was another main feature of this new breed of 
welfare-to-work programmes. Benefit receipt was clearly linked to work related 
criteria, such as actively seeking work and mandatory attendance at work focused 
interviews and started to include groups which were previously not considered as 
unemployed, including lone parents, people with disabilities, or carers (Trickey and 
Walker, 2001). The New Deal programmes were supplemented by area-based 
initiatives (for instance, New Deal for Communities and Employment Zones), which 
were specifically targeted at areas of exceptionally high levels of deprivation to tackle 
the root causes of deprivation. 
Evidence concerning the effectiveness of these programmes has been mixed. 
For instance, Blundell et al. (2003) concluded that the New Deal for Young People 
made long-term unemployment for young people less likely due to the options of 
subsidised employment, participation in an Environment Task Force, volunteering or a 
return to full-time education and training but questioned the longevity of the results. 
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On a more general level, there were concerns over people being ‘churned’ through the 
system due to the increased pressure on individuals to compete for low paid, insecure 
jobs (Clasen and Clegg, 2006, Gray, 2001), leading to frequent cycling in and out of 
benefits (Bruttel and Sol, 2006). These findings raised serious concerns over the 
suitability of these policies to offer sustainable employment and to ’make work pay’. 
Welfare-to-work programmes have been mainly funded by the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) and until 2007 were contracted to external providers 
through Jobcentre Plus1. Between 2000 and 2005, the DWP spent on average £1.1 
billion annually on employment programmes, including annual spending of about £400 
million on New Deal programmes alone (DWP, 2006b), plus about £660 million on 
employment programmes for unemployed and disabled people (Jobcentre Plus, 2006). 
This constituted a substantial share of the overall budget at a time when pressures on 
the national budget were mounting through the perceived influences of globalisation 
and substantial demographic change for example due to an ageing population (Taylor-
Gooby, 2002). Welfare spending needed to be justified in terms of its contribution to 
economic success, which made successful implementation and the effectiveness of the 
programmes a key concern (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2004). This led to a rapid expansion of 
evaluations to produce the input for evidence based policy making which in turn led to 
an increase in measuring and monitoring to demonstrate value for money (Cutler and 
Waine, 2000, Audit Commission, 1999). The contractual provision of services indicated 
                                               
1  As part of a major reform of employment service delivery, the contracting out was managed by the Work, 
Welfare and Equality Group (WWEG) and Commercial and Estates Directorate within the DWP from April 2007. 
This allowed Jobcentre Plus to focus on their role of providing direct services to customers (DWP 2007b). 
Interestingly, these services had been transferred from WWEG to Jobcentre Plus only in 2005-2006 (Jobcentre 
Plus, 2006), emphasising the quickly changing environment in service provision. 
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a devolution of responsibility to the providers, whilst control was exercised from the 
centre (Jessop, 2000). 
Learning and skills  
In contrast to welfare-to-work policies, policies within the learning and skills 
framework were, and continue to be, a devolved policy area. Since 1997, policies in 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have developed independently (Watts, 
2006, Watts and Dent, 2002). The extent of devolution in Scotland was far greater than 
in Wales and Northern Ireland and policy development in the area of learning and skills 
has been substantial (Watts, 2006, Hazell, 2000,). Policies in England fall under the 
decision-making power of the Westminster government. The focus will be on policies 
in England and Scotland, which will be discussed respectively. 
Overview of English learning and skills policy 
In 1998, David Blunkett (Secretary of State for Education and Employment) 
outlined the following picture of the required attributes of the future workforce: 
“To achieve stable and sustainable growth, we will need a well-
educated, well-equipped and adaptable labour force. To cope with rapid 
change we must ensure that people can return to learning throughout 
their lives. We cannot rely on a small elite: we will need the creativity, 
enterprise and scholarship of all our people.” (DfES, 1998: 1) 
There was a strong economic rationale behind the emphasis on skills 
improvement. While the labour market was buoyant, the low skills profile of the some 
parts of the population was causing concern. The rapid development of information 
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technology required a highly skilled, knowledge driven labour force (Bimrose, 2006) 
which would help maintain competitiveness on a global scale. Therefore, the 
improvement of the skills base was seen as vital. While the Green paper ‘The Learning 
Age’ (DfES, 1998) emphasised lifelong learning and the achievement of qualifications 
to stay competitive in an increasingly global market, it also contained strong 
ideological references to New Labour’s conception of citizenship (see further below for 
a more detailed discussion). It emphasised responsibility for self-improvement and 
responsibility to contribute to society through work thus linking the strategy into the 
overall policy goals of New Labour.  
Over the past 25 years, the provision of advice and guidance services in England 
has been based on an age division, with ‘Connexions’ providing services for young 
people under the age of 20. ‘Connexions’ services are however, not included for two 
reasons. Firstly, the study focuses on services for adults, and secondly they are 
excluded due to the complexity of the provider landscape in England. The adult market 
was served by a wide range of providers (called IAG partnerships) delivering services 
for people older than 20 years of age (Mulvey, 2006). Due to the variety of 
organisations involved in service provision, the delivery standards as well as availability 
of services varied greatly. The National Policy Framework (DfES, 2003), developed by a 
number of stakeholders including the Department for Education and Skills, 
Department for Work and Pensions, the Learning and Skills Council (LSC)2, the 
                                               
2  The LSC is a non-departmental public body which began work in 2001, taking over the roles of the former Further 
Education Funding Council and Training and Enterprise Councils (www.lsc.gov.uk) 
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University for Industry3 as well as Jobcentre Plus, addressed the concern with service 
quality by requiring ‘matrix’4 accreditation from provider organisations.  
Until 2001, funding sources included a wide variety of organisations including 
local authorities, the employment service, the National Lottery, charitable and 
voluntary organisations as well as fees from individuals or employers (Wright et al., 
2005). However, with the creation of the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) in 2001, the 
responsibility for managing learning and skills programmes in England, which include 
information, advice and guidance contracts, was shifted to the LSC. In 2005-2006, the 
LSC distributed funds of more than £34 million on adult information, advice and 
guidance alone to local authorities, public corporations and trading funds, further 
education colleges and other institutions, non-profit institutions, the private sector 
and other bodies and organisations (including government bodies) (LSC, 2006). At this 
point contracts were tendered on a regular basis and indeed private sector providers 
received a large part (15%) of the LSC’s total budget of £34 billion (ibid).  
Overview of Scottish learning and skills policy 
The rationale underlying the Scottish learning and skills framework is similar to 
the English context. Learning and skills are closely linked into Scotland’s economic 
development policy with a view to competitiveness in the global labour market 
(Scottish Executive, 2005). The strategy of the Scottish Enterprise Network from 2001 
suggested 
                                               
3  University for Industry was created in 1998 and put in charge of setting up learndirect. Learndirect information, 
advice and guidance services can be accessed over the phone and online. (www.ufi.com) 
4  Matrix is a generic quality standard for information, advice and guidance services in the public and private 
sector. It outlines qualification levels for advisers as well as general requirements for high quality service 
provision. (http://www.matrixstandard.com/) 
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“The capacity to respond rapidly to the current and future needs of the 
Scottish labour market is critical to success in an age of lifelong learning. 
We must foster an environment where people can invest in their own 
educational achievement. Those economies most adept at matching 
supply and demand in the labour market will possess a key competitive 
advantage.” (Scottish Executive, 2001: 15). 
There has been a strong focus in the service design on self-responsibility in 
managing one’s career throughout the life course by providing the support necessary 
(Scottish Executive, 2005) reflecting New Labour’s conception as the ‘enabling state’ 
(for more details see chapter 4). Nevertheless, the strong economic rationale feeding 
into the provision of employment advice is clear.  
In an effort to unify and homogenise guidance services within the learning and 
skills framework, the Scottish Government has taken a different route from the 
National Policy Framework in England, which was based on the horizontal integration 
of the various provider organisations. Scotland sought vertical integration in the form 
of an all-age one-stop shop service (Watts, 2006), which was a conscious political 
decision. The service, Careers Scotland, became operational in 2002 through a merger 
of more than 80 different organisations (Scottish Government, 2001). It is an all-age 
careers guidance service that is open to everyone no matter what their labour market 
position or skill level. This integrated approach was regarded as superior to the age-
differentiated system operated in England, because it was designed to provide an 
integrated, easily accessible service throughout an individual’s lifespan with attention 
to the key transition points in a person’s life (Watts, 2005). 
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However, while provision in England was within a quasi-market system, Scottish 
policy has rejected the contracting approach, particularly in education and training. 
Instead, the provision was located within enterprise policy (Howieson and Semple, 
2006) through an organisational link with Scottish Enterprise5. Scottish Enterprise 
administered funding provided by the Scottish Government which Careers Scotland 
negotiated on an annual basis, dependent on the achievement of targets (Watts, 
2005).  
Alternative funding 
Apart from national funding sources in England and Scotland, the European 
Union is a major provider of funding for guidance and support services. The European 
Social Funds (ESF), as well as programmes such as SOCRATES and LEONARDO DA VINCI, 
have a strong underpinning of guidance. Organisations in the public, private and 
voluntary and community sector access funding from these programmes to deliver 
services to various target regions or target groups. The voluntary and community 
sector, in particular, supplement service provision for their specific user groups using 
ESF funds (Rees et al., 1999).  
The learning and skills frameworks in England and Scotland have different 
approaches in terms of provision. However, the strategic philosophy for both is an 
economic rationale which links employment advice closely to labour market policies 
and economic development. Watt (2005) cautions against having ambitious 
expectations of the contribution which learning and skills policies can make to overall 
                                               
5 This status was in the process of change with Careers Scotland becoming an independent organisation just after 
fieldwork was completed. See Chapter 10 for more details. 
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economic productivity and future competitiveness. He concluded that only a strong 
link with demand-side policies would allow these initiatives to develop their full 
potential. Both learning and skills frameworks also show links to ideological 
considerations in terms of shifting responsibility to the individual and moral obligations 
to society as a citizen through participation in the labour market. These concepts will 
be further discussed in the following section. 
Political influences on welfare provision 
At the beginning of the 20th century Labour Exchanges were established as a 
means of mediating demand and supply between workers and employers along with 
the introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance. The Labour Exchanges 
shared many features of the modern benefit administration, with means testing, 
regular signing requirements and conditionality similar to activation policies today 
(Price, 2000). The development of the post-war welfare state built on Beveridge’s 
vision of a comprehensive ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare system and operated on a 
commitment by both Labour and Conservative parties to the welfare state and 
Keynesian demand management (Evans and Williams, 2009, Glennerster, 2007, Page, 
2007). However, the economic crisis in 1976 brought about a fundamental change due 
to the Labour government trying to contain public spending, the economy becoming a 
main policy concern and Keynesian ideas losing favour (Glennerster, 2007). 
Subsequent years were marked by substantial change with the Conservative party in 
government from 1979-1997, trying to ‘roll back the state’, emphasising individualism 
and neo-liberal marketised solutions to societal problems. They were followed by the 
New Labour government (1997-2007) which concentrated on activation as a means of 
solving wider societal problems within an expanded landscape of quasi-market 
provision. In the following sections, the main policy influences of New Labour on 
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welfare provision, with particular respect to employment and learning and skills policy, 
are discussed. 
Conservative influences on welfare provision 
Welfare provision underwent substantial change after the Conservative 
government took office. The period after the election in 1979 was dominated by rapid 
ideological change from interventionist corporatism to neo-liberalism with reduced 
state influence and a change in economic policy from Keynesian demand management 
to monetarism (Page, 2007). The dominant mechanisms which were used to 
implement this change were privatisation, marketisation and reliance on 
individualisation.  
Marketisation and privatisation 
Public spending was identified by the Thatcher government as having a major 
role in contributing to the economic difficulties at the time, and therefore as social 
security spending took up the largest part of the government budget, it had to be 
curbed (Clasen, 1994). This was ideologically connected to breaking up the 
‘dependency culture’, emphasising neo-liberal principles of self-reliance, the power of 
market-allocation and promoting choice. Markets were seen as a superior mechanism 
in the allocation of scarce public resources (Clarke and Newman, 1997) underpinned 
by the belief that marketised provision delivered higher quality services than large-
scale bureaucracies, at a lower cost due to competition among providers.  
Le Grand and Bartlett (1993a) outlined that a purely market based provision of 
welfare services was never implemented. Instead, a system of government regulated 
quasi-markets developed where private sector companies competed for funding 
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allocated by the government or state agencies. However, these quasi-markets mainly 
operated in health care and education (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993b), while in 
employment services it was mainly the provision of training that was subcontracted 
(Finn, 2005). By 1996, the public Employment Service had all but withdrawn from 
direct provision of training and assumed a role as an administrator of benefits with a 
reputation for promoting new initiatives with short implementation time scales (Finn, 
ibid). Contracts were introduced as methods of governance and subsumed in an 
agenda that followed the ‘rolling back the state’ paradigm, where the responsibility for 
tackling economic and social problems was devolved from the state to the private 
sector and the individual (Evans and Williams, 2009, Drakeford, 2007). 
These developments can be seen as attempts of privatisation on two levels; on 
an individual level and within the wider public sector. For the individual, this meant a 
devolution of responsibility and risk, influenced by the neo-liberal values of individual 
liberty and freedom (Le Grand, 2003). However, from a public sector reform point of 
view there were two main forms of privatisation. Firstly, in a large scale cost-cutting 
exercise to contain public spending and raise funds, former state-owned industries 
such as water, gas and telecommunications were sold off on the stock market (Page, 
2007). The biggest privatisation came in the form of giving council tenants the ‘right to 
buy’ which raised over £28 billion over a 13 year period (Timmins, 1995).  
The second aspect of privatisation was to grant Executive Agency status to 
former government departments and thus effectively decentralise public sector 
management and responsibility (Pollitt et al., 1998). One example was the 
Employment Service, which was granted Executive Agency status in 1990 (Price, 2000). 
This move was founded on the belief that public sector management methods were 
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outdated and inefficient and that the application of business principles to public 
administration would provide further cost efficiencies. The agency was given semi-
autonomous status, meaning it had freedom in operational matters but was to be held 
accountable in relation to its performance to the Secretary of State (ibid). 
By contrast, the Careers Service, which provided careers advice in England and 
Scotland, was hardly affected by privatisation or marketisation until the 1993 Trade 
Union Reform and Employment Rights Act. The Act enforced privatisation of statutory 
services and governance through contracts and targets. It was argued that this led to a 
loss in strategic coherence in guidance services in England due to extensive private 
provision (Mulvey, 2006, Watts, 2006). In Scotland, the impact of the Act was less 
severe. While competition was considered, Local Enterprise Companies and local 
authorities were invited to submit bids. If these bids were considered acceptable, the 
service was not referred to competitive tendering. In the end, none of the services 
were delivered by private providers (Howieson and Semple, 2006).  
Individualisation 
Individualisation had the most far reaching implications for people. 
Conservative values centred very much on the significance of individual liberty and 
freedom. This was linked to the neo-liberal belief that everyone was the maker of their 
own fortune, because of an inherent belief that individuals operated according to self-
interest and profit maximisation (Le Grand, 2003). In this way individuals contributed 
to the public good with further justification for marketised provision. Consequently, 
those reliant on benefits had a less than favourable image (‘benefit scroungers’ or the 
‘underclass’) because they were portrayed as failing to contribute to the greater good 
(Drakeford, 2007). This was most visible in social security through the ‘stricter benefit 
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regime’, which saw the amount of benefits reduced, conditionality and compulsion 
increased, along with the expansion and tightening of sanctions in cases of non-
compliance (Price, 2000).  
These three features were closely linked and there was an expectation that 
they would contribute to more effective and efficient, high quality service delivery. 
Critically though, these measures did not increase labour market participation, nor was 
there a decrease in public spending on social security. Unemployment reached 
unprecedented levels during the 1980s and early 1990s while social security spending 
increased (Glennerster, 2007). 
New Labour’s influences on welfare provision 
In 1997, the Labour government under Tony Blair won the general election. 
Having focused their election campaign on welfare-to-work issues, the Labour 
government maintained some elements of the Conservatives’ public service reform 
such as the use of markets as an efficient means of service provision. At the same time, 
they were looking to solve modern problems such as an ageing society and increasing 
competitive pressure through globalisation by activating the individual; that is by 
basing help and support on a ‘rights and responsibilities’ approach (Davies, 2008). 
These formed part of a web of ideas, named the ‘Third Way’, as a response to these 
challenges by means of social and economic change (Walker and Wiseman, 2003). Out 
of this set of ideas, the most important for this study are the concepts of 
contractualism to reform the delivery landscape of welfare programmes, and the 
changing conception of citizenship as a means to influence individual behaviour. 
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Contractualism and expanded provider landscape 
New Labour maintained the practice of contracting out services. In addition to 
maintaining market structures and the involvement of the private sector in service 
delivery, there was an early commitment to co-operation with the voluntary and 
community sector (Home Office, 1998). This commitment to the expansion of delivery 
channels through inclusion of the voluntary sector was further strengthened in 2001, 
by a call for a “promotion of alternative providers and greater choice” (Blair, 2001) to 
supplement public service delivery, in order to provide better, more cost-efficient 
services with a strong user focus. The view that voluntary and community sector 
organisations (VCOs) could better address societal problems grew out of a belief that 
they were “uniquely placed to reach marginalised groups” (HM Treasury, 2002: 5) and 
to help users to be actively involved in their communities. VCOs thus had a major role 
to play in helping to transform ideas concerning citizenship. However, critics argued 
that the evidence to support these claims was rather limited (Davies, 2008). 
Service delivery was regulated via contracts, and even though the government 
cautioned against overregulation in order not to destroy the VCO sector’s uniqueness 
(Davies, 2008), the focus on managerial features such as performance measurement 
and auditing could be seen as signs of increasing regulation of the sector (Alcock and 
Scott, 2007). Carmel and Harlock (2008) commented that it was exactly this form of 
regulating behaviour that might impact negatively on the value sets of VCOs, because a 
blanket approach to regulating contractual relationships within this wide and diverse 
sector might not produce the intended outcomes (Alcock and Scott, 2002). 
The expansion of contractualisation has been viewed as maintaining a softer 
version of the market-led competition which the Conservatives introduced (Newman, 
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2001)6. However, there was also a view that contractualisation might only be a 
stepping stone to the full scale privatisation of public employment services (Finn, 
2005). International evidence on quasi-markets with pluralist providers produced 
ambiguous results with outcomes differing according to institutional context, service 
type, provider types, or the extent of disadvantage the service user faced (van Berkel 
and van der Aa, 2005, Considine, 2000b,). Furthermore, some of the problems which 
contractualisation was supposed to solve, such as creaming (focussing help on those 
users that were closest to the labour market) and parking (delaying support to those 
with multiple barriers to work), a lack of help for the most disadvantaged as well as a 
lack of innovative approaches, persisted (van Berkel and Borghi, 2008b). 
Rights and Responsibilities: The ‘active worker citizen’ 
The concept of activation was one of the major themes of New Labour’s reform 
project (Clasen and Clegg, 2006, Clarke, 2005). This was developed within a wider 
transformation agenda of turning ‘passive’ welfare recipients into ‘active’ citizens 
through participation in the labour market. These ‘active worker citizens’ were viewed 
as governable subjects, reflexive and self-managed, subject to coercive measures to 
ensure collaboration (where necessary) and enacted through the social contract 
formulations of rights and responsibilities (Newman, 2007).  
Contractualism with the individual, as the epitome of rights and responsibilities, 
was enacted in part through the Jobseekers Agreement7 within welfare-to-work 
                                               
6 A further expansion of contractualisation was recommended in the Freud report, which was published after the 
completion of fieldwork. The report recommended a prime contractor model which would provide individualised 
services to those hardest to help (Freud, 2007).It will be discussed in more detail in chapter 10.  
7  Jobseekers Agreements were introduced in 1996 under the Conservative government but were maintained as an 
important tool to monitor jobseekers’ behaviour (McKay et. al., 1999). 
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policies. However, due to the compulsion these contracts contained, the power basis 
shifted to the adviser at Jobcentre Plus, thus giving a public agency the means to 
control the behaviour of individuals (Freedland and King, 2005). This established the 
contract with the individual as a loosely concealed control and steering instrument to 
certify the rights to benefits in exchange for the responsibility of actively seeking work 
(Mosley and Sol, 2005). Critically, a contract with the individual conferred rights to a 
targeted personalised service and choice of service provider (Sol and Westerveld, 
2005b).  
This conditionality and the imbalance between rights and responsibilities (with 
a much greater emphasis on responsibilities than rights) is what led Dwyer to assert 
that  
“membership of the citizenship club and the welfare rights that it entails 
will only be available for those (able-bodied) individuals who agree to 
contribute positively and in an approved manner to the community that 
they inhabit” (Dwyer, 2000: 89).  
This excluded some individuals from welfare receipt and withdrew their right to 
welfare. Moreover, Newman (2007) contended that coercive activation strategies 
might constrain some individuals from achieving full citizenship status as part of the 
work force due to the dangers involved in entering a deregulated, flexible labour 
market. These considerations make the rights and responsibilities based approach to 
citizenship highly contentious, particularly with a view towards the potential of these 
activation policies to produce the intended outcome. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has located welfare-to-work and learning and skills policies in their 
political and historical context. Within the context of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’, a 
complex set of policies aimed at reforming the social and economic environment in the 
UK, both policy frameworks, the welfare-to-work and the learning and skills framework 
respectively, have pursued an economic rationale to develop an active work-focused 
society into a globally competitive work force. Contractualism, with providers and 
individuals respectively, is a prominent feature and takes on the role of a steering and 
control instrument. The expansion of the provider structures to the voluntary and 
community sector in particular has raised questions with regards to the suitability of 
this approach, particularly the impact it might have on VCOs. Contractualism with the 
individual is the epitome of the rights and responsibilities agenda, where New Labour 
has sought to create the ‘worker citizen’ who would contribute to the greater good 
through paid work in exchange for the right to benefits. These developments provide 
the framework within which this study is located, particularly as it sets out the 
environment within which advisers operate.  
 
 32 
Chapter 3 
Governance in service delivery 
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Introduction 
The conceptual framework for this study is rooted in the concept of 
governance. The aim is to investigate the ways in which different governance regimes 
emerge through the management and practice of advisers at street level (Lipsky, 
1980). Governance, as a pattern of rule or the activity of ruling has a long lineage 
(Bevir, 2009). However, more recent academic interest can be located in the public 
sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, which were influenced by globalisation, wider 
socio-economic changes and the agendas of supra-national organisations. Governance 
has thus become “a strategy to link the contemporary state to the contemporary 
society” (Pierre, 2000: 52). The governance literature has explored, mapped and 
critiqued changes in the boundaries of state authority (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003).  
A starting point could be seen in the public management reforms during the 
Thatcher era, where the governance literature engaged with public management 
reforms such as devolution (‘steering rather than rowing’), decentralisation and the 
proliferation of (quasi) markets and competition (see for instance Pollitt, 2000, Pollitt 
et al., 1998, Rhodes, 1997, Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993b, Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 
Hood, 1991). In 1998, Stoker (1998) re-conceptualised governance as an organising 
principle or framework which allowed the analysis of how sets of actors with different 
power relations worked together on social issues, with the government taking the role 
of steering and guiding delivery agents using new tools and techniques, focussing on 
the rise of partnership working (Greve and Hodge, 2010, Pestoff and Brandsen, 2010, 
Clarke and Glendinning, 2002, Glendinning et al., 2002), contractualisation (Davies, 
2008, Finn, 2005, Cutler and Waine, 2000), incentive management and a renewal of 
civil society (Clarke, 2005, Newman, 2001).  
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These developments were related to concurrent shifts in political thought 
towards the ‘renewal of social democracy’ (Giddens, 2000, 1998) which was core to 
New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ approach to the organisation of public services and reform 
of the civil service (Horton and Jones, 1996). This new trend included a much wider 
range of actors into considerations of how their relationships are directed and steered. 
Thus governance refers to  
“the ‘steering’ of the subjects’ behavioural practices towards particular 
social and politico-economic goals via a set of institutions and processes 
that aim to maintain or change the status quo” (Carmel and 
Papadopoulos, 2003: 32) 
The changing political and societal context has made governance a central part 
of government reform mechanisms that have as their goal to cope with these changes 
(van Berkel and Borghi, 2008a). Within the context of social policy, two broad 
distinctions of the concept of governance could be made, which Carmel and 
Papadopoulos (2003: 32) referred to as ‘governance in the formal policy domain’ and 
‘governance in the operational policy domain’. First, ‘governance in the formal policy 
domain’ was concerned with government strategies (at different levels) to deal with 
social and societal problems. In this context, the concept of activation could be 
considered as a governance mechanism (Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007).  
Within the UK context and internationally, activation as a transformative 
governance mechanism in its diverse guises has received considerable attention 
(Serrano Pascual and Crespo Suárez, 2007, van Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007, Lødemel 
and Trickey, 2001). ‘Governance in the operational policy domain’ referred to the 
‘how’ of policy making and took into consideration the relationships between different 
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actors in the provision of services and their delivery (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003). 
Academically, this substantive area covered a variety of aspects including the 
internationalisation of policy making (see for instance Büchs, 2007, Carmel et al., 
2007), devolvement of decision making power to lower levels (Bonvin and Moachon, 
2007, Stoker, 2004), the promotion of partnership working (Wiggan, 2007, Glendinning 
et al., 2002), processes of marketisation (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008, Bruttel, 2005, 
van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005, Considine, 2000a, Clarke and Newman, 1997), as well 
as the contractually influenced relationships between state agencies, providers, front-
line workers and service users (Brodkin, 2007, Wright, 2006, Freedland and King, 
2005,). The academic interest in governance has kept pace with developments in the 
real world, and therefore this area of investigation remains a current research concern 
because of the rapidly changing policy environment. 
This study is firmly located in the ‘operational policy’ domain of governance and 
more specifically it investigates the relationships between service providers, front-line 
workers and service users. However, the operational and formal policy domains were 
closely connected and should not be separated (van Berkel and Borghi, 2008b) 
because of how front-line advisers deliver services and how relationships with service 
users were developed. This was closely influenced by overall political goals and 
conceptions of how a particular problem could be solved. These macro-level 
government conceptions have been outlined in the previous chapter.  
This chapter discusses the various forms of governance present in the UK 
service delivery context with particular reference to employment advice services, and 
outlines why the managerial model of governance was the most prevalent. This is 
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followed by a discussion of some elements of managerial governance, focussing in 
particular on performance measurement, targets and incentives.  
Governance models in UK service delivery 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, there had been a progressive shift to 
more market based service delivery since the 1980s. When New Labour took office in 
1997, the delivery structures were widened to further encourage private and, 
increasingly voluntary and community sector organisations (VCOs) to participate in 
service provision in an effort to capitalise on their special capacities to reach particular 
target groups (DWP, 2007a). The expanded set of provider organisations required a 
rethink of the governance of delivery systems away from monolithic structures and the 
rule of bureaucracy (Blair, 2001) towards, at least theoretically, partnership based 
models.  
The analysis of different governance approaches to service delivery has 
received international attention. Considine (2001) compared different approaches 
cross-nationally and developed four distinct types of governance based on the source 
of rationality, form of control, primary virtue and service delivery focus. Table 1 (see p. 
37) summarises the four types and their relevant orientations. 
Whilst this provided a valuable insight on the developments internationally, 
Newman’s (Newman, 2007) later study of governance in the UK context was much 
more current and specifically focused on the UK. According to her study, there were 
four types of governance that co-existed in the UK service delivery context: 
hierarchical, managerial, network and self governance. While these four types  
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Table 1: Considine’s four types of governance 
 Source of 
rationality 
Form of control Primary virtue Service delivery 
focus 
Procedural 
governance 
Law Rules Reliability Universal 
treatment 
Corporate 
governance 
Management Plans Goal-driven Targets 
Market 
governance 
Competition Contracts Cost-driven Prices 
Network 
governance 
Relationships Co-production Flexibility Brokerage 
 
co-existed, there had also been a historical trajectory from the traditional 
hierarchies to the modern forms of networks. This will be outlined further in a brief 
discussion of the four types. 
The hierarchical model of governance is best represented in traditional 
bureaucracy. Weber’s (Weber et al., 1991) ideal type view of bureaucracy was 
presented as an impersonal, top-down hierarchy based on rules and regulations, which 
allowed equity to prevail over individualism and thus produced efficient outcomes. 
This has been the preferred form of organising government agencies for decades 
(Wiggan, 2009). Interestingly, Weber (Weber et al., 1991) also addressed the use of 
coercion and discretion. Coercion was supposed to be strictly limited and the 
conditions of its use closely defined. This is an interesting notion, because it appears to 
allow the state to subject its citizens to coercive measures in order to achieve certain 
outcomes, which is not inconsistent with New Labour’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach. 
Discretion, in Weber’s view, was to be subordinate to the authority’s goals, and 
 38 
officials’ actions were supposed to be strictly rule bound. These points will be 
addressed in more detail in the following chapter. 
Traditionally, hierarchical forms of governance in employment services 
provision were common (Price, 2000). For instance, the Benefits Agency (although this 
was not an employment service) and the Employment Service were bureaucracies 
which were governed top-down, were centrally organised and rule bound. Service 
users would all receive exactly the same kind of service according to the equity 
principle that dominated the public service ethos. However, in the 1970s and ‘80s the 
effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery using bureaucracies was called into 
question in the face of declining tax revenues.  
The prospect that private sector management methods would improve the 
efficiency of bureaucracies, made it necessary to give administrators ‘the right to 
manage’ and make them responsible for the achievement of results (Hughes, 1994). 
The main tools for bringing this shift about could be found in New Public Management. 
This included the introduction of performance targets, service quality measures, 
customer focus and performance related pay for front-line staff. Additionally, it 
involved the contracting of public service delivery through a market based, 
competitive process involving the private sector and the outright privatisation of public 
services (Watts, 2005). A wide-ranging debate, however, existed about whether New 
Public Management was indeed ‘new’ or whether it consisted of old concepts 
disguised in new terminology, a groundbreaking revolution or merely incremental 
changes to existing practices (see for instance Pollitt, 2000, Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, 
Hood, 1991). 
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Although this debate was never resolved, New Public Management practices 
found their way into public service delivery. A market system was seen as the solution 
to the ever increasing pressure on public spending. There was a view that supply and 
demand would regulate service delivery with only the most efficient and effective 
organisations surviving in a competitive market place (Langan, 2000). This meant that 
public service organisations were to compete for contracts with private for-profit and 
not-for-profit organisations.  
Although a pure market system in the provision of welfare services was never 
implemented, a structure of quasi-markets was created which involved competition in 
a regulated and controlled environment, although this was mostly restricted to the 
education, health, and care sectors (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993b). After the New 
Labour government took office in 1997, for a short period contracting out became the 
most common type of quasi-market allocation of employment services in the UK, and 
indeed the UK used this mechanism more extensively than any other OECD country 
(Watts, 2005). However, after intensive forays into marketisation at the start of the 
New Labour government, service provision via quasi-markets developed incrementally, 
while other countries such as Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands pushed ahead 
(see for instance van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005, Bruttel, 2004, Considine, 2000a). 
When the fieldwork for this study was conducted, there was a substantial mix of 
delivery options, with public sector organisations acting as the main gateway to 
welfare to work programmes, and the private for-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations delivering specialised support to specific groups in the population (DWP, 
2007a). 
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Despite this, the benefits of provider competition in employment service 
provision - such as better quality services and efficiency savings are highly debatable. 
International evidence has suggested that the focus on efficiency and effectiveness in 
quasi-markets was more a rhetorical construct than one based on factual evidence 
(van Berkel, 2010, Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008). Elsewhere, Brodkin (2005) contended 
that within the US context, there was little evidence that contracting out produced the 
intended benefits to the government. Most importantly, Davies (2008) argued that, 
given the same conditions, public employment services were just as effective as, or 
even more effective than, their private and VCO sector competitors.  
New Public Management was as much a political statement as it was a shift in 
organisational principles (Gray and Jenkins, 1995). The world over, right-wing, neo-
liberally orientated governments trusted in the more efficient mechanisms of (quasi-) 
marketised provisions, privatisation and a shift to customer focused services (Hood, 
1991). The available literature centred very much on the, “promotional (‘look at what 
we are doing’) or how-to-do-it (‘a guide to…’)” (Pollitt, 2000: 182) sides of public 
management reform and focused on either cross-national comparisons of policy 
change or individual case studies (Vigoda-Gadot and Meiri, 2008). With particular 
regard to employment services, Pollitt (2000) pointed out that broader evaluations of 
the impact of the new regime in welfare provision during the 1980s and ‘90s were 
rare, were focused on particular policies and were carried out in-house by government 
agencies, thus raising questions about their objectivity and rigorousness. Critically 
though, the perspectives and experiences of individuals implementing the reforms 
have been given little attention. 
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The involvement of the private sector in service delivery is nowadays 
complemented by an increased contracting of voluntary and community sector 
organisations to capitalise on their unique skills and expertise (DWP, 2007a). This 
widening of the delivery network has prompted an emphasis on new forms of 
governance beyond the plain market focus which managerial and hierarchical forms 
proposed, towards partnership-based networks. Partnerships were central to the New 
Labour ‘Third Way’ model emphasising collaboration and trust between the partners 
and weaker centralised control through government (Rummery, 2002). This new way 
of governance was intended to address the limitations of the mixed economy of 
welfare (Johnson, 1998) to remedy complex social, economic and political problems 
(Jessop, 2000).  
Partnerships were promoted vertically (between government and service 
providers) and horizontally (between individual service providers on the local level) 
and usually involved some sort of contractual arrangement including performance 
targets and controls to determine how well the partnership was performing. In 
principle, the idea appears attractive; a mix of providers delivering a service using their 
particular expertise in a coordinated fashion to improve service quality and deliver 
better services with their own responsibility on how best to achieve this. However, 
there are questions to be raised about power relationships because contracting out 
has brought with it a wave of further sub-contracting. This often includes a mix of 
organisations then subjected to managerial regulations by the prime contractor.  
The implications for the relationships between contracting organisations has 
gained growing academic interest. Carmel and Harlock (2008) found that the 
combination of providers triggered a normalisation process that stripped voluntary 
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service organisation of their value sets in an attempt to turn them into market-
orientated service providers. This was due to the combination of performance 
measurement inherent in the contractual arrangement and the overpowering 
influence for-profit organisations had in the partnership. They further outlined, that 
this process effectively devalued voluntary and community sector organisations (VCOs) 
and diluted the uniqueness of their approach in dealing with their target groups in an 
effort to comply with the contractual requirements. Jackson (2010) has found that 
there was a substantial lack of understanding by public sector agencies as well as VCOs 
regarding each others’ ethos, shape and decision making processes. This raised further 
issues which require theoretical exploration with regards to the organisational impact 
on VCOs’ involvement in contracted service delivery and the governance of funder 
relations within these relationships. This particular aspect, however, was beyond the 
scope of this project.  
Interestingly, the effective devolution of power to partnerships has not taken 
place. Rather there has been a power shift back to central government, towards 
centralised command and control structures based on distrust founded in a fear of 
potential underachievement by the partnership organisations (Newman, 2001). 
Instead of the involved partners creating devolved management structures, these 
networks were managed, steered and controlled externally through central agencies 
(Jessop, 2000). Rummery highlighted that a true form of partnership working did not 
exist in the UK context of welfare service delivery, but that they were  
“a mixture of quasi-market style incentives with bureaucratic, statist 
controls.”(Rummery, 2002: 243) 
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Self-governance would provide a highly autonomous way of service delivery 
based on strong organisational or professional values and ownership of the delivery 
process by the individual adviser (Newman, 2007). It would also involve the individual 
service users in the service delivery because services could be highly tailored to suit 
individual needs. However, the current context of centralised award and control 
structures in the contracting of employment services has reduced this governance 
model to mere rhetoric (Wiggan, 2009). 
Considering that partnerships and network governance have never been fully 
realised or have been restricted to short-lived pilot programmes, the delivery of 
employment advice services was still very much dominated by the tenets of 
managerial governance within the framework of quasi-market provision involving a 
wider mix of providers (Wiggan, 2009). Performance targets, quality measures, 
customer focus and performance-related pay have formed the core of a managerial 
toolbox giving central powers the means to control and steer the providers and thus 
substantially influence service delivery. These are firmly integrated in the delivery 
contracts and since front-line advisers’ work is directly affected by them, performance 
measurement and reward systems deserve a more detailed analysis. 
Performance measurement 
While contracts allow the seemingly efficient allocation of tax money, it is 
important for the contracting agency to control whether contract requirements have 
been fulfilled. It was also essential to establish whether the contractor was indeed 
effective in its delivery (Martin, 1997). Thus the mechanisms of performance 
measurement were a means of legitimising delivery organisations just as they were 
legitimising government policies (Clarke and Newman, 1997). 
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The notions of performance measurement and performance management are 
often used interchangeably. Lebas (1995) for example, offered a separate definition for 
each with performance measurement consisting of key indicators that provide 
contextual and case specific information and performance management including 
activities that influence these contextual factors such as training, management style, 
attitudes and incentives. He also indicated that the two could not be separated 
because performance management created the context for performance 
measurement but was influenced by the outcomes of the measurement process. 
Within managerial governance, performance measurement and incentives form part of 
the same toolbox. Because of this close linkage, the term performance measurement 
will be used throughout this thesis. 
The contractual provision of services has created a principal-agent relationship 
between funder and service provider. However, this relationship brought with it its 
own problems such as high transaction cost, regulation, performance evaluation and 
incentive mechanisms which might stifle innovation, leading to creaming and parking 
of customers, or cause a decline in service quality (van Berkel and Borghi, 2008b). Two 
of these problems, performance evaluation and incentive mechanisms, will be 
considered more closely due to their direct impact on front-line advisers.  
Performance evaluation fulfilled a number of functions; it provides 
transparency about costs, highlights areas for improvement, and provides a basis for 
appraisal and evidence for incentives or sanctions which enables comparison or 
benchmarking between organisations and individuals (de Bruijn, 2002). In their 
influential work on public sector reform, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) emphasised the 
necessity for performance measurement within marketised provision, suggesting 
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“What gets measured gets done” (p.146). The central idea was the careful 
measurement of inputs against outputs and the comparison against targets and 
benchmarks to determine success and failure of an initiative and to maximise profit 
(Heinrich and Marschke, 2010).  
During the 1980s and early ‘90s, performance measurement in the UK public 
sector was mainly output focused which caused more substantial problems. The focus 
on target achievement, and the often concurrent promises of performance rewards, 
encouraged perverse tactics such as parking of difficult to help service users or 
creaming of easily to place users (Burgess and Ratto, 2003). As a response, the 
government under Tony Blair brought increased attention to performance 
measurement and the quasi-market provision of services came to operate within the 
‘performance-evaluation nexus’, a collection of governance institutions, continuous 
cycles of target setting, evaluation, auditing and policy adjustment (Clarke, 2004). 
One of the key difficulties with performance measurement is defining what 
exactly gets measured. New Labour’s continued focus on performance measurement 
required targets to be SMART that is specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and 
time-tabled in order to give a clear measure of inputs, outputs and outcomes (Audit 
Commission, 1999). There was a rhetorical shift towards outcome based measures and 
a move towards more public accountability and a regulatory function of government 
(Newman, 2001). Interestingly, there remained a strong focus on measuring the Three 
Es, economy, efficiency and effectiveness which had been a focus of performance 
under the Conservatives, with a newly added emphasis on delivering value for money 
(Audit Commission, 1999). Underlying these programmatic shifts was a belief that 
performance measurement could deliver strong improvements in service quality and 
 46 
efficiency. It was seen as the key to delivering value for money (Cutler and Waine, 
2000). 
However, measuring effectiveness and programme outcomes is problematic. 
Outcomes are difficult to define as a SMART target because they may be quite abstract 
(such as intended changes in attitude, or increases in confidence). Consequently, they 
are difficult to measure and could be neglected in favour of easier to measure outputs 
(Holloway, 1999). Flynn (2007) drew attention to the fact that in order to get reliable 
information about outcomes, performance measures and targets needed to remain 
stable over a longer period of time since the effects of some services might not 
become apparent immediately (Holloway, 1999). Whether this stability to provide 
reliable outcome information existed, particularly in the realm of welfare-to-work 
provision, is highly questionable in a world of rapidly changing policies. 
The usefulness of performance measurement in the public sector and 
contracted services was not uncontested because an emphasis on performance 
measurement did not solve governance problems (Propper and Wilson, 2003). There 
was little indication that these measures were relevant to producing the desired 
outcomes or produced the desired efficiencies (Greiling, 2006). On the contrary, 
performance measurement, particularly in the public sector, had been found to 
commodify services further and to deprofessionalise front-line workers (Adcroft and 
Willis, 2005). This was due to the commercialisation of service provision and a shift 
from value-driven professional activities to complying with rules, regulations and 
target fulfilment. In a similar vein, Radnor and McGuire (2004) produced evidence that 
performance measurement mainly served as a diagnostic function rather than to help 
improve service delivery. There was growing evidence that despite a reorientation 
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towards outcomes, perverse tactics such as creaming and parking of service users to 
maximise profit was a common problem at a national and international level (Bruttel, 
2004, Considine, 2003).  
From an adviser perspective, an emphasis on measurable, hard targets had 
limitations because the tasks performed by advisers were highly complex and often 
involved discretionary decisions (Kouzmin et al., 1999). Due to the nature of the 
contracts, the need to control service providers, the complexity of adviser’s work and a 
need to produce the necessary evidence for the various stakeholders, the government 
was measuring more and more with ever increasing levels of sophistication to ensure 
that services were delivering the intended outcomes (Propper and Wilson, 2003, 
Martin, 1997) While this seemed logical, since only measured things get accomplished 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), it might in practice lead to unintended consequences 
such as a focus by advisers on the measured task only. Flynn (2007) argued that due to 
information overload, advisers might base their decisions on limited amounts of 
information. Alternatively, their decision-making might be influenced by strong policy 
messages. Thus their decisions might be targeted towards policies which had received 
particular emphasis whilst neglecting others, potentially producing unintended 
outcomes (Flynn, 2007). The combination of these factors has made more difficult the 
development of appropriate, relevant performance measures which go beyond mere 
output measurement.  
Apart from the quantitatively orientated methods to assess performance, there 
are also those with a more qualitative focus. Reflective practice is one example which 
is prevalent in professions where the integration of theory and practice is essential, for 
example, nursing, teaching, counselling and, crucially, careers guidance (Fowler, 2003). 
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Reflective practice is an assessment method for practitioners which aims to help them 
to “evaluate their interventions, question their assumptions, recognise their biases and 
prejudices” (Irving and Williams, 1995: 107) either with the help of a supervisor or in 
self-assessment. From a managerial perspective this approach does not so much help 
to achieve numerical targets, but rather supports much more the delivery of a high 
quality service by evaluating continuously the validity of the professional’s actions with 
regards to the service user needs. Thus it prevented a purely task-orientated approach 
(Douglas, 1999). From a managerial perspective, this form of performance evaluation 
delivers on the premises of high quality service and customer focus. In addition, 
reflective practice is used to evaluate the actions of the professionals and the 
outcomes of their actions and therefore provide a more detailed insight into the 
effects of interventions. 
There are multiple ways to measure performance. The most common is via 
targets. Although not uncontroversial, performance measurement has been accepted 
as a common feature in the contracting landscape. Performance measurement and in 
particular the fulfilment of targets are often directly linked to rewards for contractors.  
Incentives  
Performance measurement has often formed the basis for incentives. These 
have been a common feature in private sector companies to reward target 
achievement. However, their introduction to the public and VCO sector has been a 
more recent development (Burgess and Ratto, 2003) which was expanded along with 
the shift to quasi-market service provision in the UK. Contracts produced a principal-
agent relationship, with the government taking the role of the principal (purchaser) 
and the pluralistic mix of delivery organisations taking the role of the agent (provider) 
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(Johnson, 1998, Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993a). As agents, providers implemented 
policy on behalf of the government (Dixit, 2002). Monetary incentives are often used 
to motivate and steer the actions of the contractor on the macro-level, and similarly 
for the contractor to steer the actions of the front-line workers on the micro-level, 
towards the intended policy outcomes. This is based on the underlying assumption 
that organisations and individuals must at least have a partial interest in financial profit 
(Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). 
However, the usefulness of incentives has been questioned in connection with 
the perverse effects such as creaming and parking for profit maximisation as previously 
mentioned (van Berkel and Borghi, 2008b). They are also called into question with 
regards to the motivation of organisations and front-line workers. How advisers 
mediate the sometimes competing demands of the multiple stakeholders may depend 
on their motivation and ultimately impact on the intended policy outcomes.  
There are a number of approaches to motivation and how it can be 
conceptualised. The most prominent from a psychological perspective is probably the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated 
behaviour is based on self-determination and internally located satisfaction through, 
for instance, mastery of a skill, personal satisfaction or, in the case of employment 
advisers or public service employees, the provision of a good service. Extrinsically 
motivated behaviour is based on achieving an external reward such as money or 
compliance with external constraints (Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Deci and Ryan, 1985). 
Le Grand (2003), who approached motivation from a public policy perspective, saw this 
dichotomy as insufficient since intrinsic and extrinsic motivation might be 
interdependent. In his view, intrinsically motivated behaviour might be motivated by 
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extrinsic rewards and vice versa. He, instead, distinguished between what he calls 
‘knights’ and ‘knaves’. He defined  
- Knights as “individuals who are motivated to help others for no private 
reward, and indeed who may undertake such activities to the detriment 
of their own private interests” (ibid: 27) and 
- Knaves as “self-interested individuals who are motivated to help others 
only if by so doing they will serve their private interests” (ibid: 27) 
Le Grand’s (2003) view disentangles the interdependence of the two 
motivators. However, it neglects the coercive impetus that extrinsic motivators such as 
organisational or program constraints might carry. An employment adviser might well 
be a ‘knight’ at heart, but may be forced by external constraints to comply with the 
expected or explicitly rewarded behaviour. Therefore, the concepts of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation are preferred for this study. 
The design of appropriate reward systems has been of some concern to 
researchers. There are several applications of performance related pay ranging from 
individualised payments, to bonuses for target achievement being spread equally 
among the team, to performance related pay not being used at all (Marsden, 2003). 
Besley and Ghatak (2005), for example, have shown that for ‘motivated agents’, that is 
individuals who are intrinsically motivated to perform a task, monetary incentives 
might not be necessary. Therefore, a reward system that is solely based on extrinsic, 
monetary rewards of an individual might not be conducive to improved performance.  
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Whilst the motivating effects of a future reward are indisputable, individual 
rewards may also function as a sanction if the performance level is not achieved, thus 
exerting much more coercive pressure on the individual (de Bruijn, 2002, Kohn, 1993). 
This in turn might lead to undesirable behaviour such as gaming, i.e. the manipulation 
of performance data by the agent. Such behaviour might be particularly prevalent 
where there was a minimum performance threshold with a bonus for exceeding the 
threshold (Dixit, 2002). While such an incentive scheme might be preferred by 
politicians because the risk of policy failure could not easily be spread, it is open to 
manipulation by the agent. Instead, team-based rewards or reinvestment in work 
environment improvements may be much more effective rewards in services which 
required complex task performances as was the case with employment advisers 
(Burgess and Ratto, 2003). 
The task complexity of advisers’ work brings with it another difficulty. Dixit 
(1997) argued that if a task outcome could be accurately observed it could carry a 
higher powered incentive, i.e. a more intrinsic reward, “because the outcome is a 
better indicator of the effort one wants to motivate” (p. 379). However, with complex 
tasks it can be difficult to define and observe the specific tasks. Therefore, in order to 
prevent focus on an easily observable task, organisations have had to resort to weaker 
financial incentives and install extensive, costly monitoring systems. This links back to 
the difficulties of designing appropriate outcome measures and the resort to more 
easily measurable outputs by principals. Burgess and Ratto (2003) concluded that 
poorly designed measures left little choice but to resort to weaker monetary 
incentives. Performance measurement and incentives are closely linked concepts and, 
as the previous discussion suggests, their design needs to be task specific to avoid 
unintended policy outcomes.  
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Conclusion 
The chapter locates the study conceptually in the governance literature, which 
has provided a broader conceptual framework than the traditional street-level theory 
approach used to analyse the different governance dynamics in the provider 
organisations. The chapter has reviewed literature on governance and governance 
types and specifically examined those types that were developed by Newman (2001) in 
the UK context. It has provided a short analysis of the existence of these types in 
service delivery and showed that the managerial governance perspective is the most 
relevant and applicable in the provision of employment advice and guidance services. 
Performance management and rewards are key parts of the enactment of managerial 
governance. Their implementation has had its difficulties due to inaccurate definitions 
of targets, difficulties in measuring and the potential for perverse behaviour to exploit 
performance rewards. Performance management is about steering and controlling 
service delivery, but it has also influenced advisers in their interactions with service 
users, for instance to limit the use of discretion (Brodkin, 2005, Baldwin, 1997). These 
‘softer’ governance factors, such as the use of discretion, are explored in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Governing individuals: 
discretion, trust and changing people 
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Introduction 
So far, the ‘hard’ factors of managerial governance, performance measurement 
and rewards, have been considered. This chapter considers monitoring and steering 
mechanisms in relation to their impact on the interactions between advisers and 
service users. Advisers have been established as a focal point for informing and 
influencing user’s behaviour (Jewell and Glaser, 2006) and politically, are portrayed as 
mediators of inequality in their role in allocating life chances (Watts, 1996). Transitions 
into employment have been established as key sites of state intervention and advisers 
are charged with mediating this process of confronting citizens with the rules of 
engagement. However, the ways in which advisers govern their relationships with 
service users and promote behavioural changes has received little attention so far. The 
following chapter will explore the ‘softer’ factors governing adviser interactions. The 
concepts of discretion and trust are discussed as a means to building a relationship 
with the service users. A discussion on how the ultimate policy goal of changing service 
user’s behaviour into a more active one rounds off the chapter. 
Discretion and street-level behaviour 
The use of discretion in service delivery has received considerable attention in 
academic literature. Proponents of discretion have argued for instance that giving 
front-line workers sufficient discretion to make individual decisions to achieve a clearly 
defined goal contributed to a high quality service (Gaster, 1999). Opponents have 
referred to problems with policy implementation which required stringent task 
definitions and controls to ensure intended policy outcomes and limited discretion to 
prevent arbitrary decision-making (see for instance Brodkin, 2005, Baldwin, 1997, 
Young, 1981, Titmuss, 1971).  
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For the purpose of this project, a person has discretion “whenever the effective 
limits of his power leave him [sic] free to make a choice among possible courses of 
action or inaction.” (Davis 1974 cited in Adler and Asquith, 1981: 9). This definition 
highlighted two key aspects, which would be of concern throughout this study. Firstly, 
persons exercising discretion are limited in their actions by a regulatory framework set 
up by the organisation they worked for or by some other external power (in the 
context of this study the contractual obligations and organisational requirements). 
Secondly, the worker has a choice between possible actions. In some respects, these 
two aspects are contradictory, because on the one hand there are rules and 
regulations in place to direct and limit the individuals’ actions whilst on the other they 
have some decision-making freedom to use the discretion afforded to them, but also 
in deciding whether or not to follow the rules and regulations imposed on them.  
This contradiction is at the heart of the pressures which advisers have to 
mediate. While it is generally acknowledged that some degree of control is necessary 
to prevent arbitrariness, Hasenfeld (1992) argued that reducing any highly complex 
task such as advisory work to a merely programmatic and procedural format would 
eliminate the human dimension and any opportunity to provide a personalised service 
would be forgone by “treating people as innate objects without regard to their 
humanness” (Hasenfeld, 1992: 4). The flexibility to react to individual needs was found 
to be important for successful policy implementation, especially where the aim was to 
bring about attitudinal and behavioural changes (Keiser et al., 2004, Maynard-Moody 
et al., 1990, Hill, 1969). With the introduction of managerial methods in service 
provision, mechanisms to control discretionary behaviour are firmly in place. Ironically, 
the introduction of these methods may be the cause of a wider spread of street-level 
behaviour where front-line workers develop coping mechanisms in order to comply 
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with the rigidly set frameworks and targets (Lipsky, 1980). Nevertheless, the purpose 
of this project is not to determine whether discretion should be restricted or not. In 
the context of welfare policies, the application of discretion is unavoidable. Rather as 
Adler and Asquith (1981) pointed out, it is necessary to examine discretion “on the 
face-to-face-level” (ibid, p. 10) to understand how managerial methods impact on the 
work of street-level staff.  
The focus on the face-to-face level of discretion has waned somewhat since 
Lipsky’s (1980) groundbreaking study. Cutler and Waine (1997) attributed this to the 
shift towards quasi-market provision and managerial methods of control during the 
1980s and 1990s in the UK, with a corresponding shift of research endeavours towards 
top-down evaluation approaches. More recently, however, there has been a revival in 
the US of street-level studies from a bottom-up perspective in the realm of welfare 
services delivery. For instance, Brodkin (2007, 2001, 2000, 1997) focused particularly 
on adviser’s uses of discretion within changing organisational contexts. While Lipsky 
focused specifically on bureaucracies, it is important that Brodkin (ibid) found that 
strategies among front-line workers in quasi-market environments did not diverge 
substantially from those in bureaucracies and that the old delivery problems persisted 
within new provision contexts. This supported the viability of Lipsky’s theory even 
within changed contexts. In a similar context, Moore (1990) examined different 
decision-making propensities based on adviser’s behaviour preferences. Scott (1997) 
took an experimental approach and determined that the level of organisational 
control, that is the extent of performance measurement, as well as service user 
characteristics, were significant factors influencing adviser decisions. These are key 
insights, since they highlight the importance of responsiveness to user needs and that 
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advisers consider this when making decisions. It also shines the spotlight again on 
managerial control versus user needs nexus which advisers mediate.  
Whilst there is a plethora of approaches and theoretical developments 
elsewhere in the world, UK researchers have seemed reluctant to apply bottom-up 
perspectives to policy implementation. Studies of street-level behaviour in welfare 
services are rare and spread over a variety of academic fields, covering for instance 
social work and employment services. Most closely related to this study, was Wright’s 
(2001) study of street-level advisers in Jobcentres in the UK. This compared official 
policy with its implementation by personal advisers. The observations focused on 
routine tasks, the introduction of a new policy, and adviser responses to performance 
measurement. Wright (2001) concluded that by applying street-level practices, 
advisers changed policies substantially by making them less active than intended by 
policy makers. Ellis et al. (1999) studied the uses of discretion by care worker teams 
when carrying out needs assessments, with particular regard to suitable 
methodologies to study this kind of behaviour. They concluded that street-level 
activities could not be fully assessed by the omnipresent top-down evaluations, but 
rather needed a bottom-up methodology. On the national level in particular, there 
appears to be a considerable gap in this kind of literature, regardless of whether it 
addresses the uses of discretion in face-to-face interactions from a methodological, 
implementation perspective or governance perspective as applied in this study. 
Trust and trustworthiness 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) showed that merely having the right 
governance structures in place on the macro and micro level did not necessarily lead to 
the desired procedural outcomes. Nevertheless they found that high levels of trust, 
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established through continuous interaction, impacted positively on the dynamic link 
between governance structures and processes. The advisers operated within 
managerial governance structures and implemented processes which produced an 
outcome for service users. The higher the trust relationship between the parties 
involved, the higher the likelihood of joint action between them (ibid). This means that 
a relationship based on trust allows the balancing of governance structures with 
processes to achieve positive outcomes. Conversely, if governance structures or 
processes gain predominance the other components may be adversely affected. The 
adviser is at the centre of this balancing act, being influenced on the one hand by 
managerial governance structures and on the other hand by the interaction process 
with the user.  
This is particularly important in quasi-market environments, where as a result 
of managerial governance the inherent uncertainty and risk are managed through 
standardised frameworks, rules, regulations and measurement (Brown and Calnan, 
2010). Trust may be considered the most cost effective means to control a contractual 
relationship. However, these relationships are often governed by an underlying 
distrust and a fear that one party might abuse its power (Gilson, 2006, Kramer, 1999); 
in this way parties may place themselves in vulnerable positions by trusting the other.  
In order for one person to be trusted, they first have to appear trustworthy to 
the other. As Coulson (1998) highlighted, trusting someone was a voluntary, willing 
and therefore, conscious action. Trustworthiness can be created through different 
mechanisms such as reputation, third party endorsements and the individual’s 
personal preferences (Coulson, 1998). In the case of front-line staff, this may be 
represented by continued interactions over a long period of time (reputation), 
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professional standards or professional degrees (third party endorsement), and the 
behaviour exhibited by the staff or service provider towards the user (personal 
preferences)8. These personal preferences could take three forms (Ben-Ner and 
Putterman, 2001): 
- self-regarding preferences which focused on establishing a reputation, 
- other-regarding preferences which focused on the concern for the well-
being of the other person, and 
- process-regarding preferences, which focused on the adherence to 
rules, norms and principles. 
Braynov and Sandholm (2002) showed that if in contractual relationships one 
party’s trustworthiness equalled the other party’s trust social welfare could be 
maximised. This is an important finding when examining advisers who mediate the 
tensions between multiple stakeholders because it means that advisers may not be 
able to produce positive outcomes if this trust-trustworthiness balance cannot be 
established. 
Trust could be conceptualised through an amalgamation of contexts interacting 
with each other, as proposed by Hosmer (1995). These contexts included amongst 
others individual expectations, interpersonal relations and economic transactions. One 
way of establishing trust is by fulfilling expectations. For example, the expectation both 
                                               
8 Ben-Ner and Putterman (2001) pointed out how organisations tried to give themselves a human face to appear 
trustworthy to service users. Their findings highlighted that in the eyes of the customer, the front-line staff as 
representatives of the service, became the service, which was why for this discussion a separation of the service 
and the adviser was not necessary. 
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from the user and from the policy side is that the provider has delivered a service 
according to the user’s needs whilst complying with contract specifications. When this 
condition is met, a trust relationship can be created in both directions (Coulson, 1998). 
There is an underlying vulnerability in trusting the other party to engage in an 
expected behaviour based on the associated risk that they may not. These factors 
when considered together reflected Mishra et. al.’s (1996) definition of trust which is 
widely used: 
Trust was considered to be “one party’s willingness to be vulnerable to  
another party based on the belief that the latter party is (a) competent, 
(b) open, (c) concerned, and (d) reliable” (ibid, p. 265) 
Based on the differing motivations and aims of the provider organisations, it 
might be expected that those providers who have a strong focus on responsiveness to 
user needs would aim to build a strong trust relationship with the user. In contrast, in 
those organisations which are more responsive to policy considerations or aim at 
financial gain, the focus might be on building trust with the contract funder and less so 
with the service user. Trust building is a dynamic process which moves through various 
stages. Initial trust is usually established at a low level and then built up, but may also 
revert to earlier stages if trust is broken (Coulson, 1998). Lewicki et. al. (1996) 
identified three levels of trust in work relationships.  
The first level (Lewicki et al., 1996) was calculus-based trust where the 
individuals were expected to comply with regulations and were under the threat of 
punishment if they did not. This view of trust relates closely to Hosmer’s (1995) notion 
of economic transactions. In the adviser-user relationship, this could work on two 
different levels. For instance, in many welfare-to-work programmes, the user is 
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required to participate in a programme and if she or he does not comply with the 
requirements faces sanctions. Conversely, the adviser is expected to comply with 
programme and reporting requirements, which are all closely monitored in the 
performance measurement systems. For instance, if they fall behind or their 
performance does not measure up, they faced the threat of not receiving bonuses. 
Consequently, for both parties the threat of punishment has a strong impetus to 
comply because the potential cost would outweigh the benefits. Tyler and Kramer 
(1996) found this kind of trust strongly based on a rational perspective grounded in the 
assumption that people were risk averse and the violation of trust was costly and 
required sanctions. Thus as a minimum, people relied on everyone adhering to basic 
rules. 
The next level (Lewicki et al., 1996) was that of knowledge-based trust. Here, 
information and regular exchanges between the parties involved allowed either side to 
predict the behaviour of the other side and a relationship was established. The key 
here was the repeated interaction of the parties involved. Again, this worked in two 
directions. The users could develop an understanding that if they provide the 
necessary information then solutions to problems could be developed and 
implemented based on personal preferences. For the adviser the constant exchange of 
information provides a consistent basis for their work. The exchange of information is 
not so much seen as a control mechanism but rather a means of support and an 
indicator if further help was needed. Thus, the collection and exchange of information 
is a means to identify problems to which solutions can then be developed on a joint 
basis. This brings about notions of cooperation and reciprocity which are key aspects 
of Hosmer’s (1995) lens of interpersonal relations. 
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Identification-based trust (Lewicki et al., 1996) was considered the highest 
level. Here both parties involved had a deep understanding of “the other’s needs, 
choices, and preferences and also [shared] some of those same needs, choices, and 
preferences” (ibid: 123). This implied that both parties could act on behalf of each 
other. Whilst such a level of trust is typical for very intimate relationships (such as 
husband and wife), a similar level of trust could be developed between adviser and 
service user when sharing a similar background or the aim of the organisation is 
expressly targeted at a specific group within the population. This similarity of 
background gives the adviser the credibility so that they are able to understand the 
needs and preferences of their service users and might even act as role models. The 
adviser may even have been chosen to work for this organisation because he or she 
has successfully mastered the situation in which others find themselves.  
Trust is an important mechanism in understanding social behaviour, especially 
when it comes to changing people’s behaviour. Trusting behaviour has been found to 
be the foundation for cooperation, and identification with a group or an individual has 
had a supportive effect (Brewer and Kramer, 1986). Thus, people who have established 
a trust relationship based on identification are much more likely to cooperate in 
activities aimed at behavioural changes since they feel a moral obligation (Kramer and 
Goldman, 1995, Dawes et al., 1990). These views apply particularly in the trust 
relationship between adviser and user, where the user has the possibility of continued 
interaction and is exposed to policy through the adviser practices. Conversely, Dirks 
and Ferrin (2001) concluded that in situations where trust was low, a highly structured 
context could mitigate potentially negative outcomes. This suggests that in 
environments where tasks were highly standardised and controlled and the context 
underwent constant changes, low trust levels can be expected. Importantly, this has 
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had particular implications for front-line advisers. It is suggested that, for instance, due 
to the low trust environment of mandatory programmes (based on the highly 
controlled and standardised context for advisers) the threat of sanctions has been a 
strong motivator for compliance, and thus a change of behaviour. 
Changing people: achieving policy outcomes 
The concepts discussed so far interact to form a complex construct of how 
advisers mediate the differing demands on them. In their interactions and fulfilment of 
contractual obligations, they are supporting, sometimes indirectly, the ideological 
visions of active citizenship that the New Labour government outlined (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). However, Rosenthal and Peccei (2006) found that it is more likely that 
advisers’ decision-making in their interactions would be mainly influenced by 
overarching policy aims, rather than by a combination of programme demands and 
their personal values as well as by the values of the organisations they were working 
for. It is therefore worthwhile examining the methods of how policies are aimed to 
contribute towards activating people as well as how organisational values may add to 
this goal. 
The policy aim of activating citizens is particularly visible in the welfare-to-work 
policies. While in fields such as social work and health care there was a rhetorical 
emphasis on partnership and citizen involvement (Newman and Vidler, 2006, 
Northmore, 2001), the literature on welfare-to-work policies, both on a national and 
international level, emphasised their activation nature via the rights and 
responsibilities agenda. Participation was mostly mandatory and the use of sanctions 
as a threat was accepted practice to enforce compliance (see for instance Walker and 
Wiseman, 2003, Considine, 2001, Lødemel and Trickey, 2001, Tonge, 1999). The 
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emphasis on ‘carrots and sticks’, on incentives and sanctions, on rights and 
responsibilities highlighted the coercive nature of these policies (Dwyer, 2004, Cox, 
1998).  
The literature on organisational culture and psychology has used the concept of 
coercive persuasion to describe a similar situation which people taking part in these 
welfare-to-work programmes may encounter. Coercive persuasion is understood as a 
tactic which aimed to bring about a substantial change in behaviour or ideology using 
incentives and threats (Schein, 1999). Originally in the context of organisational 
change, Schein (ibid) described a process where through psychological and physical 
pressuring, constant labelling and stigmatisation, individuals were coerced into 
changing their behaviour and thinking. Simultaneously, sufficient incentives and 
threats were presented to prevent the individuals from leaving the organisation and 
thus maintaining control over them. According to Schein (ibid), the creation of a feeling 
of guilt was central to prompt the change of behaviour. Whilst this process may appear 
rather extreme in the context of welfare-to-work, its basic elements could be 
recognised within welfare-to-work provision including the use of incentives and 
sanctions, possible stigmatisation and labelling (Cole, 2008) and the continuous 
emphasis from the government side on work. Schein (1999) considered coercion as a 
weak form of eliciting compliance and behaviour change, for as soon as threats and 
incentives were removed, there was a high likelihood that individuals would revert to 
their former behaviour. 
Empowerment, commonly accepted as giving someone or taking from someone 
the power to fulfil their own needs and wants (Servian, 1996) was another way of 
changing behaviour. It has close connotations with conceptions of the ‘enabling state’ 
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as advanced by New Labour (Lister, 2003) where the state provided opportunities to 
develop human capital, but it was the citizen’s responsibilities to take up these 
opportunities (Bevir and O'Brien, 2001). This perspective has increasingly been 
adopted by professionals who aimed to help people improve their personal capacities 
to change their circumstances (Baistow, 1994). The process requires a sharing of 
responsibility between the adviser and the service user, and in this sense a sharing of 
power. Clarke (2005) commented that all of these policy conceptions of 
empowerment, activation and responsibilisation were closely linked and overall 
contributed to New Labour’s changing citizenship perspective. Advisers enacted the 
processes of empowerment, activation and responsibilisation drawing attention to 
their, conscious or unconscious, contribution to achieve an overall ideological goal. 
Hasenfeld (1972) distinguished between organisations which either process 
people or attempt to change people. People-processing organisations conferred a 
status onto people through classification and subsequent disposition over a short 
period. People-changing organisations aimed for behavioural change through 
socialisation, which took place over a longer period. Trust relationships, as discussed 
before, tend to facilitate cooperation from the parties involved but take some time to 
build. However, the organisational values of, for instance voluntary and community 
sector organisations are more geared towards building these kinds of relationships. 
These organisations were value-driven, not profit-orientated (Carmel and Harlock, 
2008) and worker’s in VCOs often shared similar experiences, personal characteristics 
and values as the individuals they were supporting and thus could establish trust more 
easily (Tonkiss and Passey, 1999). Newman (2001) suggested that relationships based 
on trust created commitment by the parties involved and therefore could elicit 
compliance without applying sanctions.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has established the adviser as a mediator between state 
interventions and service user needs. From a political perspective, advisers are 
ascribed the power to inform and influence people’s behaviour and ultimately bring 
about changes in their behaviour and socio-economic status, which feeds into the 
policy goal of creating the ‘active worker-citizen’ (Newman, 2007). The chapter has 
conceptualised the mechanisms available to advisers to govern user behaviour in order 
to contribute to these higher level policy aims.  
The chapter also examined the concepts of discretion, trust and changing 
people. These three concepts interact closely with each other and form part of the 
complex choices which advisers need to make in their interactions with service users. 
Discretion, the space advisers can occupy to make flexible decisions, is important for 
policy implementation where it involves changing people’s behaviour. However, 
advisers are subjected to attempts to limit their use of discretion by the macro-level 
managerial influences such as targets and organisational procedures. The exploration 
of these issues from a bottom-up perspective has received little attention in the UK 
policy context so far. 
Discretionary decision making can be viewed as a means to establish trust, 
particularly when considering the role of the adviser as a mediator between state 
intervention and service user. Different kinds of trust are defined and a link established 
to trustworthiness. Advisers have different methods of establishing trust which are 
closely connected to the macro-level influences of programme requirements and 
policies. A connection is then established between trust and influencing a person’s 
behaviour. High levels of trust are a positive foundation to encourage compliance 
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without the use of threats because service users believe that the adviser can act in 
their own best interest. The political ideology endorses influencing behaviour through 
sometimes highly coercive measures as exemplified by the use of sanctions in welfare-
to-work programmes (although it needs to be noted that programmes within the 
learning and skills framework are much less coercive). The changing citizenship 
conception under New Labour has also brought about an emphasis on empowerment 
and self-responsibility combined with activation. Empowerment in the sense of power 
sharing between adviser and service user which enables the user to improve their 
situation highlighted this shift in responsibility away from the state.  
One of the main questions this study tries to answer is how advisers have used 
coercion and trust in combination with discretion to influence service users’ behaviour. 
The extent to which advisers apply these processes is expected to differ greatly 
between the case study services. The following chapter will explain how these 
particular services were selected and which methods were used to answer these 
questions.  
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Chapter 5 
Methods and methodology 
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Introduction 
The study is rooted in the concept of governance and aims to qualitatively 
examine the ways in which different governance regimes emerge through the 
management and practice of advisers at street level. It is based on 38 semi-structured 
interviews with advisers and managers in eight case study services9. This chapter 
describes and justifies the methods used in this study. It also outlines key ethical 
considerations and gives a reflexive account of issues with which the researcher 
engaged with throughout the research process. 
Methodological approach 
The study focuses on the experiences and qualitative accounts of 38 front-line 
advisers giving employment advice in eight different case study services. It takes an 
interpretivist, ‘subtle realist’ stance because it is concerned with understanding the 
social world from the advisers’ point of view (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and with 
explaining how advisers construct this reality. This approach has been strongly linked 
with qualitative research, offering a large degree of flexibility when collecting and 
analysing data and providing the opportunity to genuinely discover personal 
perspectives without imposing frames of reference on the research participants 
(Bryman, 2001). 
                                               
9 The data for this project was collected within the “Guidance in Europe” project funded by the European 
Commission’s Leonardo da Vinci Community Vocational Training Action Programme (ES/04/C/F/RF – 80900). The 
project was a five country study investigating careers guidance for people out of work and at risk of 
unemployment in France, Spain, Germany, Slovenia and the UK. The project started in October 2004 and ended 
in September 2007. The researcher was part of the UK team. Detailed information and publications about the 
project can be found on the project website: www.guidanceineurope.com. 
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Unlike positivist research, the interpretivist stance is not concerned with 
gathering purely factual information about the world ‘out there’, but rather focuses on 
how individuals actively create meaning (Silverman, 2006). The creation of meaning 
has been the point of much critique and debate because the positivist tradition of 
social enquiry assumes an objective approach to research, free of the personal values 
of the researcher. However, interpretivist research is based on an individual’s 
understanding and knowledge of the world and how they reflect on it, including the 
researcher’s values (Snape and Spencer, 2003). Thus, this kind of approach can never 
be objective and value free, because “we are never interacting in a historico-socio-
cultural vacuum, we are always embedded in and selectively and artfully draw on 
broader institutional and organisational contexts” (Rapley, 2004: 26). This raises 
questions about the ‘truthfulness’ of the data and thus the validity and reliability of the 
study.  
The need for reliable qualitative research should not be ignored (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986) and in response, some researchers (for example Bogdan and Taylor, 
1975, Glaser, 1967) tried to formalise their methods, stressing the application of rigour 
to this ‘softer’ data (Snape and Spencer, 2003) to avoid ‘dangerously impressionistic’ 
results (Silverman, 1985). In order to address these issues, Kirk and Miller (1986) 
suggested four steps to establish ‘trustworthiness’ and Silverman (2006) 
recommended five methods to ensure validity. Triangulation has been advocated as a 
method to ensure validity (Denzin, 1970), based firmly on positivist influences. 
Triangulation involves the combination of multiple theories, methods, researchers and 
sources to “produce a more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of 
the object of study” (Silverman, 2006: 291). However, actions and accounts by 
individuals need to be located in their particular contexts and different findings can be 
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expected to emerge from different methods and individual interpretations (Spicer, 
2004). Thus triangulation would not deliver an objective ‘total’ truth which would be 
required to satisfy positivist criticism (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). Furthermore, there 
appeared to be no evidence that studies which applied triangulation produced more 
valid results (Sarantakos, 2005). In order to establish reliability for this qualitative 
study it is therefore not important to demonstrate accuracy and ‘correctness’ of the 
data, but rather to demonstrate that the methods used for data collection and analysis 
were appropriate for the research questions and that the research has been carried 
out in a “thorough, careful, honest and accurate” way (Mason, 2002: 188).  
A solution to the dilemma of validity can be seen in what Hammersley (1992) 
described as ‘subtle realism’. This position assumed that there could be no absolute 
knowledge about the validity of claims. Instead knowledge was composed of truths 
which individuals could reasonably assert within their beliefs. It further asserted that 
the social world existed independently of the individual’s understanding and that 
making a claim did not impact on the social world in such a way that the claim would 
become true or false. Lastly, the aim of social inquiry was to represent reality rather 
than to reproduce it. Consequently, the representation of reality would only be 
accessible to the researcher through interpretations of the interview participant’s 
responses. These responses could then be further interpreted by the researcher, 
accepting that different points of view lead to different understandings (Hammersley, 
1992, Snape and Spencer, 2003). This ontological position addresses two criticisms 
brought against the use of interviews as a research method. Kitzinger (2004) raised 
concerns that interviews did not give direct access to facts and that they only gave 
indirect representations of personal experiences. Taking a ‘subtle realist’ stance does 
not require the elicitation of positivist influenced facts. In this study specific 
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consideration is given to the ways in which advisers chose to represent reality and 
often required further interpretation by the researcher. 
Methods 
The study has used eight case studies based on semi-structured interviews to 
examine how advisers mediate tensions between managerial demands and user needs 
in different settings to allow meaningful comparisons by also including contextual 
information. Yin (2003) defined a case study as 
“an inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident. [It] copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and 
as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis.” (pp. 13-14) 
The case study method has proposed a complete strategy from design to data 
collection and analysis. This method has been criticised as being unscientific due to a 
lack of rigour and its failure to deliver results which were universally generalisable 
(Hamel et al., 1993). However, unlike positivist research, the qualitative case studies 
used for this research do not aim to produce universal theories or to calculate 
frequencies. Case studies were used to expand and generalise theories which, 
according to Yin (2003), could be achieved based on a single case study. This study 
consists of eight case studies which examined the phenomenon across a variety of 
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services. Multiple case studies followed a similar logic to the replication of 
experiments. The replication of a case study either to produce a similar result or with 
the intent of producing a predictable variation has been carried out so that the results 
may be more compelling and may therefore be considered more robust (Yin, 2003). 
Thus the careful selection of suitable cases, which will be discussed further below, 
addresses some of the criticisms brought against case studies, namely the absence of 
rigour and the lack of replication. 
Case studies may incorporate a wealth of information based on interviews, 
observations or documentary analysis. The inclusion of a variety of services is of great 
importance to the study and consequently a strategy which might have involved 
observation methods, with the potential to provide greater depth and detail, was 
deemed too complex and time consuming (Matthews and Ross, 2010). Instead, an 
approach based on interviews was preferred. This method allows a large amount of 
data to be collected time efficiently and provides a rich account of the individual 
advisers’ perceptions (Silverman, 2006) while casual observations on site and the 
analysis of additional documents would supplement the interview data. In particular, 
semi-structured interviews are used. Their use is preferable over structured 
interviewing because they offer a high degree of flexibility when exploring topic areas 
while providing a structured framework to enable comparisons between the cases and 
to afford the participants a great amount of freedom in their responses. (Bryman, 
2001).  
Selection of Cases 
From a practical perspective, the selection of the cases which were examined 
required careful consideration to ensure that the data produced was meaningful and 
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capable of answering the research questions posed. The aim of the study is to produce 
an in-depth account of the experiences of employment advisers in different types of 
services and how these compared. This has required complex and detailed data. The 
key to selecting meaningful cases was related to the different types of services. As has 
been pointed out before, the landscape of provision of employment advice and 
guidance is extremely diverse in the UK context. This diversity consists of services 
provided by public sector organisations, private providers, quasi-public bodies and by 
voluntary and community sector organisations. Similarly, services can be mandatory or 
voluntary, they can focus solely on placing someone in work or might focus on skills 
development. In order to produce meaningful results for a multiple case study 
approach, Yin (2003) suggested to apply a replication logic to the selection of suitable 
case studies. This meant that cases should be selected in such a way that the analysis 
produced similar results or contrasting results as predicted at the design stage of the 
study. 
After an initial mapping of the full range of services available, the study set out 
to capture the diversity of service provision in the UK context. Therefore, some of the 
cases selected have been pre-determined by the major policy interventions of the 
government within the two frameworks. This included five initial case studies. Three of 
them covered the welfare-to-work framework (New Deal, Work Area, Working 
Estate10), while the other two interventions can be associated with the learning and 
skills framework (Careers Scotland and Move On). The initial expectation was that the 
services would show broad similarities within each framework so that based on the 
                                               
10 Please note that these names are pseudonyms to protect the service providers’ identities and their employees 
(except for New Deal and Careers Scotland). A discussion on the use of pseudonyms can be found in the ethics 
section of this chapter. 
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replication rationale there would be similar results within the services of each 
framework and contrasting results to the other frameworks.  
Following early analysis of the initial data, it became apparent that there were 
emerging issues which required additional interviews within the case study 
organisations. Furthermore, it emerged that target groups for the services as well as 
contextual factors might be influential in service delivery. Taking this into account, two 
further case studies were conducted which focused on vulnerable groups but could be 
situated within the Employment and Skills Framework (Redundancy Help and Lone 
Parent Advice). These two cases might provide contrasting information to the Working 
Estate case in the welfare-to-work group that had a joint focus on jobless people and 
inactive people. The third additional case study was conducted with a new service 
(Telephone Guidance) which applied a unique approach to delivering guidance over 
the telephone for all ages and can thus be contrasted with Careers Scotland which has 
been delivered face-to-face to a similar audience. Thus a total of eight case studies 
were selected which covered as broad a spectrum as possible of the employment 
advice and guidance landscape in the UK across the two policy frameworks. 
However, to gain the detailed information required on how advisers mediated 
managerial demands in their work, it was necessary to speak to the individual advisers 
within the various services. It was assumed that the advisers held their own value sets 
and combined them with the values of the provider organisation. Through their 
interaction with the public, advisers were representing these organisational values. 
Additionally, they were charged with delivering the contracted provision which in turn 
became a key part of the provider organisation. Advisers as representatives of their 
organisations became the provider organisation or service in the eyes of the service 
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users (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001) and thus users simply experienced a service in 
their interactions. Consequently, the advisers would be the ones directly mediating the 
impact of contractual requirements in their interactions with service users. Therefore, 
they were the most suitable individuals to deliver information on the impact of 
managerial arrangements on their work and consequently also the organisation. 
However, in order to validate the information received from advisers and to establish 
further data points for comparison, additional interviews were scheduled with 
managers which would provide additional contextual information as well as specific 
information. 
Having taken the time and the impact on the work schedule of the advisers into 
consideration, the researcher specified the number of people to be interviewed in 
each service (1 manager and 2-3 advisers) which would have produced 36 interviews. 
Given the limited time frame and the number of organisations to be included in the 
study, this seemed a manageable amount of interviews which would provide a 
sufficient amount of data to answer the research questions. However, the final 
selection of interview partners could not be influenced by the researcher. In some 
services, a selection would not have been possible due to their small size. This was the 
case particularly with voluntary and community sector organisations (VCO) whose 
relevant teams had just about enough personnel to gather the intended amount of 
data. Other organisations added additional interviews at their own discretion to give 
the researcher an opportunity to develop a fuller picture of their service’s work. While 
the researcher aimed at keeping the number of interviews across the types of 
organisations roughly similar, this was not always possible. Table 2 (see p. 77) 
summarises the total number of interviews completed for each case study according to 
the individual’s role (adviser / manager): 
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Table 2: Final distribution of interviews across case studies 
 Advisers Managers Total 
Case 1 
“ New Deal”11 3 4 7 
Case 2 
“Work Area” 3 2 5 
Case 3 
“Working Estate” 3 2 5 
Case 4 
“Careers Scotland” 3 1 4 
Case 5 
“Move on” 3 2 5 
Case 6 
“Redundancy Help” 2 1 3 
Case 7 
“Telephone Guidance” 3 1 4 
Case8 
“Lone Parent Advice” 3 2 5 
Total Amount of 
Interviews 
23 15 38 
 
It is important to note that despite efforts to provide a representation of 
employment advice services available as completely as possible, the landscape of 
provision in the UK is far more diverse. However, the selected cases covered the main 
policy frameworks and target groups of government policy and thus allowed 
meaningful comparisons. As has been previously mentioned, the aim of the case study 
approach is not to provide universal generalisations, but to examine a contemporary 
phenomenon within its context and build on current theories. 
                                               
11 Please note that these names are pseudonyms (except for the New Deal and Careers Scotland) to protect the 
service providers’ identities and their employees according to the rationale laid out in this chapter. 
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Access 
After the initial selection of services, contact with the provider organisations 
was established to arrange the research visits which were planned to last one to two 
days each. Contact was established through different routes. For some providers 
contacts already existed through key informant interviews which were conducted for a 
different stage of the EU LEONARDO project. They were thus contacted again and 
asked whether they could facilitate access. These providers were happy to assist and in 
most cases, provided a new contact to a local gatekeeper who, based on the project 
information and the requirements of the researcher, selected a location for the 
interviews and made further arrangements.  
In other cases, the researcher obtained a list of provider organisations for a 
specific programme online and tried to arrange a visit directly with the organisations. 
Here initial contact was established mainly through e-mail which contained detailed 
project information with follow-up phone calls to answer questions and negotiate 
access. This method of establishing contact was less successful because some 
organisations simply did not respond or persisted in referring the researcher to other 
members of staff without anyone in the organisation claiming responsibility for 
research requests. In these instances, the researcher abandoned the attempt to get 
access to that organisation after several follow-up phone calls. Nevertheless, 
persistence did pay off, suitable organisations were found and field visits were 
arranged with them accordingly. 
As interviews were arranged through gatekeepers, the researcher had limited 
influence on the time frame available for interviews other than making an initial 
request regarding their duration (Lewis, 2003). Particularly in the public organisations, 
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interview schedules were often set-up by the person arranging the visit. In some 
locations this schedule was tightly monitored. In some cases, despite indicating that an 
interview would take up to 90 minutes, the researcher was granted access for less time 
than requested. This required the ad hoc adaptation of question schedules by adopting 
a strategy whereby some of the contextual questions were left out and the interview 
‘streamlined’ by focussing on key questions. The adaptation of interviews was easily 
possible due to the flexibility which semi-structured interviews afforded the researcher 
(Bloch, 2004). Another strategy included disregarding time limits which the researcher 
felt uncomfortable about as she was aware that her research visit interrupted the 
interviewee’s workday significantly.  
Another consideration, particularly with the public service providers, was the 
extent to which the organisations ‘selected’ by the initial contact person were indeed 
willing to participate in the project. That is to say, how far were they indeed required 
or even ordered by higher authorities to take part in the project. This posed some 
ethical issues for the researcher as will be discussed below. But there was little choice 
but to comply with the issue and to ensure interview participants were consenting to 
the interviews. Whilst this issue was never openly addressed, there were clear 
indications that one office of the same organisation was clearly experienced with 
handling researchers (‘we are the flagship office’ – Manager, New Deal) while the 
other was more apprehensive towards the project which became apparent when a 
second visit needed to be scheduled and access to advisers was denied due to time 
constraints. Nevertheless, the access to those organisations through gatekeepers 
established a level of credibility for the researcher and the project which first had to be 
established with the directly contacted organisations. This was achieved by giving 
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detailed explanations of the project and its purpose during a process of negotiation 
which, as Neumann (2006) observed, is to be expected when trying to gain access.  
Despite having successfully gained access the method of access through 
gatekeepers might have affected the researcher’s acceptance in the organisation 
(Mason, 1996), as the examples above highlight, and might thus have affected the data 
which was collected. A more detailed discussion of this issue follows in the section on 
data collection. However, there was a clear difference in terms of access and 
acceptance between the different types of services, where particularly private and 
voluntary and community sector organisations seemed more enthusiastic their public 
sector counterparts. 
As has been mentioned before, a second wave of interviews was conducted to 
address newly emerging issues and include the newly selected cases. Two 
organisations were accessed through experts (Redundancy Help and Telephone 
Guidance) while a third (Lone Parents Advice) was accessed directly. Gatekeepers were 
informed that interviews would take longer because the question schedules from the 
first and second tranche of interviews needed to be covered. There were no problems 
in arranging visits with this second group of organisations and no issues such as those 
encountered in the first wave, despite the longer duration of the interviews requiring 
visits to be spread over 2 to 3 days. 
However, in the organisations which were re-visited some problems occurred 
with arranging the second visit. As mentioned before, one organisation denied access 
to the advisers in which case only a second interview with the managers could be 
conducted. Another organisation had closed down, because the service they were 
delivering had come to its contractual end. Consequently, the depth of the data from 
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those two organisations is not as detailed as for the organisations which went through 
both diets. Nevertheless, enough data was collected to allow comparisons between 
the services. 
Ethics 
Ethical considerations are central to conducting any research project and at all 
stages during the project (David and Sutton, 2004). A number of research and 
professional organisations such as the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 
2006) have therefore developed guidelines for the ethical practice of research which 
outlines basic considerations to help the researcher make informed decisions when 
faced with ethical choices and dilemmas. The researcher has particularly been guided 
by the ESRC Research Ethics Framework (ESRC, 2006) when developing appropriate 
responses to ethical issues and the necessary choices throughout the course of the 
project. Many of the ethical aspects are closely inter-related (Bryman, 2001). The 
project received full ethical approval as required by the Department of Applied Social 
Sciences at the University of Stirling. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
There was concern regarding confidentiality and anonymity with some of the 
case study organisations due to the unique nature of the service provided. It was 
feared that there might be the opportunity for deductive disclosure whereby an 
organisation or interview participants could be identified based on traits and 
characteristics contained in the information supplied (Kaiser, 2009). The researcher 
had to weigh up risks for the service providers as well as the individuals in order to 
comply with the ESRC recommendations that sources of data need to remain 
confidential (ESRC, 2006). The difficulty lay in how to best protect the organisations 
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and the individuals without compromising any of the detail and richness of the data 
collected. The provider organisations which had participated in the research and 
caused the most concern were those which maintained national networks of offices 
(for example Jobcentre Plus or Careers Scotland) and could easily be recognised by an 
informed reader. It was felt that if local and locational information of the participating 
office was removed from the interview data, the identity of the participating office 
would be sufficiently protected. For all other case study services pseudonyms were 
used. This method of identity protection was considered sufficient by the Department 
of Applied Social Science Ethics Committee at the University of Stirling.  
In order to protect individual respondents from potential harm due to critical 
comments, all characteristics which might help identify individual participants have 
been removed. Because the research was concerned with differences across service 
types, there was no need to identify the individual respondent other than their role, 
such as adviser or manager. Additionally, this research project will be publicised a 
substantial amount of time after the interview process. Considering the high turn-over 
rates in the employment advice and guidance sector, time introduces an unintended 
protection barrier, because many of the individuals who participated in the research 
may have moved on to other jobs.  
To ensure privacy, it was attempted to hold interviews in a room separate from 
the participant’s actual work space. In many organisations, the contact person had 
made arrangements to provide a quiet place for interviewing. However, in some 
organisations, interviews had to take place at the respondent’s desk which was often 
integrated in an open plan office space. While respondents were assured that their 
identities would be protected in the research, the open plan set-up of offices did not 
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necessarily protect their privacy with regards to the opinions and insights revealed. 
This might have had an adverse effect on how freely the interviewees responded. 
However, the researcher believes that in the cases where the interview took place in 
this kind of setting, the respondent was less concerned about protecting their privacy. 
Possibly, this was because the respondents’ position was known among colleagues and 
superiors and therefore they did not see the interview as an intrusion into their privacy 
or as a threat of potential repercussions in the workplace. Nevertheless, information 
gained in interviews was not shared with anyone to adhere to the assurances made 
when gaining consent.  
Informed consent 
In order to ensure that the interviewees participated voluntarily in the 
research, free from any pressure and threat, it was vital to gain their consent 
throughout their involvement in the project (David and Sutton, 2004). A prerequisite of 
putting the participant in a position to make an informed choice about their 
participation is to provide them with as much information about the research as they 
need. This might include information on the security and management of the data 
obtained in the interview, precautions about the protection of the participant’s 
identity, how risks to participants and the researcher are managed (ESRC, 2006). An 
informed choice about their participation also includes the knowledge that they may 
withdraw from the research at any point of the project should they feel uncomfortable 
with certain questions or how the interview proceeds. Should this be the case, the 
decision to withdraw should be respected. The individual participant’s well-being 
should always take precedence over the research project (ESRC, 2006, Marvasti, 2004). 
There were therefore a number of measures which the researcher took in order to 
obtain the informed consent of interviewees in the different organisations. 
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At the beginning of each interview, the interviewee received an information 
sheet with a brief introduction to the research which the researcher discussed with the 
participant. This information consisted of a general outline including the aims of the 
project as well as the assurance that the data obtained would be used in scholarly 
publications such as the researcher’s thesis or journal articles. Additionally, 
participants were assured that the utmost care would be taken to protect their 
confidentiality and privacy as well as how data would be managed and secured. They 
also were given the option to withdraw from the research at any point without further 
repercussions. Subsequently, participants were asked for permission to be recorded. 
This included also the signing of a consent form (or the oral approval on tape) which 
included details on how data would be stored and managed. Interviewees were also 
given the opportunity before and after the interview to ask any questions which they 
might have in relation to the research project. None of the interviewees refused their 
consent or the recording of the interview. Occasionally, participants enquired about 
the use of the research and of the impact the research was expected to have which the 
researcher tried to answer truthfully. 
Throughout the interview, the researcher checked periodically whether the 
participant was still comfortable with how the interview proceeded and with the 
content of the questions. Whilst none of the participants withdrew from the study or 
refused to answer a question, the researcher was aware when some participants had 
become visibly tense and it became apparent that the respondent was uncomfortable 
with the series of questions or the probing. In this case, the researcher decided to 
abandon the line of questions in favour of continuing the interview and maintaining 
the rapport which had already been established. In many cases, the participants 
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returned of their own volition to the abandoned line of questions at a later point in the 
interview and discussed the issue without further prompting. 
Such reactions by the participants may also have been caused as a result of the 
‘selection’ process. Due to the fact that most organisations had to be accessed through 
gatekeepers, the researcher was not involved in the selection of the actual interview 
participants. The individual participants within the services were often identified 
through line managers and thus their participation may not have been entirely 
voluntary, despite indicating their consent. This might have led to some participants 
representing the position of their employer rather than their own personal view. And 
whilst the researcher tried to be as sensitive as possible to signs that this might have 
been the case and tried to gain a more personal insight through careful probing, it 
cannot be assumed that all such instances were detected.  
Prevention of harm 
Prevention of harm conjures images of violence and physical threats. However, 
there are also psychological forms of harm such as stress. While it is not possible to 
identify neither all possible kinds of harm nor all situations in which people may 
experience harm (Marvasti, 2004), consideration needs to be given to this point and 
measures taken to avoid it. One way of doing so is to try to anticipate potentially 
harmful situations and develop appropriate responses.  
The research method itself, in this instance the case study approach and a small 
number of interviews within each case study, may be a source of harm (David and 
Sutton, 2004). The potential for deductive disclosure has been highlighted previously. 
This may cause stress for the interview participant. However, precautions were taken 
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by informing the participant about how their identity would be protected through the 
use of pseudonyms, gaining their continued consent throughout the interview process 
and informing them of the methods of data management. 
Answering questions which the respondents felt uncomfortable with because 
they feared repercussions from superiors if their opinion became known was another 
source of potential harm. This issue had been dealt with by obtaining the verbal 
consent of the participant throughout the duration of the interview and by giving them 
the opportunity to abandon interviews. However, the researcher also responded to 
signs of stress or anxiety by not further pursuing a question as has been outlined 
above. Questions where respondents displayed some anxiety revolved mostly around 
performance evaluation where it had an impact on reward payments or where such 
evaluations were seen as indicative of an employee’s contribution to a service’s 
performance. Here the researcher assured participants before and after the interview 
that the information shared with the researcher would not be made available to 
anyone else, and in particular not to superiors for evaluation purposes. In some cases 
questions where participants avoided succinct answers were also related to contract 
details and respondents might have felt they were disclosing information which was 
confidential. In such cases, the researcher tried to elicit this kind of information from 
the manager who would have a better grasp of what contractual information was 
confidential or through programme specifications and other information which was 
freely available online.  
However, it is also worth noting that the researcher could be exposed to harm, 
mainly in the form of psychological pressure from, for instance, superiors of interview 
participants. During the course of the project, this did not materialise. However 
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precautions were in place to deal with this kind of problem. These included debriefings 
with thesis supervisors as well as assurances that in case of need, supervisors could 
always be approached for advice and support. In this way, some of the psychological 
impact of hearing customer stories or dealing with the stressful data collection task 
could be mediated. 
Whilst in most locations, the environment felt secure, there were some obvious 
signs of expectation of violence on the part of the service providers in the form of 
security personnel. In some services, security personnel tried to blend in and be as 
inconspicuous as possible. In other services they had an intentionally strong and 
straightforward presence. In most provider offices, there were entry control systems 
through, for instance a receptionist. This allowed only registered visitors access to the 
relevant people. The researcher never witnessed any violent incidents at any single 
location. However, there were reports by some of the interview participants of 
frequent security incidents when visitors had to be removed by the security personnel 
or the police. 
In order to additionally ensure the personal safety of the researcher while at 
the interviews or en route to the locations, several contacts (for instance, supervisors, 
contacts at the organisations, friends) were always informed about the researcher’s 
interview schedule and travel arrangements. Contacts were also in possession of a 
mobile contact number so that in emergencies contact could be made on location.  
Data storage 
Where consent was given, interviews were recorded with the tape recorder 
clearly visible to the participant. None of the participants refused to be recorded. 
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However, in a few instances, recording was not possible due to background noise or 
time constraints (multiple, very short availability of the participant for instance). Here, 
extensive notes would be taken which were used to provide some context 
information. Interviewees were informed about how their interview data would be 
stored and treated at the beginning of each interview both verbally and in writing and 
asked for their written consent. The following procedure would be followed in terms of 
data storage and management.  
Once the interview was complete, the researcher reassured the respondent 
that their interview would only be accessed by the researcher and her thesis 
supervisors (where this was deemed necessary) and an external transcriber who would 
have no further connection to the project. The transcriber was contractually obliged to 
maintain data security and anonymity of interview participants and contents. Thesis 
supervisors would only have access to the fully anonymised version of the transcribed 
data. Outside this group of people, data would not be accessible to anyone else.  
The interview tapes were kept in a lockable filing cabinet at the researcher’s 
office. To protect participants’ identity, tapes were only labelled with a reference 
number. Notes from the interviews were also kept in a locked filing cabinet. 
Transcripts of the interviews were stored on a password protected university server 
and thus access was only available to the researcher. At the end of the project, the 
tapes will be erased to ensure compliance with data protection laws.  
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Interviewing and analysis 
The following section provides an account of how the data was collected and 
the challenges faced during this stage of the research. It will also outline the process of 
analysis and further steps to interpret the data. 
Interviewing 
The flexibility of the interview process was also reflected in the ways that 
rapport with the interviewee was established. Face-to-face interaction required the 
researcher to be more alert to body language and nuances in the questions and 
answers not only of the respondent, but also of herself. The ability to rearrange 
questions or deviate from the question schedule to involve the respondent and 
establish a relationship contributed to more accurate answers and interpretations 
(Shuy, 2003). Once rapport had been created, it also allowed the researcher to employ 
a more conversational style which was common in qualitative interviewing. It allowed 
the interviewee to express their views of what was important about a particular issue 
without the restriction of pre-formulated answers as in structured interviewing, while 
it also allowed the researcher to ask for clarifications and further explanations. This 
was particularly important because the researcher had little prior knowledge of the 
particular terminology used in some organisations or the specific processes within the 
programmes (for instance, the use of the word ‘shop’ with reference to their office or 
the time frames of when users would move to a different programme stage). 
The use of “language is key to the interview. It is the medium through which 
data is collected/ generated” (David and Sutton, 2004: 89). However, the interview 
situation was a social interaction and consequently the personality of the interviewer 
as well as the environment in which the interview was conducted might introduce a 
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certain bias, due to different social relations between the interviewer and the 
interviewee (Fontana and Frey, 2005). Environmental influences could be controlled by 
the interviews taking place in the workplace of respondents, usually in a separate 
interview room to provide some privacy (for a more detailed account of the data 
collection, see the relevant section). However, the influence of personality factors on 
the interview quality could not be controlled since they were dependent on each 
individual respondent. Upon reflection by behaving in a professional manner and 
respecting respondents’ time and work requirements, combined with appropriate 
amounts of small talk to establish a friendly basis for the interview, the researcher 
attempted to reduce some of the bias. However, interviewer subjectivity and influence 
was one of the main criticisms against the use of qualitative research and relates to 
previously identified positivist concerns about reliability (Steinke, 2004). Whilst this 
might be counteracted by using different researchers (Patton and Patton, 2002), a PhD 
project does not lend itself well to this approach as it is generally conducted by a lone 
researcher. Conversely, it could be argued that a lone researcher improves the rigour 
of the project due to personnel continuity and consistency of interviewing technique. 
Qualitative data is only meaningful within its context (Marvasti, 2004). While a 
large amount of contextual data could be gathered through the interviews, it was 
supplemented, where possible, with casual observations. Whilst there was no 
intention to engage fully in observation, waiting times between interviews, for 
instance, helped to provide an understanding of the respective workplace and the 
structures within it. The accounts of the advisers and managers could loosely be cross 
referenced with observations thus reinforcing the interview data. Additionally, policy 
and programme documents, as far as they were available online, were also accessed to 
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confirm and contrast the interview data. Particularly the programme documents 
provided insights into the requirements and intended outcomes of the programmes. 
The use of different data sources is common practice to ensure the consistency 
of information and thus make the research findings more robust. However, the 
question schedules used for the semi-structured interviews were initially developed 
and intended for an EU LEONARDO funded project on employment advice and 
guidance services in five European countries. Consequently, the questions were 
targeted towards the research questions of the LEONARDO project and not necessarily 
aligned with the research questions of this study. However, there was considerable 
thematic and conceptual overlap between the two projects, so that the topic guides 
used produced a large amount of usable data for this project. The complete alignment 
of the data with this project followed in the analysis stage, which will be discussed 
below. 
In the actual process of collecting the data the researcher had to be aware of a 
number of issues. Personal characteristics of the interviewer may have an influence on 
how participants respond to questions (May, 2001). Fortunately, these differences 
could be mediated due to a well balanced mix of respondents. Semi-structured 
interviews require the interviewer to establish a rapport with the respondent so that 
the interview can flow properly and allow the researcher to acquaint herself with the 
service studied. At the same time, the method of semi-structured interviewing 
establishes a certain distance because the duration of the interviews is not sufficient to 
be fully immersed in the research setting (Bryman, 1989). Striking a balance between 
delving deeper into understanding the services and provision, whilst keeping an 
objective overview of the subject matter, was a challenge.  
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In order to establish rapport and conduct an information rich interview, the 
interviewer needed to be constantly aware of how the interview progressed. This 
included being aware which topics had been discussed and touched upon, if necessary 
making adjustments to questions, probing and rearranging to ensure that all questions 
were answered. Potentially interesting avenues needed to be explored, while at the 
same time there needed to be sufficient awareness of the duration of the interview in 
order not to get lost in a friendly ‘ramble’ because the situation of the advisers could 
all too readily be understood. The fact that the first language of the researcher is not 
English was an advantage in this case, because it required the researcher to focus on 
the content and process of the interview thus leaving little room to getting emotionally 
too involved with research participants. 
Data was collected over a period of 13 months (November 2005 – December 
2006). The length of this time period was determined by several decisions during the 
course of the project. The first round of interviews was arranged fairly soon after the 
start of the EU LEONARDO project, because contacts with some of the chosen services 
already existed. Consequently, the timing of appointments was mainly a factor of 
arranging transport and assembling the necessary equipment. Once on location, 
contacts had usually arranged some sort of a schedule that gave a rough guideline of 
interview partners. Some provider organisations were more structured and organised 
in their approach than others which might have been an indication that some 
organisations took part in research interviews quite frequently. While a highly 
structured approach offered great time savings and less of a burden on normal 
organisational processes, there was more time for casual chat and for gaining a feel for 
the organisations when the schedule was less structured. 
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A second tranche of interviews was scheduled after additional issues had 
emerged in an initial analysis indicating that some service types had not been included 
thus far and needed to be further explored in order to provide a more complete 
picture of employment advice provision in the UK. The second tranche would include 
visits to previous locations, as well as three new organisations, and a second question 
schedule (again developed within the framework of the EU LEONARDO project) would 
be used.  
While contact had already been established with previously visited 
organisations, the process of arranging suitable interview times with them proved 
more difficult the second time. The researcher felt that some organisations considered 
themselves ’over researched’ and were hoping that through delaying the process, the 
researcher would eventually abandon the second round of interviews. Once the 
researcher had an agreed date, the actual interviews went well and the respondents 
shared their opinion as freely as before. Organisations which were approached for the 
first time were quite keen on taking part in the project. In particular VCO sector 
organisations expressed a keen interest, perhaps because they might have felt it would 
support their work and provide exposure. 
When piloted, the interviews took about 75 minutes to complete. However, 
when collecting the first wave of project data, it transpired that interview times 
differed substantially because some respondents were more talkative than others. It 
was considered whether organisations should be informed about the potentially 
longer duration of the interviews when gaining access in an attempt to disrupt their 
operations as little as possible. However, it became apparent that on average 
interviews took about 75 minutes as initially observed and therefore, no adjustments 
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were made. Indeed interview times varied from about 30 minutes which was a 
strongly abridged interview, to 2.5 hours when interviewing with an extremely 
talkative person.  
As previously mentioned, some of the organisations established schedules 
when and with whom an interview was to take place. Sometimes this schedule had to 
be adhered to rather rigidly so that over-running on the allocated time was not 
possible. Thus some interviews ended prematurely. In one organisation particularly, 
the schedule was so tight that a highly abridged set of questions had to be used. This 
nevertheless provided valuable data. The situation itself provided invaluable insight 
into the work environment of the advisers and the pressures they had to mediate. 
However, the situation also presented the researcher with a dilemma, because she had 
to weigh up which questions would be most important to ask. It was also very difficult 
to establish rapport with the participant due to the short time frame. Consequently, 
the researcher contemplated returning to the service for a second round of interviews 
to complete the remainder of the topics. The attempted return was halted by 
management who did not allow a second round of interviews with advisers citing time 
constraints and impact on the service. Thus the researcher had to be content with the 
data gathered. 
In another location, the researcher was required to cut the question schedule 
into smaller sections. Whilst this allowed all questions to be asked of the interview 
participant, it was somewhat difficult because at each new start of the interview, 
rapport had to be re-established and a new starting point needed to be found. 
Additionally, it was unclear how much time the participant would have because the 
interview took place between appointments with users. If the service user arrived, the 
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interview had to stop so that the adviser could attend to the user. While this was 
disruptive to the interview flow, it gave the researcher time to casually observe what 
was going on in the office, which provided a plethora of contextual information giving 
a deeper insight into the advisers’ work environment. The previous examples were 
however exceptions, and usually the contact persons had made generous 
arrangements according to the researcher's requests. 
For the second wave of interviews, the duration differed more substantially, 
because the services which were added to the research had to complete both topic 
guides whilst the services which were revisited only had the second question schedule 
to complete. Taking this into consideration, visits at new locations were scheduled to 
take two days. Similar challenges to the first wave of interviews occurred but the 
researcher was better prepared to deal with adjustments and cope with sudden 
alterations. 
Data analysis 
Data analysis is an integral part of any research project used to extract meaning 
from the data collected. But often it can not be distinguished as a separate stage in the 
research process because it starts from the moment the researcher contacts 
gatekeepers and interview participants (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). However, these 
subjective impressions jeopardise the quality of the research and therefore, an analysis 
strategy is required to ensure the robustness of the findings.  
Initially, for each case study service a case description was developed as a 
general strategy to guide further in-depth analysis of theoretical concepts (see chapter 
6). The case descriptions followed an overall structure which provided detailed 
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information about each case. After this the cases were assessed according to various 
criteria to examine whether there was potential for aggregation of cases into types 
that shared similar features. Based on this initial assessment a typology was developed 
that served as a guide for further analysis of the theoretical concepts. While the 
synthesis of cases into types makes the analysis more complex, it allows the 
exploration of wider theoretical aspects in a more easily accessible fashion (Yin, 2003). 
The use of a typology in interpretive approaches can be traced to Weber, who used his 
ideal types as a means to explain social actions (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
Initially, the researcher considered using a software package, such as NVivo, to 
carry out the actual analytical task. However, due to time constraints, it was deemed 
impractical to set-up and develop a full NVivo project. Additionally, while NVivo was 
superior for data management, it could be confusing during the coding and analysis 
stages. Instead a combination of methods were used to facilitate data exploration and 
analysis. The researcher used an approach similar to Framework as outlined by Ritchie 
and Spencer (1994). Framework was developed as an analysis approach particularly for 
applied policy research and offers a systematic process to synthesise and interpret 
qualitative data.  
In order to conduct the analysis, the researcher first needed to refamiliarise 
herself with the data. Because the researcher had conducted all the interviews, wrote 
up field notes and partially transcribed the interviews, a good initial knowledge of the 
data existed. Observing time constraints, a large part of the transcription was 
outsourced. It can be argued that transcription is a form of interpretation of the data 
and in this case it was done by an outsider, which could potentially influence the 
quality of the interview data (Poland, 2003). Recognising this problem and as a means 
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to quality assure the data, the researcher read and listened to a sample of interviews 
to get a feeling for how the transcriber had transferred the spoken words into text. 
Additionally, this also served to fill in gaps where the transcriber had not understood 
properly what had been said, thus minimizing word transfer errors. Additional 
knowledge was gained through high level analysis of the cases for the EU LEONARDO 
project. However, this kind of analysis forced the researcher to focus on different 
issues and concepts and thus could only provide a rough guide. In order to re-focus 
and realign the familiarisation process with the PhD research questions, a select 
number of interviews was explored in greater depth and emerging themes and issues 
noted. 
The next step consisted of the construction of a thematic framework. The 
thematic framework allows data to be reviewed and referenced according to key 
themes which had previously been established (for instance, discretion) and issues 
that emerged at the familiarisation stage (for instance, trust). It was important to 
recognise that the development of a thematic framework required judgements to be 
made in terms of the salience of ideas and potential connections between topics 
(Matthews and Ross, 2010). 
Once the themes had been established, they were applied to the data. It was 
quite difficult to stringently apply the thematic framework to the data because initially 
the themes were quite broad and required further refinement which in turn required a 
review of already treated transcripts. Thus the application of the thematic framework 
was an emergent and iterative process but which also allowed first insight into 
connections between themes. During this process, salient quotations from 
respondents were physically highlighted and catalogued according to the thematic 
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framework for subsequent illustration and exemplification of findings. This process of 
highlighting and cataloguing allowed easy retrieval of the relevant passages, while 
keeping the data within their context so that the potential for misinterpretation could 
be reduced (Bryman, 2001).  
The next step consisted of the primary aggregation of data, where data from 
individual cases was categorised under their type in tables. This allowed for 
comparison of themes within types as well as across types and the synthesis of the 
data. This process required close attention to the similarities within each type but it 
was also important to keep track of any differences. This supported two aims. Firstly, it 
strengthened the validity of the typology. And secondly, it required the researcher to 
look for reasons as to why these differences occurred and thus strengthened the 
robustness of the analysis and the overall project. The writing of the analysis then 
followed a pre-determined structure that allowed for in-depth analysis of the 
theoretical concepts within and subsequently across types. This allowed the gradual 
building up of a larger picture which piece-by-piece answered research questions and 
helped to achieve the overall aim of the project. 
Conclusion 
The focus of the study was to provide and in-depth qualitative exploration of 
how advisers mediated the tensions between service user needs and managerial 
demands. It uses 38 semi-structured interviews in 8 case study offices to address this 
question. The chapter located the study in an interpretivist, ‘subtle realism’ framework 
and refuted positivist criticisms such as the lack of reliability, validity, generalisability 
and rigour. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the main method to collect 
data because they facilitated the collection of in-depth information while allowing 
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sufficient flexibility to react in an ad-hoc manner to changing interview circumstances, 
for instance abridged interview times. The chapter also provided a reflexive account of 
the data collection process and considered the impact of access through gatekeepers 
as well as ethical considerations, such as deductive disclosure of case study providers 
or interview participants. The chapter concluded with an account of the data analysis 
process, which was facilitated through the creation of a typology. The following 
chapter provides details of the creation of the services typology. 
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Chapter 6 
Developing a typology from case study profiles 
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Introduction 
Employment, advice and guidance services in the UK were delivered in two 
distinct frameworks, the welfare-to-work framework and the learning and skills 
framework. As a result, the provision landscape was very diverse in terms of which 
organisations provided services, their target groups and the qualification profiles of the 
advisers. This diversity was actively supported by the New Labour government to draw 
on the unique benefits each organisation could provide (Blair, 2001, Home Office 
1998). The following sections will provide a map of employment advice and guidance 
provision, followed by in-depth profiles of the case study services used in this study. 
Emerging patterns from the profiles, supplemented by contextual and theoretical 
considerations, will be used to develop a typology of advice and guidance services in 
the UK.  
Mapping the UK employment advice landscape 
In the UK in the early Twenty-first Century a plethora of organisations provided 
employment advice and guidance. The following sections provide a brief map of 
services available in the UK12. This map was informed by the starting premise of this 
study, which also later informed the choice of the case study services. It focused on 
considering which services were available to individuals faced with unemployment, 
redundancy, returning to work or a career change in the UK. For the purpose of this 
study, therefore, employment advice services were all those services that offered 
advice and support to adults in order to mediate transitions between different labour 
market statuses (Frade et al., 2006). 
                                               
12 This map was derived from a mapping exercise carried out for the ‘Guidance in Europe’ project. The results of 
this exercise were reported in the UK national report (Wright et. al., 2005) and further synthesised in a 
comparative report (Frade et. al., 2006). 
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One of the providers was Jobcentre Plus, the UK’s public employment service. 
While this may not seem an obvious consideration at first, Jobcentre Plus was the first 
point of call when an individual was faced with unemployment due to its 
administrative function in the distribution of unemployment benefits. Labour market 
related advice was provided within the different New Deal programmes, which were 
targeted at specific audiences (for instance New Deal for Young People, New Deal 25+ 
or New Deal for Lone Parents). Access to these programmes was usually mandatory. 
Advice was dispensed by ‘Personal Advisers’ who were public servants.  
Specific services within the New Deal programmes, which focussed for instance 
on training or improving employability (for example CV writing), were subcontracted to 
a range of providers including private companies and voluntary and community sector 
organisations. Interestingly, while the co-operation with Jobcentre Plus fell under the 
welfare-to-work scheme, some of these services also had contracted provisions under 
the learning and skills framework. This broadened their user base, because Jobcentre 
Plus users were mandated to make use of the service, while the provision within the 
learning and skills framework offered voluntary access, but was often targeted at 
people with low skills profiles (below NVQ2). Advisers in these services had different 
qualification profiles, with specific guidance related qualifications only essential where 
organisations were required to hold the guidance sector specific ‘matrix’ quality 
accreditation. 
Services under the learning and skills framework were provided by a wide range 
of organisations, including voluntary and community sector organisations, further 
education colleges, training companies, adult and community education providers, 
local authorities, higher education institutions and private guidance providers. These 
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services were provided via a variety of means including face-to-face delivery, online or 
over the telephone. Access to these services was voluntary and initiated by the service 
user, and broadly focused on all age groups, although in England the provision was 
differentiated by age groups. The ‘Connexions’ service was specifically targeted at 
young people, while a wide range of providers delivered services for adults. In some of 
these organisations, advisers were qualified to postgraduate level in guidance specific 
fields and this was a condition of their ability to practice. In other services, advisers 
held qualifications in line with the ‘matrix’ requirements, while others did not see 
qualifications as essential to provide advice, but encouraged their staff to develop 
these skills.  
Unions, particularly in England were also sometimes a source of employment 
advice. Union Learning Representatives in England advised their co-workers on 
learning and skills development. However, they often closely co-operated with other 
local guidance providers (TUC Learning Services, 2005). In Scotland, unions did not see 
themselves as guidance providers but closely collaborated with other employment 
advice providers. Access to all these services mentioned before was free of charge, 
whether they were mandatory services under the welfare-to-work framework or 
voluntary access services under the learning and skills framework. There were also 
some paid services (see for instance Jackson et al., 2001). However, these usually did 
not target an individual directly, but were rather focused on an organisational level to 
provide advice for instance with redundancies or executive recruitment. These services 
were not taken into consideration for this study, because an individual could not 
access them directly in a strict sense. 
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This study focused on employment advice services for adults only and 
therefore, services such as ‘Connexions’, which were particularly targeted at young 
people were not included. A starting premise for this study was to consider services 
available to individuals faced with different labour market transitions in the UK. This 
perspective drove the selection of case studies which included services from the 
welfare-to-work as well as the learning and skills framework to represent the full 
spectrum of services which were available to guide a service user’s decision making. 
Consequently, the services studied were of a diverse nature. They included services 
that were provided by public, private and voluntary and community sector 
organisations, services that could be accessed voluntarily or were prescribed by 
government policy and differed widely in the size of their organisation. The following 
section gives an overview of the case study services and a range of criteria will be used 
to describe the services in more detail. These are: 
- the nature of the service and the organisation: including the mode of 
access to the service, funding arrangements, the type of provider 
organisation and organisational goals 
- the service organisation and staffing: including the size of the 
organisation, staff qualifications and management structures 
- the service delivery: including the kind of service interactions that take 
place and the service environment 
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The Case Study Service Profiles 
Service 1: New Deal13 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
New Deal was provided by Jobcentre Plus throughout the UK. The organisation 
was hierarchically structured, with centralised policy decision-making. Decisions on 
contracting of service providers were also mainly made by a central office so that the 
local offices only had limited ability to influence what additional services were 
available to service users. When fieldwork started Jobcentre Plus was in the process of 
being rolled out nationally. This process had started in 2002 and was nearing its 
completion and the re-branding exercise was almost finalised. During the second wave 
of fieldwork the restructuring and all re-branding were complete. 
Access to this service was mandatory for people aged 25 and older who were 
unemployed for 18 out of the preceding 21 months. Service users were automatically 
transferred to the service within the organisation and notified by post that they had to 
attend an interview. The service was funded by the government through taxes and as 
such there was an obligation to prove that the money was spent effectively and 
efficiently.  
                                               
13 Please note that service names are aliases chosen to protect the participants’ anonymity except in the cases of 
the New Deal and Careers Scotland, which could be easily identified by the knowledgeable reader. However, 
participants’ anonymity was protected by not disclosing the location of their offices. 
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Service organisation and staffing 
At the office level, there was a service manager and an adviser manager who 
oversaw the front-line advisers. Responsibilities of the service manager included the 
analysis of the management information provided on a daily basis, acting as a liaison 
with the district level and over-seeing local provision. The adviser manager scheduled 
adviser-user interactions and generally oversaw the adviser’s diaries, dealt with IT 
problems and observed adviser-user interactions on a regular basis.  
Advisers in the case study services were all public service employees with 
varying backgrounds before they had joined the organisation. Upon joining, they had 
received intensive training on the administrative side of the service and quick training 
on interview techniques. First port of call for advisers in the office would be the adviser 
manager. 
Service delivery 
The service consisted of a series of interviews which the service user was 
mandated to attend. If the users failed to attend the service they faced sanctions 
which ranged from a withdrawal of benefits for one day in the first instance to 
complete withdrawal in the third instance (“three strikes and you are out”). After 26 
weeks of directed job searching users attended a Gateway interview where they would 
be directed towards a mandatory activity for another 22 weeks before they returned 
to the organisation. These options consisted of training courses or work placements 
depending on what was available and depending on who the organisation was sub-
contracting to. The most common training courses at the case study service were 
joinery, painting and decorating, and occasionally an office administration or IT course. 
 107 
Service 2: Work Area 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
This service was contracted by a private provider. Originally a recruitment 
agency, the provider had branched out into delivering service contracts for various 
target groups, including long-term unemployed, lone parents and people with health 
issues. The organisation had a central office where decisions about which tenders to 
bid for were made. If successful, a local team was then established. Using this strategy, 
the provider had developed a UK-wide network of service delivery offices holding a 
wide range of contracts. 
Access to Work Area was mandatory for people who were unemployed for 18 
out of the preceding 21 months who were 25 years of age or older, or who were 
unemployed for 6 months if they were between 18 and 24 years. The service was 
located in a large city with a strong industrial pedigree. In the 1980s, the city suffered 
large scale redundancies during the closure of its manufacturing industry from which it 
was only slowly recovering. As a consequence, the average period of unemployment 
for service users who were mandated to the service amounted to 11 years. Service 
users were randomly assigned by Jobcentre Plus to one of three providers according to 
a percentage allocation of service users. The case study service was allocated at 
random to 25% of service users, while the main provider was assigned 50% and the 
other contractor dealt with the remaining 25%. 
As this indicates, the funding for the service was provided through contracting 
from the Department for Work and Pensions. The contract ran for a duration of three 
years and the provider was paid the majority of money based on outcomes. The 
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provider received smaller amounts of money for each user entering the service to 
cover basic overhead costs, as well as payments when users moved from stage one to 
stage two, with a larger payment made when the user moved into employment. By far 
the largest payment was allocated to a sustainable employment outcome which meant 
that a user had stayed in employment for 13 weeks.  
Service organisation and staffing 
The case study office had eight advisers, one dedicated administrator, an 
operations manager and an accounts manager. The operations manager was 
responsible for running the office and the contract, while the accounts manager liaised 
with local employers to create job opportunities for the service users. The advisers 
were initially drawn in a big recruitment exercise and emphasis was placed rather on 
their personal qualities and that they fit with the team, the organisation and the 
nature of the service. Advisers did not necessarily have a qualification in information, 
advice and guidance, although some had backgrounds in human resource 
management or counselling, at the same time though, one adviser used to be a police 
officer and another a teacher. This had changed by the second wave of fieldwork, by 
which point a number of advisers had achieved vocational qualifications and a number 
of advisers were working towards qualifications. The overall number of advisers also 
increased to 10. However, there was still considerable attrition. There were only two 
advisers still working at the service who participated in the initial wave of fieldwork 
and the local service management had changed completely. 
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Service delivery 
Service users received mandatory referrals from Jobcentre Plus and referred to 
the service. Once initial contact was established either through a personal visit or a 
phone call by the user, an appointment was set up with an adviser who had free 
capacity on their case load. The customer then attended a group induction session and 
an initial 60 min where the customer’s needs were established. The service used a 
‘dream job approach’ to find out which type of work, hours and industry would suit the 
users best and this method also got them to think outside of the box. Interestingly, 
service users in this service were called ‘members’. Indeed, users accessed the 
premises through a security guarded entrance bearing much of a resemblance to a 
private members club.  
The service was organised in three stages. The users were moved through these 
stages at specific points in time during their claim. During the initial four weeks on the 
service, the user had to attend the Jobcentre for their regular ‘sign-ons’ to receive 
their benefit payments as well as the case study service for the intervention. Once the 
service user was moved to stage two in week five, Jobcentre Plus transferred 
Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) payments to the service provider and the user only had to 
attend the meetings with the adviser, where the sign-ons were completed. While 
payment of JSA was transferred to the provider, the power to sanction the user for 
non-compliance stayed with Jobcentre Plus. The provider had to build a case and show 
that the customer had not complied with directions. Stage two lasted for 26 weeks and 
the adviser and the user would work together on removing barriers to work and 
finding suitable employment. This collaboration sometimes included ‘soft barrier’ 
courses which were developed and delivered in-house and addressed issues such as CV 
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writing, interview skills and confidence building. Other provisions (for instance short 
courses) were contracted as required. Furthermore, the service user attended regular 
meetings with the adviser to review action plans and job search goals and actions. In 
these meetings, the adviser and user identified issues that needed to be addressed for 
the user to return to work. 
The last stage was voluntary where the customer could choose to stay with the 
service provider for a further 22 weeks. Much of the same processes were followed 
and the service user also had access to the provider’s resources. However, JSA 
payments were transferred back to Jobcentre Plus and the user had to appear at 
Jobcentre Plus for regular sign-ons. 
The provider used a variety of incentives to encourage users to return to 
employment. To facilitate a job start or interview attendance, the advisers could 
access a discretionary fund to pay for clothes, transport or even cover bills until the 
service users received their first pay check. Initially, the provider also offered a ‘find 
your own job’ grant of £100, which the users received when they took the initiative 
and found employment for themselves. This was not part of the contract but was the 
policy of the organisation. However, this practice was stopped. Once the user had 
entered and sustained employment for 13 weeks, they were eligible for a payment of a 
lump sum of £300, which was covered by the contract. For these initial 13 weeks of 
employment, the provider also employed a retention specialist who would provide in-
work support if service users faced difficulties in managing their new regime. 
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Service 3: Working Estate 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
This service was provided by the same organisation as Work Area, but in a 
different city. This was a deliberate decision because one programme was delivered in 
Scotland and the other in England. Even though a comparison of England and Scotland 
was not a core aim of the fieldwork, it was important to understand the relationships 
between providers and service users. The service was a two year pilot programme 
specifically focused on highly deprived areas. The case study location fitted that 
criterion, being in the middle of a major urban regeneration project with a large 
percentage of ethnic minority residents. Unemployment and inactivity were 
considered relatively high in the area. Customers were eligible to access the service 
only if they lived within a specified postcode area.  
There were two strands to the service, a mandatory and a voluntary strand. The 
mandatory service users were referred by Jobcentre Plus if they had been unemployed 
for six months and lived within the specified postcode area. The voluntary service 
users were reached mostly through outreach work within the local community and 
canvassing local residences as well as word of mouth within the community. Voluntary 
users were often inactive and not in receipt of benefits and therefore not required to 
look for work.  
The service was funded through a pilot contract by the DWP for a period of two 
years. Funding for this period was in excess of £2 million, which was considered an 
extremely large amount of money for a service contract like this. But it depended 
largely on the successful job retention of service users that the provider would be able 
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to achieve this sum. As with the previous service, the provider was given a small 
amount of money to cover overhead costs, and then again smaller increments for 
moving service users from stage to stage. A larger amount was received when the user 
entered employment and the largest share was paid out on job retention for 13 weeks. 
Service organisation and staffing 
Locally the service was managed by an operations manager and an account 
manager. The operations manager covered everything to do with the local delivery of 
the contract, while the account manager liaised with employers and sub-contracted 
local providers. Additionally, there was a local ‘quality champion’ who cross-checked 
documents that were submitted for claims to the DWP, so that swift and smooth 
payment could be ensured.  
There were eight personal advisers in the offices with different work 
experience and backgrounds. Some were experienced within the organisation. Others 
had human resource management backgrounds. Due to the largely ethnic minority 
population in the area, a large proportion of the advisers were fluent in more than one 
language which facilitated communication with the service users. The office had 
experienced some attrition with the service originally having been run by a different 
management team. The operations manager pointed out that advisers were selected 
based on their motivation to achieve results and their fit with the team. 
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Service delivery 
Mandatory service users that fitted the postcode criterion and other eligibility 
criteria were automatically referred to the provider by Jobcentre Plus and had to 
report there within a specified period of time. Mandatory users could be sanctioned 
for not complying with their action plans and directions, although the adviser needed 
to build a case and sanctions were then referred back to Jobcentre Plus. Voluntary 
users accessed the services on their own account. They usually made contact with the 
provider and then followed the same procedures as mandatory users. However, the 
elements of compulsion and compliance present in the mandatory strand of the 
service did not apply to voluntary users. Equally, there were no time constraints for 
voluntary users. It was worth noting though that the voluntary users were those that 
were harder to reach and sometimes also harder to help due to specific barriers, most 
frequently language problems. 
The service user then received an appointment for an initial interview with one 
of the advisers who had capacity on their caseload. The initial interview took around 
60 minutes. The adviser, along with the user, set up a case file and, as in Work Area, 
used a ‘dream job’ approach to explore potential avenues. An action plan was 
developed with actions for the service user, which was mandatory for mandatory 
users. The adviser then booked a subsequent meeting at a time that the adviser 
thought most beneficial for the customer.  
Advisers indicated that they made appointments for users more frequently the 
closer they were to the labour market in order to brief them and provide them with 
additional support as needed. The length of these subsequent interviews also differed 
depending on the needs of the customer and could range anywhere from five minutes 
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to two hours. Within the initial meeting the adviser also identified barriers and 
pathways to addressing them, which included the in-house provision of so called ‘soft 
barriers’ courses which covered CV writing, interview skills, telephone manners and 
confidence building among others. Users could also be directed to external provision 
with a local provider if there was, for instance, an English language need. The initial 
interview and the period of time where the barriers were diagnosed made up Stage 1. 
This stage took up to four weeks, although for some customers this time period was 
shorter. 
Once an action plan was established, the service user was moved on to Stage 2 
which had a maximum duration of 6 months. The advisers then built an individual 
strategy with the service user and worked with them on a one-to-one basis. The aim 
was to get the service user into sustainable employment as fast as possible, while 
dealing with their barriers.  
After Stage 2, service users could select to either stay with the service for 
another 22 weeks or to return to Jobcentre Plus. One of the advisers reported that 
that about 80% of service users returned to Jobcentre Plus, either to escape the rather 
strict regime at the provider organisation or because the service could not deliver any 
additional support that would help them get into work. There was also a financial 
aspect because users were not eligible any longer for certain bonuses, such as travel 
expenses, if they stayed on. Those that stayed on were rather close to the labour 
market. 
“A lot of people on my follow on do eventually go into work and they 
just need that little extra time frame to be able to support themselves, 
have the support when they go into work.” (Adviser, Working Estate) 
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The service did provide retention support for service users. There were also 
considerable financial incentives for service users to maintain employment for 13 
weeks which advisers actively use as a selling point for the service. 
“They get a £50 bonus if they find a job from us. After three months they 
get £100 bonus from us and £500 from the Jobcentre. That’s after three 
months. After six months they get another £750 from the Jobcentre. It’s 
a real helpful tool in the final persuasion when they’re edging away, I 
don’t know if I want to do this.” (Adviser, Working Estate) 
As in Work Area, service users were called ‘members’ and a similar situation 
with access existed. Security personnel guarded the front entrance to the premises, 
while the office lay out itself was practical and open with dedicated areas for job 
searching, waiting, in-house training and the adviser desks. 
Service 4: Careers Scotland 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
This service was delivered by a large organisation in Scotland, which, according 
to the service manager, could be considered a quango due to its funding structure. In 
2002, over 80 different careers guidance services were amalgamated into this one 
organisation to ‘declutter’ the complicated and convoluted careers guidance landscape 
that had existed until then. When fieldwork was carried out in 2005, there was still 
restructuring and reorganisation going on. There was a lot of education about the 
goals and the nature of the organisation communicated to employees to integrate the 
various contracts, approaches, philosophies and management structures that the vast 
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number of different organisations had followed previously. Managers of the service 
considered the integration of all these organisations as a great success and 
accomplishment. 
The goal of the service was to provide an all-age careers guidance service with 
voluntary and free access. The only mandatory service users were 16-18 year olds who 
were not in education or employment (NEET) and benefits (although this specific group 
was not the focus of this study). They were mandated by Jobcentre Plus to attend the 
service on a regular basis to encourage them to take up employment or return to 
education. Access to the service was provided through different channels. There were 
offices in almost every bigger town throughout Scotland and guidance material could 
also be accessed through the organisation’s website.  
At the time of the fieldwork, funding was provided through the Scottish 
Executive. The provider directly negotiated targets and the associated funding with the 
government and report to them directly. However, the funding was administered 
through Scottish Enterprise in an effort to save costs on administration and make use 
of Scottish Enterprise’s expertise14.  
The main services provided by the organisation included, but were not limited 
to: 
- career planning to help service users make informed choices about their 
career choices. 
                                               
14 Subsequently, the Scottish Executive was renamed the Scottish Government. There has also been a separation of 
Scottish Enterprise Careers Scotland after a funding scandal at Scottish Enterprise. 
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- employability skills which included support in approaching the labour 
market through courses, CV writing and interview skills, etc. 
- employer services which included among others, help and support in 
case of redundancies, legal support, as well as career planning support 
for other organisations. 
Service organisation and staffing 
The case study office was split up in two locations. One location was the 
customer facing site, the so called ‘shop’, which was constantly staffed with four 
advisers. Advisers attended the shop on a rota basis and each of them had to attend 
for a certain amount of time according to their other duties, which included general 
careers guidance at schools or involvement with local labour market projects. The 
second site consisted of an office building where advisers had a permanent desk and 
took care of their administration tasks. This site was not frequented by customers. 
Through this structure there was a clear separation between the front-line advice 
service and the managerial side of the organisation. 
All advisers were qualified careers advisers (postgraduate level). Due to the 
amalgamation into one organisation, there were many different work styles and 
specialisations among advisers. Some saw themselves as specialist adult advisers, 
whereas others saw their remit more broadly. Under the umbrella of the new 
organisation they all were supposed to cover all aspects of the service according to the 
all-age nature of the integrated service. The organisation employed people to train as 
careers advisers. However, if they did not pass their degree course, they were not 
allowed to deliver careers guidance and were assigned more administrative functions.  
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Service delivery 
Service users accessed the service voluntarily to seek help with careers 
decisions. Some had made use of the service’s website before and needed additional 
advice after, for instance, some unsuccessful job interviews. The ‘shop’ was equipped 
with a number of computer terminals which allowed access to the organisation’s 
website with online resources. Other careers information and job search sites could be 
accessed as well. Furthermore, there was a large selection of careers guidance books 
as well as a broad range of leaflets giving information about working in specific 
industries.  
When entering the ‘shop’, the service user was greeted by an adviser and the 
purpose of the visit established. In most cases, the user was directed to the self-help 
resources after a short explanation of what was available and the recording of some 
details of the service user. The local adviser occasionally checked with the service user 
if they found the information suitable or if they needed any help. The service manager 
commented that according to procedure, the vast majority of service users did not 
receive in-depth guidance but rather used the self-help with light support. The 
intention was that only about 4% of service users actually had an in-depth discussion 
with a careers adviser, although advisers commented that they applied this more 
flexibly. The self-help service could be accessed for as long as necessary, where as an 
in-depth interaction with an adviser would take a maximum of 60 minutes. 
Advisers outlined that most users accessed the service only once to solve a 
specific problem. In the rare event, that a user returned the procedure was that users 
were not guaranteed to see the same advisers due to the rota system. The adviser 
then accessed a case file, which was stored on a database system. In practice, 
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however, the adviser who had previously consulted with the user sometimes gave the 
service user a rough idea when he or she would be in the office again, so the user 
could time the visit and continue consulting the same adviser. 
Service 5: Move On 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
Move On was provided by a small voluntary and community sector 
organisation. The original focus of the organisation was to support migrant workers 
from Italy in their move to the UK and during their initial time in the country. Doing 
this work the organisation had built up a detailed knowledge of the local labour market 
and how to support workers in the transition to sustainable employment. In an effort 
to expand their funding base, the organisation sub-contracted Move On provision from 
a main contractor. The contract for Move On was renewed yearly and payment was 
based on achievement of certain targets. The service manager, however, did point out 
that as long as they achieved their targets on average, payments would be received. At 
the time of the first visit, the organisation was contracted to see 43 eligible service 
users per month, which was increased to 48 by the second visit. 
A notable change in the organisational structure occurred between the two 
fieldwork visits, when the service provider merged with another, bigger voluntary 
sector organisation that had similar aims and a similar target group, but a more stable 
and established funding structure. By the time of the second visit, the provider was 
fully integrated with the other organisation, but continued with the Move On contract 
and providing its previous support for migrant workers. 
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Service organisation and staffing 
The service was led by one manager who was also a co-founder of this 
organisation. There were two advisers, an administrator, who helped with job 
searching occasionally, and two volunteers, who helped out with administrative 
matters and job searching. The employee and payment structure was very much based 
on volunteer time and contribution. 
“But in fact we are, well I am paid part-time *…+ and the two advisors, I 
mean *Adviser 1+, well she’s a volunteer really, she’s paid, because she’s 
doing the accounts and advising she is paid for the accounts, for doing 
the accounts, well [the administrator] is full-time and [Adviser 2] well 
he’s here full-time but he’s a volunteer, he’s paid for part-time really.  
And [woman] is a volunteer, she’s here three days.” (Manager, Move 
On) 
The manager and one adviser were fully qualified careers advisers, although 
they partially qualified abroad. The second adviser was working towards an NVQ2 in 
Advice and Guidance, whereas the other volunteers did not have any qualifications 
with regards to advice and guidance.  
The staff situation had changed dramatically after the merger. The staff, 
including the manager, had changed completely. The new manager had a background 
in anthropology and was working towards an NVQ2 in Advice and Guidance, together 
with a volunteer adviser. 
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Service delivery 
Service users were referred to the service by the local Jobcentre Plus office if 
their qualification level was below NVQ 1. The interaction was supposed to be 20 min 
long and was considered a one-off intervention. However, the interventions often took 
longer according to the service user’s need. The service consisted of advice with 
regards to job searching (CV, interviews) and also information on improving skills, 
depending on what the service user asked for.  
According to the service manager, referral from the Jobcentre and therefore 
access to the service was voluntary and the users often walked in to the service office 
to see if they could be helped immediately, or made an appointment. The provider’s 
policy, as outlined by the manager and the advisers, was that they were seen by 
whoever was available and the adviser then addressed the issues the service user had. 
In the rare event that users returned for additional information or support, they saw 
the same adviser as before. 
Service 6: Redundancy Help 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
Redundancy Help was a pilot project which was fully funded through the 
European Social Fund (ESF) for 3 years and focused on employees that were under 
threat or had recently been made redundant. The pilot programme covered the 
Scottish Enterprise area (South and Central Scotland), while the Highlands & Islands 
region of Scotland could not be included due to EU funding restrictions. The service 
was delivered within the same organisational framework as the Careers Scotland. The 
 122 
service was intended to fill the gaps that were not covered by a programme that 
addressed large scale redundancies. The aim was thus to be able to provide a seamless 
service for employees affected by redundancies. Access to the service was voluntary 
and dependent on whether the organisation that was making employees redundant 
notified the service. Even so, employees still had the option of whether or not to make 
use of the service. 
While the service had targets to achieve (which were built into the project bid), 
these targets appeared flexible and the project manager indicated that they had been 
revised occasionally based on insights from the programme implementation.  
Service organisation and staffing 
The service was delivered by the advisers from Careers Scotland, who were all 
qualified careers advisers. Most of them had substantial experience in working with 
adults. These advisers were seconded for part of their time to the pilot. Each office 
throughout the South and Central region of Scotland had at least one adviser who was 
responsible for delivering Redundancy Help, if it was triggered.  
Advisers reported to their local line manager on their general work but also 
including their work on Redundancy Help, and also reported to the project manager to 
feedback information and experiences. 
Service delivery 
The service delivery was triggered through a redundancy. However, whether 
the advisers were active depended on the size of the redundancy and whether it 
would trigger a response from the service that covered the large-scale redundancies. 
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According to the service manager, the definition of ‘large-scale’ differed widely 
between regions. In some offices, it could be as little as one person being made 
redundant whereas in other regions it could be as high as 500. The way advisers found 
out also differed widely. Advisers recalled that sometimes a company phoned up and 
asked for support, sometimes there was information in the local newspaper and the 
advisers approached the company and offered support. At other times, the advisers 
only learned after the redundancy when a worker came to one of the offices of the 
Careers Scotland service, at which point the service user received the regular service 
that was provided there. 
The advisers and the manager explained, that the service consisted, at a 
minimum, of a presentation that informed the employees about the services that were 
available to them, benefits that they could apply for and contained a lot of sign posting 
to organisation offering support. This presentation took place at the company that was 
making employees redundant. If advisers were given some lead in time, they could 
work over a longer period of time with employees that wanted support. Advisers then 
delivered careers advice on the company premises during the employees working 
hours. This often included advice on a career break, re-training and re-orientation, or 
support with job searching and preparation for interviews. The content of the 
interaction depended largely on the service user’s needs.  
If the redundancy occurred with insufficient lead in time or the employees were 
not finished with their career planning with the adviser, the advisers explained that 
service users were directed to the local premises of the Careers Scotland service where 
they were supported by a careers adviser. 
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Service 7: Telephone Guidance 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
This service was delivered by a third sector organisation that mainly contracted 
information, advice and guidance services from various providers which included the 
Learning and Skills Council as well as the BBC, for instance. The organisation was 
unique in that it provided mainly contact centre services for various contractors. Since 
access to the service originated from the service user through a phone call, the service 
was entirely voluntary in nature. The aim of the service was “to empower people 
through information” (Manager, Telephone Guidance). 
The organisation was split over two sites, of which only one site was included in 
the project. The organisation had been involved in delivering the Telephone Guidance 
since 1999. Initially a small team of 30 employees started delivering the service. At the 
time of the fieldwork, the team had grown to about 250 employees across the two 
sites of which about 200 were on the adviser team at different levels. The remainder 
were managerial staff and administrative support. Advisers worked full-time, part-time 
or just hourly.  
The organisation sub-contracted the service from the University for Industry 
(UfI), who held a remit from the LSC as well as the Department for Education and Skills 
(DfES). The service had key performance indicators to fulfil, which were constantly 
monitored and adjusted through close co-operation with UfI. According to the 
manager, the service took between 700,000 to 800,000 phone calls per year across the 
two sites.  
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Service organisation and staffing 
There were three levels of advisers. Information advisers solely provided 
information to the caller which mainly consisted of sign-posting to various education 
resources and providers. These advisers were qualified to NVQ2 in Call Handling. The 
service manager described them as the face of the service, because any phone call was 
initially taken by them and then fielded to competent staff if the query was more 
complex. The next level was the Learning Adviser who was able to provide information 
on funding opportunities, and can direct callers to skill diagnostic tools as well as 
advise on whether skills might be transferable to other careers. Learning Advisers were 
qualified up to NVQ 3 in Advice and Guidance. The new service that the organisation 
provided was the in-depth careers advice. This was provided by Careers Coaches, who 
were internally also referred to as Lifelong Learning Advisers. These advisers often had 
previous experience in advice and guidance, or if that was not the case, they were 
working towards an NVQ 4 in Advice and Guidance. To satisfy initial demand, qualified 
careers advisers were hired, but the usual pathway was progression through the 
organisation from an Information Adviser to a Careers Coach. Progression was only 
possible upon completion of the relevant qualifications. 
Service delivery 
Telephone Guidance was accessible seven days a week from 8 am until 10 pm 
due to demand and feedback from service users. The manager described, that callers 
were fielded to one or the other site based on where an adviser was available first. 
Initially, an Information Adviser received the call and assessed the situation and then 
transferred the call to the first available, suitable adviser.  
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The general policy as described by the manager intended that the in-depth 
guidance service was mostly targeted at service users with low qualification levels 
(below NVQ 2), who were eligible for up to three interactions of about 30 minutes 
each. However in practice, advisers did not turn away users with higher qualification 
levels, but did not automatically offer the two additional interactions and a written 
action plan. Advisers explained, that it was expected that higher qualified users would 
keep notes for themselves, while the action plan for lower qualified users were also 
used to inform colleagues about the contents of the previous interactions. In 
subsequent interactions, the service user did not necessarily speak to the same 
adviser.  
The manager and advisers outlined, that the actual content of the interaction 
depended on the needs of the service user. In some cases this was advice on a career 
switch or a discussion about career prospects in a certain industry. The advisers 
outlined that they checked with the service user whether the information they 
provided was what the user was looking for to keep the interaction as closely focused 
on the user’s needs as possible. If the service user was eligible, the adviser offered an 
action plan which was then either e-mailed or post mailed to the user. If desired, this 
triggered a follow up call a couple of weeks later to check on their progress and any 
further support needs.  
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Service 8: Lone Parent Advice 
Nature of the organisation and the service 
This service was delivered by a large third sector organisation which operated 
primarily in the West of Scotland. With more than 600 employees in a large network of 
offices, also offering childcare and development opportunities, the service was quite 
substantial15. The aim of the organisation was to provide support and advice for lone 
parents, which included not only their return into employment, but also included legal, 
psychological and financial advice. The aim of the Lone Parent Advice service was to 
support lone parents into employment through advice, support and skill building. To 
fulfil this goal, the organisation offered training courses, for instance in child care. 
Access to the service was completely voluntary and service users, particularly those 
receiving individual support, could stop the process at any point in time. 
Funding for the service was provided through the organisation. The advisers 
were contracted internally to deliver ‘employability’ modules to course participants, 
which were then billed to the course budget. Individual consultations were covered by 
the organisation’s budget. There was also an EU funded project which focused 
specifically on retention support for lone parents, but this was not part of the research 
project investigation.  
                                               
15 After completing the interviews with the service manager and the advisers, the organisation had to file for 
bankruptcy. This came as a complete shock, as there had been no signs or indications by the advisers and the 
service manager with regards to financial problems. The service shut down over night, leaving many people 
unemployed and lone parents who were in the middle of completing qualifications unable to complete their 
courses. 
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Service organisation and staffing 
Advisers for Lone Parent Advice came from various backgrounds, including a 
camera woman, a previously unemployed lone parent, and an adviser with Working 
Estate. There was not necessarily a focus on qualifications as an adviser, but rather on 
whether the adviser was enthusiastic about the work they were going to do and the 
way they would worked with the service users. The unifying feature among all advisers 
as well as the manager within the Lone Parent Advice service was that they were lone 
parents. There were four advisers with the service, of which one had line managing 
responsibilities based on experience, as well as a overall service manager who also 
oversees the employment retention programme. 
Service delivery 
Advisers and managers commented that the service was delivered wherever 
suited the service user best. This included, for instance, the local library, a café or the 
service user’s house. The manager outlined a process where the service users often 
approached the organisation for support with something else, for instance legal advice 
or child care, and perhaps indicate that they were considering returning to work. They 
were then referred to one of the advisers, who would then make an appointment. The 
content of the subsequent interactions depended entirely on the service user’s needs 
and could consist of confidence building, identification of barriers to work, information 
on courses or intensive support with job searching and interview skills. The service was 
highly personalised and interviews took place at times and durations that suited the 
service user best. Advisers mentioned that if a service user felt they could not continue 
with the process, they stayed in touch with the user but did not pressure them to 
follow through with their plan to return to work. 
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A second strand of the service, what advisers called ‘employability advice’, was 
delivered in a group setting and was generally part of a vocational training course. 
Advisers explained that the various modules were delivered on a monthly basis with 
the continuity of a dedicated adviser. The modules included but were not limited to CV 
writing, interview skills, assertiveness training, as well as salary negotiations and time 
management. Advisers targeted the course modules towards the group of people 
attending the work shop (for instance, a group of teenage mothers). If the participants 
needed individual support, the adviser made an appointment and addressed the issue 
as mentioned above.  
The Services Typology 
The case study services were specifically chosen for their diversity and to 
represent the full spectrum of service provision available within the UK. However, this 
diversity made a meaningful analysis difficult if it was solely based on service 
attributes. The emergence of patterns, their similarities and differences were difficult 
to ascertain due to their great variance. A useful tool to facilitate the analysis was a 
typology which grouped similar services together based on certain features. This 
allowed a more detailed analysis on several levels. On the one hand, within a certain 
type similarities and differences could emerge more easily and allowed the comparison 
of similar kinds of services. On the other hand, the comparison across types allowed 
the drawing of a bigger picture. At this level, patterns of interactions could be spotted 
and theories potentially confirmed or amended. 
Considering the variety of case study services, there were a number of 
possibilities to establish a meaningful typology. Services could be structured along 
organisation types (for instance, public, private and third sector organisations). 
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Another consideration was the structuring with regards to funding sources. Equally, a 
comparison according to the relevant framework (welfare-to-work or education and 
skills) appeared initially viable. A more recent analysis by (Personnaz et al., 2007) 
developed a typology based on the nature of the service which was applicable in a 
cross-national context. However, all these approaches did not produce a clear 
structure that allowed an insight into how advisers mediated the tensions between 
their managerial requirements and their interactions with service users because of 
frequently changing organisational structures, approaches to service delivery and 
shifting funding structures. 
The construction of the typology was based on the emerging themes from the 
initial analysis, taking also into consideration the contextual factors as well as the 
theoretical concepts underpinning the study. The initial analysis of the case study 
services, as presented before, suggested that the most consistent factors across 
services were the mode of access (mandatory or voluntary) and whether services were 
largely standardised or focused on the service user’s needs. The mode of access was 
somewhat influenced by the framework that the programme fell under, whether it 
followed the more stringent welfare-to-work strand or the education and skills 
framework. There was also a policy rationale, which stated that users of some services 
should be compelled to participate, while in other services users should be enabled 
and supported, suggesting more voluntary participation. The creation of more user-
defined services was one of the key tenets of managerial governance mechanisms 
(Gray and Jenkins, 1995), so the use of this dichotomy seemed pertinent to the 
analysis from a theoretical perspective. 
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While the development of types made the analysis as such more complex 
because it required the additional analytic step to establish the types, choosing the 
most consistent factors across services allowed an in-depth exploration of the 
theoretical concepts in a more accessible way. The interpretation of the findings could 
also be presented in a more structured way and thus revealed similarities and 
differences between cases within as well as across types.  
Based on the above profiles, the services can be placed along two ‘axes’, 
creating four quadrants. The horizontal ‘axis’ covers service access, whether it was 
voluntary or mandatory. The vertical ‘axis’ has standardisation and user definition at 
its extremes. The four quadrants thus created combinations of these aspects and 
illustrated the extent to which these services exhibited certain features, for instance if 
they were high on standardisation and low on mandatory access for instance. When 
applied to the service profiles, the quadrants look as follows: 
 
Table 3: The services typology 
 Mandatory Access Voluntary Access 
Standardised Service New Deal 
Work Area 
Working Estate 
Careers Scotland 
User-focused Service  Move On 
Redundancy Help 
Telephone Guidance 
Lone Parent Advice 
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There are four possible types:  
- a mandatory-standardised type,  
- a voluntary-standardised type,  
- a voluntary-user defined type, and  
- a mandatory-user defined type.  
It was interesting to note that the latter type does not seem to be populated 
with services in the UK. This was because the centralised nature of the UK policy 
context and the current provision environment do not allow such a combination. 
Mandatory services were mainly found within the welfare-to-work provision. These 
kinds of policies were centrally steered by the UK government, and programme 
content and provision was highly standardised and defined. A mandatory – user 
defined service would require a transfer of responsibility to a lower level organisation 
that was able to manage a programme targeted to specific user needs as well as 
allowing the service user to be involved in the decision-making process. Within the 
context of the introduction of consumerism in the UK policy context, there had been 
an attempt to transform the ‘passive’ welfare recipient into an ‘active’ customer and 
citizen with rights and responsibilities. However, theorists (Potter, 1994, Clarke & 
Newman 1994) argue that the transfer of power that would be necessary to complete 
this transformation has been incomplete and therefore, this approach failed to actively 
involve service users in shaping public services. The services typology appears to 
confirm this argument with the lack of a service in the mandatory- user defined type. 
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An example where such a service type can be found is in the Nordic countries, where 
the legal basis for user participation has been created (Van Aerschot, 2008). 
Conclusion 
Diversity in the provision of employment advice services was actively supported 
by the UK government to supplement public service delivery in order to provide high 
quality services with a strong user focus (Blair, 2001). This chapter supplied a map to 
the service provision landscape in the UK. The service profiles revealed quite a 
structured picture of what kinds of employment advice services were provided within 
the UK context. The diversity of the services required the construction of a typology to 
conduct a meaningful analysis of the different cases. The typology allowed for a more 
structured approach to the data analysis and provided a framework to discover 
similarities and differences of the front-line governance of service provision in the 
diverse employment advice landscape. The typology will allow both an insight into the 
subtle differences among services of the same type. At the same time, the comparison 
across the types will reveal, it was hoped, the substantial differences in how advisers in 
these various service types governed service users, and how their work was steered 
and controlled by governance approaches. 
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Chapter 7  
Steering the service user 
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Introduction 
Politically, front-line advisers are portrayed as focal points to mediate 
government policy, inform, and influence service user’s behaviour (Jewell and Glaser, 
2006). The study is rooted in the concept of governance and aims to examine the ways 
in which different governance regimes emerge through the management and practice 
of advisers at street level (Lipsky, 1980). This chapter examines the adviser-user 
relationship and how advisers delivered employment advice to the service users. In 
particular, these interactions were an expression of how advisers governed the 
relationship and tried to balance managerial demands with relationship processes to 
achieve a behaviour change. The nature, quality and content of this relationship was 
central to the outcome of the service, particularly where this involved changing 
people’s behaviour (Hasenfeld et al., 1974). 
In order to explore how advisers in the different service types tried to change 
people’s behaviour, the building blocks of establishing the relationship between the 
service user and the adviser in the various case study services needed to be explored. 
The analysis of similarities and differences among services of the same type produced 
a footprint for the type. This was then used to compare the implications for the 
adviser-user relationship and how advisers negotiated the underlying tensions across 
the different types. 
The character and dynamics of the adviser-user relationship were closely 
connected. Dynamics of the interaction define the character of the service and vice 
versa. The nature of access to the service, mandatory or voluntary, potentially sets an 
initial tone for the dynamics of the interaction. The pre-defined aspects of a service, 
for instance availability of training courses or set moves from one stage of the 
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programme to another, set boundaries to how advisers could use discretion. Trust in a 
person’s actions and capabilities were a way of ensuring compliance with 
requirements and thus had a direct bearing on the outcomes a service might produce 
(Newman, 2001). The underlying assumption was that if an adviser could successfully 
balance the managerial demands with responsiveness to user needs, they were in a 
position to establish trust and elicit compliant behaviour that would, in turn, produce 
the intended behaviour change in the service user (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
The following sections set out to examine this assumption within the service types. 
Discretion 
First the concept of discretion was analysed within the different service types in 
order to capture the similarities and differences of the services that make up a type. As 
discussed earlier, discretion is a contested concept and in varying contexts has 
different definitions. For the purpose of this project, an adviser has discretion: 
 “whenever the effective limits of his power leave him[sic] free to make 
a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.” (Davis, 1974 
cited in Adler and Asquith, 1981: 9).  
This definition was deliberately chosen, as it is quite broad in order to capture 
the uses of discretion in the different types of services. The uses of discretion were 
expected to differ substantially. The following sections examine the use of discretion 
within the four service types. 
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Mandatory-standardised type services 
Services in this group were often standardised and left little room for flexibility 
and the use of discretion for advisers. The limitations that curtailed adviser’s flexibility 
in the New Deal, for instance, included time limits for interviews which advisers 
reported they strictly adhered to, as well as checklists that advisers worked through in 
an interaction. Although there were time restrictions for advisers in the Work Area and 
Working Estate services, they did not appear to adhere as strictly to the restrictions 
but rather focused on the user’s individual needs. The advisers described adapting 
frequency, length and content of the interactions according to how close the adviser 
perceived the user to be to the labour market. Advisers in Working Estate pointed out 
that they saw users more often but for a shorter time if they were close to applying for 
jobs and getting interviews. However, they also indicated that as much as they tried to 
focus on the individual’s needs and providing individual support, the programme 
guidelines always took precedence. This meant that advisers in Work Area and 
Working Estate worked with a strong focus on returning users to the labour market 
and moved users from stage to stage at specific points in time as required by the 
programme guidelines (with the exception of the voluntary users in the Working Estate 
where advisers had more leeway).  
Despite this, it seemed that advisers in these two services were more flexible 
than advisers in other services of this type, for instance, in selecting measures to 
support the user. Advisers highlighted that, if, for example, users needed a forklift 
license to increase their chances for employment, the provider could buy-in the service 
and send the user to the course. Additionally, advisers had discretionary funding 
available that could be used to reimburse travel expenses or to help with the purchase 
 138 
of interview clothes or work wear. Advisers appreciated this additional support and 
flexibility because they felt they could make a real difference to people’s lives and 
support them in their transition to work. In fact, advisers were eager to point out that 
their work, despite providing a similar service to that of The New Deal was distinctly 
different from that of an adviser there: 
“… I see myself as adding a bit more of a personal touch than the 
Jobcentre can and ultimately helping people more than the Jobcentre 
can *…+ and the intervention that I do here is much more than sort of 
sign here right okay on you go, I will try to explore every avenue possible 
for people…” (Adviser, Work Area) 
In contrast, advisers said that interactions between advisers and users in the 
New Deal were highly structured and followed a pre-defined pattern with little 
deviation from user to user. This made interactions between advisers and users seem 
rather mechanical and advisers indicated that it impacted on their motivation and 
ability to provide a targeted service:  
“It’s just like… you’re like a robot, I mean, you just come in, you’ve got 
your list printed in front of you and you just get on with it basically.” 
(Adviser, New Deal) 
This inflexible and rule-bound way of working translated into the interactions 
with service users. Advisers had limited options to, for instance, send service users 
onto courses. The New Deal advisers highlighted that mainly due to lack of financial 
resources they were unable to respond to user’s requests to be sent on courses such 
as painting and decorating, because these courses were not contracted by the 
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provider. This led to users being sent onto courses that were not necessarily suitable 
or helpful to them. The mandatory nature and strict timeline of the service required 
the user, as well as the adviser, to comply with the measure if they did not want to risk 
being sanctioned. The fact that the adviser was potentially threatened by sanctions 
may appear strange, yet there was the threat of a performance downgrade if the 
adviser did not adhere to service requirements. This highlights the restrictions advisers 
in this service were operating under. Previous literature has shown that performance 
evaluation is one of the tools that can limit adviser’s discretion and increase service 
standardisation from a managerial level (McKevitt, 1998). The use of these tools will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
In contrast to the New Deal, advisers in the Work Area and Working Estate 
services in particular appreciated the opportunity to respond on a more personal basis 
to the user and develop an individual approach to the user’s needs. The fact that their 
interactions were not governed by a standardised framework was seen as positive 
because it gave advisers a certain degree of control over maintaining a relationship 
with the user.  
“It’s very much left up to us, which is what I like. I find that if we did 
have a framework it wouldn’t work very well because every person is 
completely different and you need to be softly, softly with some people 
otherwise they’ll disappear *…+ and you’ve got no control over helping 
them out.” (Adviser, Working Estate) 
This was an interesting aspect, bearing in mind that each service user in the end 
represented a monetary premium for the provider, and thus retention within the 
service at a minimum was crucial for the service’s financial profitability. Thus the 
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provider, through its advisers, was very eager to retain service users, which it was 
more likely to do if they could approach each user on an individual, targeted basis. This 
suggested that while advisers used discretion to respond to service user’s needs, they 
also needed to use this discretion to maximise their service’s profit. 
The language used by services in this group to refer to their users was also 
worth exploring. The widespread use of the ‘customer’ language in the New Deal 
implied that service users had a choice and indeed decision-making power. It implied 
that the user had flexibility in planning their actions and selecting choices that were 
adequate for their situation and even of switching the service provider if the service 
provided was not satisfactory. This suggested that to some degree the adviser had the 
discretion of a ‘sales person’ to make offers that would entice the customer (Clarke 
and Newman, 1997). Indeed, Jobcentre Plus Customer’s Charter outlines: 
“We aim to help people to be more independent. We will work with you 
to make sure your job options are realistic and will encourage and 
support everyone to work if they can. We will also try to help you get 
any training you need.” (Jobcentre Plus, 2009: 1) 
However, this was not reflected within the reality of service provision as 
advisers described it. Service user’s choice and decision making powers were 
characterised by advisers as being bound by very narrow margins and thus the user’s 
decision making capacity was limited. One adviser described a situation where a 
service user had acted pro-actively and enrolled in a college course and the advisers 
did not have the power to integrate the college course into the service provision even 
though the college course might have greatly benefited the service user. Advisers had 
to point out that the programme requirements took priority over any other 
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involvements. Indeed, the only way for service users to evade the programme 
requirements was to effectively sign off of benefits, which of course was not advisable 
for some service users due to their financial or personal situation. Advisers were not 
given the flexibility to react to such circumstances on an individual basis and thus had 
to tell the users: 
“…Look, if you want to continue [with the course], what I suggest you 
do, you go out there and find a part time job to be able to sign off the 
benefits to continue that. If not, you will have to give up your training to 
comply with [the service].” (Adviser, New Deal) 
This quote outlined some further issues. One was the pressure that was applied 
to the user to comply with the programme requirements to avoid sanctioning despite 
the programme potentially being a less desirable option. This is discussed in more 
detail in the section on changing people’s behaviour. Another issue was that advisers 
saw the benefit of the user being on a college course and trying to find ways around 
strict programme compliance by advising the user to sign off. Whether this was 
entirely in the interest of the service user is questionable. The adviser’s behaviour 
mirrors Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level behaviour where bureaucrats made 
discretionary decisions and thus changed the policy outcome. In this example, the 
intended policy outcome was to help the service user return to work as quickly as 
possible. In the short run, the adviser’s actions removed the person from the benefits 
register and only in the mid-term a potential return to work. Nevertheless, these 
moments appeared to be rare in the New Deal provision and advisers were mostly 
bound to the strict rules and control and thus had very limited opportunity to provide 
a service targeted to the user’s needs. 
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Advisers in the Work Area and Working Estate services referred to service users 
as ‘members’. This evoked images of an exclusive club and certain rights and 
responsibilities associated to the membership of a club. Membership in this context 
awarded the service users a degree of importance and suggested they were an integral 
part of the service. Indeed, the user was much more involved in the decision making 
process. Advisers and users co-operated in the creation and implementation of action 
plans that were built around the users’ needs. Within the meetings with the user, the 
adviser had the flexibility to decide what actions were most appropriate to allow the 
user to gain sustainable employment. This was, however, limited by the programme 
guidelines which provided strict boundaries what could and could not be done. This 
suggested that while advisers had more flexibility in the actions that could be taken 
and that user involvement in the decision making process was increased, the idea of 
membership was not fully realised. This result was similar to the customer rhetoric in 
New Deal. Advisers in the New Deal felt the need to revert to street-level tactics in an 
attempt to be responsive to users’ needs which was not necessary for advisers in the 
Work Area service who had the necessary flexibility albeit within very narrow margins.  
The adviser-user interactions in all mandatory-standardised services were 
recorded on IT systems, which were also used to track user progress. Advisers saw the 
data recording on the system as very time consuming and the focus on paper work was 
reported to negatively impact on the adviser’s ability to focus on the service user. 
“… it was all focused on getting the paperwork right, that you can’t 
always sort of… concentrate on the member *…+ because you’re so 
focused on the paperwork because you know it’s just gonna keep 
coming back to you…” (Adviser, Work Area) 
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The task of tracking user progress was thus a highly bureaucratic process and 
enforced hierarchical rule following. Advisers said these processes combined with the 
requirements to move users from stage to stage in the service, whether they were 
ready to move on or not, sometimes limited their ability to provide a service that was 
truly focused on the user’s needs. Voluntary service users in Working Estate were the 
exception. Advisers here had some flexibility about when to move a user to the next 
stage. While advisers tried to be responsive to user needs and provide a personalised 
service, they were very clear from the start that service guidelines would take priority 
over the user’s needs as this quote highlights: 
“… sell them the fact *…+ that you are here for them, that you are gonna 
try and help them, you know, you’re not a big bad Jobcentre, you know, 
at the same time you have to make them realise that you have 
guidelines that you have to work by and if push comes to shove, the 
guidelines have to come first.” (Adviser, Work Area) 
This emphasized that advisers were very aware that they were working for a 
private organisation and that compliance with service requirements was essential to 
secure the funding for the organisation. However, it did not prevent advisers from 
looking at cases on an individual basis and use the discretion they had to the benefit of 
the user.  
Voluntary-standardised type services 
Standardisation in this service type was introduced through channelling service 
users towards self-help tools. A service manager outlined that the delivery strategy 
foresaw that the actual number of cases where advisers acted in their professional role 
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as careers advisers and provided in-depth one-to-one guidance was supposed to be 
relatively small (only about 4% of service users) and should generally only be available 
to those with a very low qualification profile. The remainder of the service users would 
be channelled to access self-help tools or given minimal support. The manager further 
commented that the main tool, which users were advised to use was the Career 
Planning Journey which consisted of a number of steps to complete when making a 
career choice or change. While this not only introduced a certain degree of 
standardisation, it also removed the service user from personal interaction with an 
adviser to a certain extent. 
This was a form of standardisation that advisers were very critical of because 
they felt it infringed on their identity as professional advisers and was devaluing their 
specialised knowledge. Indeed, some advisers expressed a concern that a push to 
further standardisation in an effort to deliver the same service in every location would 
lead to a ‘McDonaldisation’ (c.f. Bourgeault et al., 2001) and advisers were very keen 
to point out that 
“… careers guidance isn’t burgers and chips…” (Adviser, Careers 
Scotland) 
In the existing guidance literature, Watts (2005) highlighted a trend towards 
more standardised self-help tools, while in line with the OECD view of a differentiated 
service delivery model, seemed at odds with the actual content of the Career Planning 
Journey, which was used to determine career planning needs in a personal interview. 
In a personalised interview, the adviser would be able to build a relationship with the 
service user and respond to their needs, but this process also required multiple 
meetings to allow a complete assessment of the service user’s situation and needs. 
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Therefore, it was questionable how personalised the service really was given the 
direction of the majority of users to self-help tools and a lack of continuity in the 
adviser-user relationship based on the proposition that any adviser should be able to 
help any service user based on their recorded case file. Advisers recognised these 
developments and were applying street-level tactics to circumvent these limitations.  
“… if I had spent a long time with them and they needed to come back, I 
would say to them, ‘This is when I’m available. Either call back then or 
phone me to make an appointment to see me’, rather than them 
dropping in and starting again with somebody else who doesn’t know 
their background…” (Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
Indeed, there appeared to be a very strong current that despite the managerial 
emphasis on using the Career Planning Journey, advisers flexibly responded to 
individual’s needs. Thus, advisers were actively disobeying managerial instructions in 
order to maintain some of their specialist professionalism and discretion. While they 
reported that they used the planning tool where possible, advisers took the discretion 
to apply it flexibly according to where in the planning process the user was and what 
kind of support the user needed. If a user was clearly struggling with the decision 
making process, advisers said they took the time to provide more in-depth services 
whether the user fell into the specified 4% group or not. 
“Somebody once said ‘OK, this is the Career Planning Journey, but 
sometimes it’s like a bit of a jelly, you have to mould it according to how 
the individual is.’ And quite clearly, if they are just sitting three and 
being like ‘I don’t get this. This just doesn’t make sense’ we are having 
to re-check on how we approach it.” (Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
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Advisers appeared quite concerned with the individual’s needs and they would 
support the service user whether they were part of the specified in-depth target group 
or not. However, at the time the interviews took place, the organisation was still 
evolving and the focus of service managers might have been on getting the business 
model right rather than ensuring that the service was indeed standardised as intended. 
Advisers quite clearly tried to work around the increasing inflexibility and 
standardisation in order to maintain their professional identity as careers advisers and 
apply their specialist knowledge to the benefit of the users. This had implications for 
the advisers in terms of performance measurement, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Clearly though, the envisaged model of adviser-user interaction through 
extensive support only for those qualified raises questions regarding the ability of the 
service to deliver a truly personalised and individualised service that it anticipated. If 
the majority of users were left with no or minimal support through face-to-face 
interactions, a targeted service provision may not be delivered despite the advisers’ 
best efforts to work around it. 
Voluntary- user-defined type services 
The use of discretion in the voluntary-user defined services varied somewhat 
often due to the nature of the service. The majority of services, however, did show 
quite a large degree of responsiveness to user needs through the use of discretionary 
measures and advisers’ ability to respond flexibly to a user’s individual situation. 
Access to these services was completely voluntary and users often had a 
specific need for support or information when they approached the service. Advisers 
said they responded flexibly to user’s enquiries. However, some services were 
somewhat restricted to specific target groups, such as people at the verge of 
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redundancy or users with a low qualification profile. Nevertheless, advisers said they 
often provided the service to everybody that approached them. For instance, one 
adviser mentioned that he felt a certain obligation to provide the service to non-
qualifying people, because they asked for help and because of that, advisers in his 
organisation felt it would be morally wrong to charge the user for the service, which 
they were technically expected to do.  
For example, advisers in the Telephone Guidance service said they advised 
some users on how to gain access to multiple guidance sessions even though they did 
not qualify for the full service based on their qualifications. This demonstrated where 
advisers actively circumvented service requirements to respond to user needs, even 
though it might have been financially detrimental for their organisation. This was 
interesting because it showed obvious signs of the type of street-level tactics that 
(Lipsky, 1980) ascribes to bureaucrats. While street-level bureaucrats developed these 
tactics as a way to cope with high workloads and stress at work, it is also possible that 
advisers in voluntary-user defined services had different motives. These may have 
included personal experience or moral concerns with turning someone away who was 
looking for help. This was supported by the fact that the programmes these advisers 
provided were contracted and therefore, they had targets to achieve which 
theoretically meant that they had to focus mainly on eligible service users to maximise 
their profit and time. This suggested that advisers in voluntary user-defined services 
might have been motivated differently from advisers in other service types. This will be 
discussed in the later chapter on how advisers negotiated the tensions of their work. 
This became particularly obvious in the service that the Lone Parent Advice 
service provided. Most advisers shared the experience of lone parenthood with the 
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service users and thus felt a strong obligation to support other lone parents based on 
their own experience and their own success. This feeling appeared so strongly that 
advisers went out of their way to help the service users as the following example 
shows: 
“… It’s probably not my vocational guidance remit to take a client to go 
into… she wanted to go in and register with some recruitment agencies 
but she didn’t really want to do it herself and that’s not really my remit. 
But because *…+ it was a big step for her… it’s a judgement call and I 
thought, right, OK. So the first two, I went in with her and the second 
one I said, I’ll wait outside, you go up the stairs… *…+ So sometimes 
although that’s not really in our remit, it took an hour and the difference 
was amazing. *…+ We can do those wee things that make all the 
difference.” (Adviser, Lone Parent Advice) 
This indicates that advisers in this service did have a large degree of discretion 
that they could freely apply. It was up to them (“a judgement call”) to determine what 
and how much of an effort they made and there were no programme limitations that 
narrowed down the margins for response. 
The Redundancy Advice service was somewhat exceptional. Due to the nature 
of the service and the short notification times, advisers did not have much discretion. 
On short notice, advisers said they usually only delivered a standardised presentation 
with information and pointers of where users could find help and indicated first steps 
to take after redundancy. If the timeframe allowed for one-to-one interactions, 
advisers had discretion to respond to the user’s need. This ranged from emotional 
support by arranging in-depth counselling sessions to in-depth careers advice for those 
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that were ready to move on with their careers or a referral to the more general careers 
services that advisers were associated with.  
The analysis above showed that advisers in mandatory-standardised case study 
services had a relatively small margin of discretion, even though there were variances 
between the services in this type. Their discretion was often limited by tools and 
service features that drove standardisation. Advisers in voluntary-standardised 
services used their discretion quite proactively and tried to maintain a greater level of 
flexibility despite an ever increasing drive towards standardisation and attempts to 
channel advisers’ interactions. The group of the voluntary-user defined services 
showed some variance as well, but overall the advisers said they responded to users’ 
needs in a targeted fashion. The analysis of the use of discretion for each type is 
summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 4: Use of discretion in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Use of discretion Limited Proactive, but 
moderate limitations 
Very few restrictions, 
targeted to user needs 
 
Trust and compliance 
Trust was pointed out by many advisers as being central to their relationship 
with users. It is considered an important mechanism to understand social behaviour, 
especially where it is linked to achieving compliance and behavioural changes (Kramer 
and Goldman, 1995, Dawes et al., 1990, Brewer and Kramer, 1986). Therefore, Braynov 
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and Sandholm (2002) saw trust as an exchange relationship that allowed the 
maximisation of social welfare if equal levels were exchanged. Mishra’s definition of 
trust has been widely used (Mishra et al., 1996):  
“one party’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the 
belief that the latter party is (a) competent, (b) open, (c) concerned, and 
(d) reliable. “ (p.265) 
According to this definition competence, openness, concern and reliability are 
central to a trusting relationship. Advisers in all three types were keenly aware of these 
characteristics as the following examples show: 
“They’ve got to be able to trust you because you’re giving them some 
quite direct objectives that are going to change their lives effectively. 
They’ve got to be able to trust you to know that you know what you’re 
doing. So you’ve got to have the confidence to do that.” (Adviser, 
Working Estate) 
“I use examples from my life to clarify … you know, to highlight different 
things in the course and so obviously [Manager] will use different ones 
and [Adviser+ will use different ones but I think that’s really important 
because if you don’t give a little bit of yourself, then nobody’s gonna 
trust you...” (Adviser, Lone Parent Advice) 
These quotes emphasized the complexity of developing a trusting relationship. 
In each one, several different characteristics of trust were addressed. In the first 
example, the adviser highlighted competence (knowing what you are doing) and 
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concern (giving them objectives that will change their life). The second adviser placed 
the emphasis on openness and concern (examples from their own life, giving of 
themselves). As a result, it appeared that different types of trust were more associated 
with different types of service provision. This outcome was mainly derived from the 
mode of access to services as well as from the extent of user focus of the service.  
Going back to Mishra’s (1996) definition, many users who accessed the services 
were already in a vulnerable position due to their worklessness, impending 
redundancy or inactivity, for instance. Trusting the adviser required the service user to 
take additional risks, for example by sharing highly confidential information. Although 
taking these risks, “is voluntary: it involves willingness, not compulsion” (Coulson, 
1998: 14). As a consequence, it was fair to ask if trust could at all exist between adviser 
and user in a programme that was compulsory and threatened the user with sanctions. 
There may be the potential for trust in this kind of relationship, but the kind of trust 
that was exhibited by mandatory service users as opposed to voluntary service users 
could be expected to differ greatly.  
In order to further explore this point, different types of trust were examined, 
which have been identified in the governance and organisation studies literature 
(Newman, 2001, Lewicki et al., 1996). These types are:  
- Calculus-based trust: assured consistency of behaviour because 
individuals feared the consequences of non-compliance; 
- Knowledge-based trust: is based on information and a history of 
interactions that allows each actor to anticipate the behaviour of the 
other; 
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- Identification-based trust: is based on an understanding of the other’s 
wants and needs and creates a long-lasting, loyal and mutual 
relationship. 
These types of trust are not mutually exclusive and might be expected to co-
exist or evolve in different service types. The following sections explore the different 
types of trust which existed in the different case study services.  
Mandatory-standardised types of services 
Organisations that fell into the mandatory-standardised group mostly offered 
compulsory programmes where users were coerced under threat of sanctions to 
comply with programme requirements. Advisers in this group of organisations were 
very adamant about making it clear to the user from day one of the interaction that 
they would face sanctions such as benefit cuts or even benefit withdrawal. This placed 
the service user under constant stress and threat. These arrangements established 
conditions for ‘calculation-based’ trust, within which users were expected to comply 
for fear of the consequences.  
The environment in which the majority of interactions took place potentially 
added to the stress. The offices in all mandatory-standardised services were open plan 
arrangements that offered little privacy with a clear division of power exemplified 
through the arrangement of office furniture. The extent to which the office 
environment was used to encourage or discourage trust differs between organisations 
in this quadrant.  
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In one extreme example, the service users were visually reminded that they 
were not trusted by the service provider through the presence of uniformed security 
guards on the premises. For example, during the data collection the researcher 
observed that even though the guard tried to blend in with the day to day business by 
chatting to service users and advisers or by doing little chores such as fetching coffee, 
the presence of someone in uniform created an uneasy feeling of constant monitoring 
and control. The guard was a physical manifestation of the distrust exhibited against 
the service user, indeed anyone in the office, and that, if necessary, compliance would 
be enforced. The researcher herself was reminded by the guard a number of times not 
to leave her belongings out of her sight because they might either be removed or 
stolen. This was detrimental to helping to create a relaxed and comfortable 
environment where a trusting relationship could be established. This kind of 
arrangement countered several key parts of the definition of trust, namely openness, 
concern and reliability.  
Other organisations in this group used the physical environment much less to 
demonstrate a power differential. Even though security personnel were present on 
location in the Work Area and Working Estate services, they were physically removed 
from the area where interactions with users were taking place. This created a much 
more relaxed and friendlier atmosphere. Indeed advisers indicated in interviews that a 
large part of their work consisted of establishing trust with the user right from the 
start. Advisers were very clear about the purpose of establishing this kind of 
relationship, which was to achieve compliance without having to apply pressure. 
“And so with everybody you’ve got to have a different approach 
however it’s going to work with them. If they’re comfortable with the 
 154 
strict bit, well they may not be comfortable with it but it’s going to work 
better if you do the strict bit, with the people you don’t need to do that 
with, there’s no need. It’s a softer approach and a friendlier approach to 
gain trust. That will work a lot better.” (Adviser, Working Estate) 
In the Working Estate service, advisers said it did not matter to them whether 
the service users were mandatory or voluntary users when looking to establish trust. 
However, advisers were very clear that, particularly with mandatory users, the rules 
and regulations were given preference at any time. This could potentially have a 
downgrading effect and push the relationship more towards a calculus-based level of 
trust, because the threat of a sanction in case of non-compliance was clearly present. 
At the same time though, advisers did not have the power to sanction service users 
directly. Advisers had to build a case against the service user and then refer the case 
back to Jobcentre Plus for sanctioning. As a consequence, advisers looked much 
deeper into what was behind a user’s non-compliance with the programme. 
“Well we basically have to have a wee chat with them and say to them, 
you know “What the matter, how are you not doing this?” because 
some of them it is a cry for help, but it’s picking up on it.  So it really 
depends… like I say it just always depends on the individual, it’s what we 
can do for them at the time.  You can… if they’re not complying you can 
also give them a Job Seeker’s direction, which basically means they have 
to comply with it, if they don’t then they can be referred back to the Job 
Centre and action taken against them.” (Adviser, Work Area) 
This process required advisers to develop genuine concern for the individual’s 
situation and to explore what could be done to help the user. This could have 
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potentially alleviated for some of the negative impact of the mandatory access. 
However, the motivation behind the concern was questionable. Ultimately, it could 
not be determined from the data whether the individual adviser was genuinely 
concerned with the service user, or whether there was a strictly managerial rationale 
behind the concern, because a user that was referred back to Jobcentre Plus was lost 
income for the organisation, although it could be a combination of both.  
Despite the drawn out process of sanctioning and the efforts to develop a 
relationship with the service user, the dominance of the service regulations over user 
needs strengthened the view that the threat of sanctions had persistent impact on the 
type of trust that could potentially be developed. Although there was potential, 
particularly with voluntary users in the Working Estate service to enable knowledge-
based trust, the nature of access to the service and the threat of sanctions pointed to a 
trust relationship that was predominantly calculus-based. 
The analysis of this type indicated that the environment in mandatory-
standardised services appeared to more suitable to produce calculus-based trust, 
although to a greater or lesser extent depending on the service. This was due to the 
threat of sanctions exerted from the service regulations as well as the physical threat 
of punishment through security personnel on the premises.  
Voluntary-standardised type services 
The type of trust that could be established in services that fell in the voluntary-
standardised quadrant was difficult to determine. According to a manager in the case 
study service, a large number of service users were channelled towards self-help 
resources (about 70%), a much smaller proportion could receive some additional 
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support (about 16%) and only a small minority received in-depth guidance (4%). Users 
that were channelled towards self-help and additional support had very little 
interaction with the advisers and therefore, to determine a type of trust based on 
knowledge and building a relationship might be a bit far stretched. For the small 
minority that received in-depth guidance, the establishment of a relationship might 
well have been possible. Access to the service was entirely voluntary. There was no 
fear of sanctions, and consequently no potential coercion of the user towards 
compliance.  
The advisers spoke of being at the “shop” where they interacted with users. 
The idea of a shop was quite vital here because it described most of the interactions 
between advisers and users. Users came in and were offered an opportunity to browse 
the materials available or use the self-help tools. Advisers said that they occasionally 
checked with them whether they had questions and needed support. This bore strong 
similarities with a high street shopping experience. As a consequence, there was little 
room to establish a truly personal relationship between adviser and service user. 
Added to that was the use of an IT system where case notes were recorded, meaning 
that any adviser who was on site could deal with any service user if they returned. This 
again limited the chances for continued interaction between adviser and user and thus 
made it difficult to establish more personal types of trust. 
It was important to note though, that the most likely form of trust that could be 
established between adviser and user was knowledge-based. In this case, trust was not 
based on continued interaction and knowledge accumulated about each other. This 
form of knowledge-based trust was rather based on the knowledge by the service user 
that advisers were professionals and thus based on their training, knowledge and 
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experience were capable of addressing the user’s problem. Conditions of competence, 
openness and reliability were most important in the establishment of trust between 
adviser and user in this case. Indeed, advisers were aware of their status as 
professionals and that users were seeking out their help specifically because they were 
professionals. At the same time, advisers were highly concerned with the increased 
standardisation of the service by directing service users towards self-help tools. This 
signified the erosion of their status and identity as professionals and the consequences 
this had on their interactions with users as the following quote illustrates. 
“… if you go to the doctor with a pain in your stomach or whatever, you 
want the doctor to diagnose and try and sort the problem.  If the doctor 
just hands you a dictionary of medical terms and says, try and …*…+ try 
and solve the problem yourself, which is kind of in a sense what … some 
of this is about sort of thing but, to me, that’s … maybe that works for 
some people but a lot of people … you’ve got to give them help, support 
and advice cos then the bottom line for me is … what role do I have?“ 
(Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
The service was entirely voluntary, attending the service and working on a 
problem area as such was already an act of compliance, one that could not be 
enforced though. Additionally, advisers said that if they provided in-depth guidance it 
was strictly the user’s responsibility to follow up any suggestions received from the 
adviser. However, these suggestions were derived from an interaction with the user, 
where the user could form an impression of the knowledge and experience of the 
adviser. Thus, the most likely type of trust that could be established in voluntary-
standardised services was knowledge-based. 
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Voluntary-user defined type services 
Organisations that fell into the voluntary-user defined group could not establish 
compliance through force because access to their services was entirely voluntary. This 
removed any form of calculation-based trust, due to the lack of coercive methods to 
ensure compliance. Still, the case study services exhibited widely different ways of 
establishing various types of trust with the service user. In a few cases advisers had 
little opportunity to establish more evolved types of trust due to the timing of the 
interactions. 
In the Redundancy Help service, advisers said they often called in on short 
notice and could only deliver an informative presentation to a large audience. Clearly, 
in such a setting, trust with an individual was difficult to establish. If the timeframe 
allowed for individual interactions, advisers said they provided a one-to-one session. 
However, advisers described that in those interactions they were often concerned with 
helping people cope emotionally with redundancy rather than getting into the details 
of careers advice. In these one-to-one interactions, knowledge-based trust could 
perhaps be established. However, advisers were very aware that the timeframe and 
the situation left service users little choice but to trust in their ability as careers 
guidance professionals rather than establishing relationship over time based on 
personal knowledge. 
Advisers in the Telephone Guidance service faced a similar situation which was 
due to the nature of the service provision. The service had an inherent anonymity 
because advisers and users could not see each other. Additionally, users might choose 
not to provide their name. This was an interesting case, because it was widely assumed 
that anonymity might be a deterrent for trust because trusting a complete stranger 
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potentially bore a lot of risk. The issue has been explored extensively by game theorists 
and linked to a number of personality traits such as an individual’s affinity to risk (Eckel 
and Wilson, 2004). However, Eckel and Wilson could not find any substantive 
connections. Consequently, other factors might be more influential. Indeed, in their 
experiments, participants did not have control over the situation while users of the 
Telephone Guidance service were in control. They could end the conversation by 
simply hanging up, something that happened every now and again as advisers 
reported. Additionally, the anonymity might afford the caller with some security to 
share their problem and thus be more open. As a consequence, the anonymity of the 
phone delivery method might be beneficial to establish trust and not a deterrent. 
Indeed, throughout their interaction, advisers said they tried to establish a 
continuous rapport with the user in order to ensure that the user was comfortable 
with the conversation and with the topics that were addressed. Advisers worked with 
the user on an action plan. They were thus establishing a basic form of knowledge-
based trust building on the user’s knowledge about the competence (qualification) of 
their service and openness and concern for the user’s problem. 
Move On and Lone Parent Advice were two services that were provided by 
voluntary and community sector organisations. Most of the advisers in these 
organisations had personal experience of the situation their users were in. They shared 
either a background in migration or had experience of being a single parent. This 
potentially formed the basis of the third type of trust which was identification-based 
trust. Due to their personal experience, advisers were able to anticipate the problems 
facing their service users and empathise with them. The ability to empathise with the 
service user was considered extremely important by advisers in these organisations to 
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ensure the user’s compliance and their willingness and ability to change something 
about their situation as the following quote exemplifies. 
“… what we do is much more based on … you get to know each other 
cos if we can know each other and trust each other, then the whole 
thing’s gonna work out … better.” (Adviser, Lone Parent Advice) 
“I mean because I had the same experience [...] if I can give them this 
information I’m really happy to do it. Because when I was here, I came 
the first time, they gave me all of this kind of information also, I found it 
useful and I would have found it a bit annoying if they told me [...], no, I 
can’t give you this information because I can give you only job 
information.” (Adviser, Move On) 
Additionally, advisers said they took the liberty to support the service user even 
if it was outside the service remit, if they felt it made a difference to the user’s life and 
enabled them to take charge. One of the main aspects related to this was the 
continuity of working intensively with a single adviser over a period of time so that 
indeed a personal relationship could be established. 
“… it’s probably … probably not my vocational guidance remit to take a 
client to go into … she wanted to go in and register with some 
recruitment agencies but she didn’t really want to do it herself and 
that’s not really my remit.  But because this lady … it was a big step for 
her … it’s a judgement call and I thought, right, OK.  So the first two, I 
went in with her and the second one I said, I’ll wait outside, you go up 
the stairs … she was handing in her CV and a covering letter *…+ so by 
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the end of it, she was fine.  But it’s just about having that security 
blanket for that one step.” (Adviser, Lone Parent Advice) 
Advisers in these organisations delivered on all aspects of trust:  
- Competence through their personal experience of having successfully 
mastered a similar situation as well as additional training, 
- Openness through addressing a service user’s problems individually and 
taking the time to focus on them, 
- Concern through supporting the individual in particular situations that 
may even be outside the service remit as well as showing empathy, and 
- Reliability through a continued interaction on a one-to-one basis. 
Voluntary-user defined services, and particularly Move On and Lone Parent 
Advice, were the only services who addressed the complete range of trust attributes. 
They were able to establish a high level of knowledge-based trust and potentially even 
identification-based trust could be established.  
However, trust was not a unilateral occurrence. As Coulson (1998) highlighted, 
trusting someone, in this case the adviser, was a voluntary, willing and therefore, 
conscious action. For the user to trust an adviser or a service, they had to appear 
trustworthy to them in the first place. Trustworthiness could be created through 
various mechanisms such as reputation, third party endorsements and the individual’s 
personal preferences (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001). In the case of advisers, this 
might be represented by continued interactions over a long period of time 
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(reputation), professional standards or professional degrees (third party 
endorsement), and the behaviour that was exhibited by the adviser or the service 
towards the user (personal preferences)16. These personal preferences could take 
three forms (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001): 
- self-regarding preferences which focus on establishing a reputation, 
- other-regarding preferences which focus on the concern for the well-
being of the other person, and 
- process-regarding preferences which focus on the adherence to rules, 
norms and principles. 
All three forms were generally present in the case studies, but some were 
stronger than others depending on the service or adviser. Based on the analysis above, 
the different quadrants would fall into the following types. 
Mandatory-standardised programmes exhibited a strong propensity towards 
process-regarding preferences. This was due to having to follow rules and principles 
dictated by the service. This was exemplified by advisers having little discretion to 
respond to user needs and putting programme requirements first.  
Voluntary-standardised programmes covered the self-regarding preferences 
because they were built on the professional reputation of the advisers. The example 
                                               
16 Ben-Ner and Putterman (2001) pointed out how organisations tried to give themselves a human face to appear 
trustworthy to service users. In the eyes of the service user, the advisers as representatives of the service, 
became the service, which was why for this discussion a separation of the service and the adviser was not 
necessary. 
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here was the Careers Scotland service, where it was pointed out that the trust advisers 
were able to establish was not furthered by the environment or the way interactions 
were conducted, but that other factors such as looking for advice from a professional 
had a bigger influence. 
Voluntary-user defined services fell in the other-regarding preferences 
category. As shown, the advisers exhibited a large amount of concern towards the user 
and sometimes made extra efforts outside of their remit to help the user. They were 
personally involved in the cases of the individual user and a strong relationship was 
developed. 
Summarising the outcomes of the analysis above, it appeared that in the 
mandatory-standardised case studies conditions were more conducive to establishing 
calculus-based trust, rather than promoting higher levels of trust. This was due to the 
constant threat of sanctions and physical displays of distrust and supported by the 
mostly process-regarding preferences of advisers. In the voluntary-standardised case 
study service, mainly knowledge-based trust could be established based on the 
adviser’s credentials as a trained guidance professional, which demonstrated the self-
regarding preferences of advisers. Whereas in the voluntary-user defined case studies, 
advisers appeared to be able to establish knowledge-based trust through continuity in 
their interaction or their personal experience and exhibiting strong other-regarding 
preferences, which in some cases could also lead to identification-based trust. Table 5 
(see p. 164) summarises these findings. 
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Table 5: Types of trust in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Type of trust 
developed 
Calculus-based trust Knowledge-based trust Knowledge-based 
trust/ Identification-
based trust 
Personal preferences 
of adviser 
Process-regarding 
preferences 
Self-regarding 
preferences 
Other-regarding 
preferences 
 
It was interesting to note, that the type of trust an adviser was able to establish 
and the connected personal behaviour preferences of advisers seemed to be linked to 
the extent of programme standardisation. The more a programme was standardised 
the less opportunity for the advisers to establish more personal forms of trust. The two 
(extreme) cases of The New Deal and Lone Parent Advice highlighted this in particular. 
In The New Deal the environment, the programme, the interaction, every single part of 
the service was standardised and controlled. The mandatory requirement to comply 
with the programme allowed only the existence of calculus-based trust, which was 
exacerbated by the adviser’s following processes closely. At the other end of the 
spectrum, there was the Lone Parent Advice where advisers empathised with service 
users, addressed problems on a highly individual basis and even selected locations for 
the interactions based on user preferences, thus laying the foundation to a highly 
trusting relationship. This corresponds to findings by Newman (2001) who pointed out 
that 
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“While calculus-based interactions tend to produce compliance, 
identification-based relationships tend to produce high levels of 
personal engagement and commitment” (p. 101).  
These findings highlight that services that were capable of producing high-level 
commitment of and engagement with the service user seemed to be in a better 
position to encourage changes in the service user’s behaviour.  
Changing people: persuasion, self-responsibility and 
empowerment 
While on the surface, the different case study services had particular goals such 
as reintegrating people into the labour market or providing them with information and 
guidance about their career choices, all of these programmes shared an underlying 
goal of changing people’s behaviour and their perceptions about themselves. The 
extent to which a person was willing to change their life was dependent on their 
motivation to do so, as well as the extent to which they were supported in this step. 
These were key issues that were constrained by a number of factors both internal and 
external to the various services. The analysis from the previous sections suggested that 
the types of trust and trustworthiness among the different service types varied 
substantially. Based on the service type and the different forms of trust, it could be 
suggested that the organisations in the three quadrants aimed to change people in 
different ways and using diverse methods, with arguably widely varying results. 
Following, the ways in which the services tried to change people’s behaviour will be 
examined. 
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Mandatory-standardised type services 
Programmes in the mandatory-standardised quadrant followed a very strict 
activation routine, offering the service user incentives while threatening them with 
sanctions if they did not comply. Indeed, some advisers in these case studies shared 
and supported the activation rational of the policies when they outlined in their 
interviews that users simply needed someone to push them to make a change to their 
life. One adviser in the New Deal saw his role specifically to change people’s mind set.  
“They go on a programme, they come out and say … I never knew this 
programme was so interesting, now I want to be available to look at 
jobs in admin.  So you see, all those are like … you’ve been able to 
change the customer’s mind frame, you see and that’s what it’s all 
about, trying to change their mind frame to get them into something, 
even though they’ve never wanted to do it before.” (Adviser, New Deal)  
Expressing this view, advisers supported the labelling of the user and the 
justification of sanctions. It could be argued that, in the eyes of the adviser, the user 
was already strongly labelled and stereotyped (“they can go on to things but they’re 
not willing so they just need a little push” (Adviser, New Deal)) and consequently it was 
acceptable to the adviser to use threats and punishment to force users to take up an 
activity they had previously not intended to pursue. At the same time though, due to 
financial constraints, advisers were only able to offer limited opportunities for people 
which led in some cases to users being sent onto qualification courses that were 
unsuitable for them. This seemed quite ironic in light of the New Labour government’s 
intention to encourage, persuade or even compel people to change their behaviour 
and try to improve themselves by becoming active, self-motivated citizens through a 
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wide variety of training, support and advice instead of remaining passive welfare 
recipients (DWP, 2007a, Dwyer, 2000). However, if a service user had personally 
recognised a need for change and enrolled in a college course, it was possible that the 
adviser told them to withdraw from the course in order to meet programme 
requirements.  
“…Look, if you want to continue, what I suggest you do, you go out there 
and find a part time job to be able to sign off the benefits to continue 
that. If not, you will have to give up your training to comply with New 
Deal.” (Adviser, New Deal) 
This seemed to create quite a paradox for the service users because on the one 
hand, they were pushed into changing their lives, while on the other hand they were 
severely restricted in how they were allowed to change them. They had to follow a 
government prescribed change process where change was allowed but only within 
strictly defined boundaries.  
While the programmes were dominated by the strong activation rationale, 
advisers in Work Area and Working Estate supported this rationale less in their work 
with users. Despite being partially restricted in what they could do, advisers tried to 
approach each service user individually and respond to their individual personality.  
“It’s very much left up to us, which is what I like. I find that if we did 
have a framework it wouldn’t work very well because every person is 
completely different and you need to be softly, softly with some people, 
otherwise they’ll disappear and get a job or whatever and you’ve got no 
control over helping them out. Or with some people you actually have to 
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be quite tough, especially the younger ones who’ve not maybe had the 
discipline of finding a job before. They don’t understand what’s involved 
so you’ve really got to set a timetable for them.” (Adviser, Working 
Estate) 
It was interesting, that the advisers, despite focusing so much on the 
individual’s characteristics, still talked about control. This was the adviser’s control 
over the user and thus signified that despite all attempts, there was still a strong view 
that the user was not capable of helping themselves and needed someone else to have 
control over helping them out by providing incentives and if necessary use sanctions. 
And while advisers placed a strong emphasis on establishing trust with the user to 
ensure their compliance in order to encourage change, the control factor over the user 
was substantial.  
While the same objective was present for the voluntary users, the impetus on 
the “stick” was less because users could potentially simply walk away and advisers 
again would lose control over them. This effectively meant a financial loss for the 
company and consequently, it was extremely important from financial point of view to 
maintain a good relationship with the service user. 
The organisations in this quadrant had a quite active approach to changing 
people that was dominated by a hierarchical and controlling relationship. The adviser 
was in charge and the ways in which the user was made to change differed merely in 
the extent of the overt or more covert use of incentives and sanctions. To what extent 
these organisations were indeed capable of engendering the intended kind of change 
in the user and the sustainability of this change was highly questionable. Indeed, the 
literature on organisational culture and psychology used the concept of coercive 
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persuasion to describe a similar situation that service users in these mandatory 
services found themselves in. Coercive persuasion was understood as tactics that 
aimed to bring about a substantial change in behaviour or ideology through the use of 
incentives and threats (Schein, 1999). In the context of organisational change, Schein 
described a process where through mental and physical pressuring, constant labelling 
and stigmatisation, the individual was coerced into changing their behaviour and 
thinking against their own values. Simultaneously, sufficient incentives and threats 
were presented to prevent the individual from leaving the organisation and thus 
keeping control over them. The feeling of guilt was central to prompt the user to 
change their behaviour.  
Interestingly, Dwyer (2000) used exactly this triad of encouragement, 
persuasion and compulsion to describe the methods to make people change their 
behaviour in order to become responsible citizens. The service users in the mandatory 
programmes were exposed to the constant language of activation delivered by the 
advisers, other service delivery organisations, the media and policy makers. The 
language produced a division between them (the service user) and us (the law abiding 
citizens). As the quote from the adviser above outlined, labels and stereotypes which 
ultimately stigmatised the service user were quickly at hand. Stigma produced feelings 
of guilt, shame and inferiority (Goffman, 1963) which ultimately lead users to believe 
that something was wrong with their behaviour and change needed to occur. The 
incentives offered to change that behaviour and the mindset (that work was essential) 
included tax benefits and additional allowances while the all present threat was 
benefit removal. Thus, advisers were placed in a position where they could control the 
individual and users complied with what was asked of them to either gain the 
incentives or avoid the punishment. However, this was a very fragile state.  
 170 
“To make stable changes at this level requires more than behavioral 
change. It requires the learner to reframe the situation, to learn new 
concepts and to develop new attitudes and new ways of thinking and 
feeling, or the behavior changes will not last once the immediate 
incentives are removed.” (Schein, 1999: 169) 
Thus the extent to which organisations in the mandatory-standardised 
quadrant were able to sustainably change an individual’s behaviour was rather limited. 
The lack of trust due to the predominantly calculus-based relationship and the 
process-regarding preferences of advisers were severe inhibitors in changing the 
service user’s behaviour. 
Standardised-voluntary type services  
The service in the standardised-voluntary quadrant appeared to attempt to 
turn service users into their own career managers by placing the onus on the self-
responsible user. This was in alignment with New Labours conception of the 
responsible citizen. This vision entailed that individuals had a duty to take 
responsibility for their own and society’s well-being through being an active member 
of the workforce (Dwyer, 2000). The services provided to the users should support and 
reinforce this view by providing opportunities to be an active citizen. 
Particularly the aspect of developing a self-responsible user was mirrored in the 
service provision in the standardised-voluntary quadrant. Because access to the service 
was voluntary, the service user had to be self-motivated to even consider using the 
service. Going to the “shop” or accessing the online resources required some effort 
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and thus, accessing the service in itself was already an expression of taking 
responsibility. 
The methods used in service provision added to this conception. The majority 
of users were directed towards self-help resources and toolkits and only checked on 
periodically. These toolkits included highly standardised tools for career planning and 
one of the advisers pointed out that  
“... once people knew how to plan their career, then they could do it 
themselves. They don’t need to keep coming back to speak to us 
because they know how to look at their skills and their interests and 
then to look at the job and what skills and what that job demands and 
match it up.  So if people understand that, then they have gained that 
knowledge and also, you know, if you … if people write a CV for 
themselves instead of us doing it for them, then they’ve learned a good 
skill … (LAUGHS)” (Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
The aim of the whole service, as the adviser summed up, was to enable the 
user to become their own, self-sufficient career planner who could use the tools 
provided to get into work or change careers and thus continue to contribute to society 
through work.  
It also indicated a strong shift of responsibility from the state to the user. In 
using the service, they were educated to handle career decisions independent of the 
help of a professional. Indeed the advisers started to teach the tools and the use of 
standard methodologies in schools, so that once the pupils became adults they would 
have the skills to manage their career and take responsibility for it. So eventually, in a 
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long-term vision, all adults could be independent and rely on themselves and only the 
younger generations would need to be taught and educated. In the short run, the 
success of changing adults into the independent, self-responsible service user might 
not be as far reaching. In the long run, however, it might be quite an ingenious plan to 
subtly shift more responsibility onto the individual. Although this was a rather 
futuristic and somewhat unrealistic vision due to ever changing societies and political 
movements, it was a good example of how political ideals were attempted to be 
implemented in daily life.  
Voluntary-user-defined type services 
Empowerment, participation and co-operation were the key aspects of services 
in the voluntary- user defined quadrant, although with a different emphasis depending 
on the service. Empowerment had strong connotations with “power” and the process 
of empowerment often referred to people giving or taking the power to fulfil their own 
needs and wants (Servian, 1996). The service users in this quadrant were, however, 
recognised as being in low power positions, due to their social status (lone 
parenthood, low qualification levels or being on the verge of redundancy). The 
organisations in this quadrant focused on an advocacy approach which provided those 
service users with support to enable them to follow their own interests, find fulfilment 
or satisfy their own needs. An interesting point to note was that, due to the voluntary 
access to these services, users had already empowered themselves by identifying a 
need and taking a step to seek advice and help. The empowerment approach of those 
services should be understood in more general terms of enabling the user to follow 
through and support the user throughout the duration of the service with regards to 
the ultimate aim to facilitate a transition between various labour market statuses. 
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The strongest focus on empowerment could be found at Lone Parent Advice, 
which was partly determined by the provider’s purpose to support lone parents and do 
advocacy work on their behalf. There appeared to be a very strong buy-in by the 
advisers rooted in a deeper understanding of the service user’s situation. All of the 
advisers and managers that participated in the interviews in this service were lone 
parents themselves and therefore had first hand experience of the impact of lone 
parenthood. As a consequence, they viewed the service users as individuals who were 
in quite a vulnerable position and needed all the support they could get to help them. 
Advisers saw service users as their equals and thus did not create a power differential 
like for instance advisers in The New Deal. This lack of power differential might also be 
due to the voluntary nature of the service.  
Because of the personal experience of the advisers, some of them felt quite 
passionately about their work and government policy or rather the lack of support 
from government and thus felt compelled to support users. 
“I work with vulnerable women and vulnerable people who, for many 
different reasons, are not employable. *…+ the reason tends to be that 
they are lone parents *…+ or they are girls who got pregnant at school, 
have no education and therefore when their children go to school, they 
have nothing to do, you know, they’re not only caught in a benefit … 
hideous benefit trap which is a really … which is another thing that I’m … 
I just can’t believe that the government lets all these women get caught 
in these benefit traps that they cannot get out of.” (Adviser, Lone Parent 
Advice) 
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Because of this shared experience, similar personal characteristics and the high 
involvement of advisers, they were potentially delivering a higher service quality 
(Spicker, 1984) which might lead to more sustainable employment outcomes for the 
service users.  
Advisers said that the process of changing the service user’s self-perception 
could be very slow and gradual, because the service user was in charge of the 
progression. The service user determined for instance where meetings took place (for 
example a local café or the library) and the advisers offered some guidance in relation 
to the frequency of meetings and how to approach certain issues. From the start, this 
put the service user in a position of power because they were in control and by 
determining meeting times they are able to fulfil their own needs. The adviser then 
responded to those needs by providing relevant advice as the following quote 
highlights: 
“So I travelled to *a town+ and I went to meet a client there in a café, *…+ 
and then we had a meeting which was specifically about interview 
technique and about finding her the right job. *…+ So we probably did 
about an hour and 20 minutes on… just discussing…” (Adviser, Lone 
Parent Advice) 
Advisers indicated that if a service user did not feel ready to return to work, 
they would not do well at whatever job they attempted to do. Thus advisers felt that it 
was highly important for them to let the user drive the process and be in control at all 
times. Indeed, advisers said that if a user felt overwhelmed with the whole 
development because of changing circumstances and wanted to take a break, they 
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gave them the space to take their time and offer their support whenever the user 
needed it. This again put the user in charge of the situation. 
“… if I’m making all those efforts and they basically don’t turn up 3 
times, then I leave them a message saying, here’s my number and I send 
them out my card and stuff like that and … and I say, you’ll have to 
contact me now, I won’t do the chasing any more … because if you’ve 
turned up 3 times in some library in [a town] and you’re waiting for 
them and they don’t turn up, you can’t … other people are losing out. 
[...] But after that, I will always leave a telephone message and I will 
send out to their home address my card saying, you know, please feel 
free to contact me when you’re ready and if there’s anything I can help 
you with.” (Adviser, Lone Parent Advice) 
According to advisers the positive experiences of managing small tasks and 
achieving small goals contributed immensely to the overall personal development of 
the service user and gave power to the user over their situation while offering support 
throughout this process. Thus the attempts at changing the service user focused on 
personal development and supporting users to realise their potential without applying 
pressure. This might encourage a more sustainable change in the user’s behaviour and 
self-perception and more sustainable choice to return to employment which complies 
with Schein’s (1999) findings on the removal of coercive measures. 
A similar approach was used by the Move On service. The adviser provided 
targeted information to the service user which enabled them to, for instance, apply for 
a job or improve their interview skills. It was a co-operative approach because the 
adviser and user worked closely together when building a CV for example, or 
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discussing employment options. Similar to advisers in the Lone Parent Advice service, 
many advisers at Move On had personal experience of migration and based on that 
had a determination to provide advice and support for people in a similar situation. 
However, the main difference was that the Move On service was often a one off 
interaction to get a CV fixed or obtain information. This did not allow the advisers to 
build up a relationship over time and be as responsive to the user’s needs as the user 
might have identified the initial need differently from what appeared necessary. While 
the user was still in charge of the situation by identifying their need, the make up of 
the service prevented them from fully benefitting from the support available. 
Although, this was where the advisers made discretionary decisions and offered 
another appointment to the service user.  
Additionally, the appointment system and the interaction at the organisation’s 
offices limited flexibility in terms of responding to user’s timing or other needs. 
Because most of the interaction was restricted to a one-off meeting, the adviser was 
mainly in a position to enable the user to change their self-perception and fulfil their 
needs, but they were not able to provide the full support and follow through the whole 
process that would fully empower the service user and put them in control of the 
service provision. Indeed, it was down to the user to implement the suggestions and 
use the information independently. Implementing the suggestions and using the 
information would have been the final step in fully empowering the user to take 
control, but a lack in support with that final step (as it was available in the Lone Parent 
Advice service), prevented some of the users to actually follow through with their 
return to employment.  
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“Well a few clients, we gave them all the information they wanted, on 
the follow up we said are you working, oh no, are you on training, no, do 
you want to come back here, oh yeah, and then why don’t you, well 
really I didn’t look for a job, I didn’t leave my seat.” (Adviser, Move On) 
Therefore, while the service was able to offer the information and advice and 
enable the user to change their situation, it was questionable how effective the 
changes really were because it came down to the individual’s motivation and 
determination. The lack of personal support in the implementation phase of the advice 
and guidance service might limit its ability to contribute fully to a person’s change 
process. 
The Redundancy Help service presented somewhat of an exception. Due to the 
nature of the service and the short response times, advisers were not in a position to 
initiate a long-term change in a service user. However, advisers were very aware of this 
fact and saw themselves more as a first point of support for people facing redundancy 
and providing some emotional support for those affected. Advisers said that if users 
felt ready to move on the adviser would provide the general careers guidance service. 
“… as well as allowing people to tell their story and *…+ help people 
address issues around redundancy and their feelings, you know, to do 
with their emotions concerning redundancy, so it would only be when 
people themselves feel they’re ready to look forward, *…+ we would be 
jointly trying to help them plan *…+. So you have to help them, as far as 
you can, address the emotion.” (Adviser, Redundancy Help) 
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The way advisers saw their work bore similarities with the approach Lone 
Parent Advice was taking. To them it was important that the individual was 
emotionally ready to move on and look for a job. Pushing someone to move on, in the 
advisers’ view, did not lead to a long term satisfactory outcome for the individual if 
they had not gone through the process of coping emotionally with their redundancy. 
One of the advisers pointed out, that emotionally dealing with redundancy followed 
similar stages as a grieving process and could involve emotional mood swings from 
denial, depression and desperation to anger. If a user was still coping with any of these 
stages, advisers doubted that the individual was ready to make an objective 
assessment of their skills and to move on to new employment.  
Advisers were aware that in the majority of cases, the briefness of their 
interactions did not allow the opportunity to support the service user throughout the 
process. However, they did see themselves as enablers of the process for users to 
move on and potentially initiate a process where the user followed a wish for a career 
change or change of employment field. Empowerment as used in the sense of the 
definition above was therefore limited and the effects of the service on a long-term 
change of the person’s self-perception may not have been immediately clear. The aim 
of the service was not necessarily to achieve long-term changes but rather to provide 
immediate support to cope with the event of redundancy and to provide first pointers 
in a new direction. It was left to the service user’s motivation to follow through and 
thus the ability of the service to bring about changes in the service user was limited. 
Telephone Guidance was an interesting case because at the point of access, the 
service user had already empowered themselves by taking action to address their 
needs. Again, access was voluntary and thus motivated by the service user. The users 
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were driving the process and had full control over what information to share and what 
advice they sought. This implied that the service users already had a basic idea of what 
their needs were and they were seeking the support to follow through. At this stage, 
the users were already empowered because through the phone call they were 
addressing their information needs and were advocating for themselves throughout 
the conversation. The interaction of the adviser and the user was strongly user-guided 
and the user at any point had the power to end the conversation. The adviser was 
highly involved in the conversation to determine the best action plan together with the 
user. This differed from the provision of the Careers Scotland service in that the 
adviser went through the experience together with the user. While this bore strong 
elements of empowerment and co-operation, in the end the adviser was only 
providing a tool for the user to independently act on. The opportunities for follow ups 
were limited (only for qualifying users and only three times) and therefore the 
relationship and the support remained virtual. Thus, while there were some elements 
of empowerment such as the focus on the user’s situation and a personalised action 
plan, the responsibility to follow through was left with the users and they had to be 
sufficiently motivated to accept that responsibility. Similar to the Redundancy Help 
service, Telephone Guidance provided initial pointers where to start with a change in 
the person’s self-perception, but through the call and the decision to seek professional 
advice, the service users had already empowered themselves and the change process 
had already started. However, the opportunities to change the user and their 
perception were clearly limited and dependent on the user’s motivation to continue 
with the process.  
The analysis above highlights the different ways advisers in services were trying 
to change the service user’s behaviour. There appeared to be clear differences 
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between the serviced types. Some used highly coercive methods, while others acted 
more supportive of the individual’s needs. Table 6 summarises the various approaches 
for the service types. 
 
Table 6: Change methodologies in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Method to initiate 
behaviour changes 
Coercive Persuasion Independent, self-
responsible service 
user 
Empowering the 
individual 
 
Despite this differentiation, some service providers had realised the underlying 
potential for conflict and unsustainable outcomes. In the Work Area and Working 
Estate services, for instance, advisers tried to implement a more user-led approach by 
working towards the user’s dream job. The extent to which this was possible was 
limited by the service requirements and organisational goals. Despite their vastly 
different approaches, similar tensions for advisers appeared in the other service types 
as well. How these requirements restricted adviser’s abilities will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Nevertheless, the situation created a dilemma for the adviser which 
way to follow: focus on the individual or follow the service and organisational 
requirements?  
Conclusion 
The study employed a governance perspective to examine the ways in which 
different governance regimes emerge through the management and practice of front-
line advisers. This chapter applied the typology developed in the previous chapter to 
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the case study services, which all used different approaches to achieve the goals of 
their services and positive outcomes for the service users. The analysis showed 
consistency among the services in each type, with only smaller deviations which were 
due to the different approaches. 
Specifically, this chapter examined how advisers in the different types of 
services delivered employment advice to service users through the use of discretion 
and building of trust. This provided an insight into how they were trying to achieve the 
overall policy goal of changing service user’s behaviour and the methodologies 
involved. Table 7 provides an overall summary of the previous analysis. 
 
Table 7: Summary of the analysis on discretion, trust and change methodologies in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Use of discretion Limited Proactive, but 
moderate limitations 
Very few restrictions, 
targeted to user needs 
Type of trust 
developed 
Calculus-based trust Knowledge-based trust Knowledge-based 
trust/ Identification-
based trust 
Personal preferences 
of adviser 
Process-regarding 
preferences 
Self-regarding 
preferences 
Other-regarding 
preferences 
Method to initiate 
behaviour changes 
Coercive Persuasion Independent, self-
responsible service 
user 
Empowering the 
individual 
 
The analysis showed that each service type exhibited distinct qualities with 
regards to the use of discretion, the type of trust that is developed between adviser 
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and user, the personal preferences of establishing trustworthiness with the user and 
the method to initiate behaviour change. These results could be interpreted from two 
different perspectives. On the one side were issues concerning mainly the influences 
on the adviser. They were represented through how advisers use discretion and the 
preferences advisers in the different types of services adopted to establish 
trustworthiness. On the other hand, there were the user-centred issues of establishing 
trust and changing the service user’s behaviour. These were also a representation of 
the tensions an adviser negotiated: the restrictions placed on advisers’ discretion 
versus the various ways to establish trust and a relationship with the service user. As 
such, these issues were then like two sides of the same coin. Each side representing a 
different image while only together they will produce value.  
On the side that represents issues influencing the adviser, Lipsky’s (Lipsky, 
1980) theory of street-level behaviour was useful. It suggested that front-line staff 
developed coping behaviours to deal with particularly restrictive service requirements 
and pressures applied to them. In the analysis this was exemplified through the use of 
discretion by the adviser as well as the personal preferences to establish 
trustworthiness which could be seen as an expression of the task focus of the adviser. 
This included an underlying assumption that the adviser wanted to respond to service 
user’s needs, which was confirmed in many interviews across the different service 
types.  
Advisers in mandatory-standardised services acted in an environment with 
restricted discretion and their preferences were focused on process compliance. These 
advisers were very likely to employ street-level tactics to enact some discretion or to 
achieve a positive outcome for the service user. However, in order to cope with service 
 183 
demands, their personal preferences focused mainly on procedural issues - advisers 
tended to prioritise service requirements over user needs. In contrast, advisers in 
voluntary-user focused services used a large degree of discretion to focus on user 
needs and their preferences exhibited the same direction. For these advisers, there did 
not seem to be a need use street-level tactics. Advisers in the voluntary-standardise 
case study service showed a mixture of the two extremes. They used discretion 
proactively, but its use appeared to get more and more restricted. Their personal 
preferences focused on their identity as a professional and the knowledge and 
recognition this inhabited. As a result, there was some application of street-level 
tactics in an effort to achieve a positive outcome for the service user while maintaining 
their professional independence and identity. 
When looking at ways to establish a relationship, a similar picture developed. In 
mandatory-standardised services the establishment of trust was based on a fear of 
sanctions and the reliance on a mutual code of conduct. The adviser would follow 
procedures and the service users in turn would do what was asked of them. This 
pointed to highly coercive methods to ensure compliance with the service demands 
and to initiate behaviour change. Again, the voluntary-user defined services had an 
opposite approach. Advisers established trust through their reputation, through their 
qualifications or through similar life experiences as the service user. Change in the 
service user was based on focussing on the user’s readiness to make a change to their 
life and empowerment and support to enact this change. Again, voluntary-
standardised services covered a middle ground relying mainly on establishing trust 
through their reputation as professionals, while equipping the service user with the 
tools to manage their careers independently. These two sides of the coin put together 
suggested that the more restricted discretion and the more process focus prevailed, 
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the more trust would be based on following procedures and enforced compliance, 
which overall amounted to a strongly coercive mechanism to change service user’s 
behaviour. The ways in which these organisations attempted to change service user’s 
behaviour mirrors Hasenfeld’s (1972) distinction of people-processing and people-
changing organisations. 
The extent of adviser’s ability to use discretion appeared to be a vital pivot 
point in how advisers could mediate tensions between the service demands and user 
needs. The links between discretion and managerial methods to control and restrict 
discretion have been well established (McDonald and Marston, 2006). They 
represented another field of tension that advisers were negotiating and thus had an 
influence on how advisers delivered their service. These managerial methods to steer 
adviser behaviour are the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Advisers being steered 
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Introduction 
Chapter 7 applied the services typology to the adviser-user relationship. It 
examined how advisers steered service user behaviour and ultimately attempted to 
change their behaviour through the use of discretion and trust. The focus of this 
chapter is the analysis of how adviser behaviour is steered when delivering services. 
Employment, advice and guidance services are increasingly contracted to various 
provider organisations. In order to ensure that the providers fulfil their contractual 
obligations a plethora of measurement and control mechanisms are applied that 
monitor not only the provider’s performance, but also steer adviser behaviour. 
McDonald and Marston (2006) identify methods such as performance measurement 
and incentive pay as ways to control adviser behaviour. These methods are enacted by 
the service or line manager who thus is the personified representation of these 
otherwise depersonalised methods. This follows a similar logic as outlined in the 
previous chapter where the adviser acts as a representation of the service. The aim of 
this chapter is to identify how managerial practices were used to steer adviser 
behaviour in the case study services. 
The use of discretion and the building of trusting relationships with the service 
user have been identified as vital ingredients to sustainably change user behaviour. 
Consequently, the managerial methods that govern adviser behaviour are of great 
interest. The control and steering mechanisms determine the extent of discretion 
available to the adviser when interacting with the user and also provide incentives or 
disincentives to use this discretion. Thus they are setting the boundaries within which 
the advisers can operate to influence the service user’s behaviour.  
 187 
Therefore, this chapter will examine what methods of performance 
measurement were used in the different service types to shape adviser behaviour. This 
will be followed by an analysis of how incentive pay was used to reinforce this, and 
lastly by an account of how these two methods combined to represent kinds of trust 
placed in the adviser and how this influenced adviser behaviour.  
Performance evaluation 
Pidd (2008) outlines that one of the reasons for performance measurement is 
to maintain central control when service provision is decentralised or subcontracted, 
as was the case in the majority of the case study services. Thus performance 
evaluation could be used to assess the extent to which an adviser complies with the 
specific purpose of the service. Performance is understood as a measure of how well 
or poorly a person or organisation fulfils a set task (de Bruijn, 2002, Martin, 1997). 
However, performance evaluation includes a multitude of indicators, often in 
combination. Liu and Mills (2007) refer to five different measures, which could be used 
at various levels to evaluate performance: 
- money measures: include cost and profit 
- time measures: focus on timetables and the amount of backlog 
- work measures: include quantity and quality of the work 
- effect measures: focus on attainment of certain standards or changes in 
staff or customer behaviour 
- reaction measures: include peer evaluation and customer feedback 
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In addition, targets are a prominent feature in service provision and a key 
ingredient in performance measurement. Targets can be set at different levels, for 
instance by the agency that provides funding or by the provider who then might 
cascade it down to the individual adviser. Targets often serve managerial purposes and 
form the basis of incentive payments (Liu and Mills, 2007), which will be discussed 
further below. The following sections will apply the various kinds of measurements to 
the service types, with a particular view to the use of targets. This will show how these 
managerial tools were used to influence adviser behaviour in the different service 
types and to compare and contrast them. 
Mandatory-standardised type services 
Case study services in this category had quite highly developed evaluation 
mechanisms including all types of measures but with a very strong focus on money 
measures and time measures. Data for work measures, effect measures and reaction 
measures were also collected, but there appeared to be less managerial emphasis on 
them. In some cases, they were even removed from the adviser directly. A case in 
point was the recording of job entries at New Deal, which had been transferred to the 
Inland Revenue Service and statistics were no longer collated at provider level. 
Cost and money measures were at the centre of these mandatory-standardised 
services because they were often financed using public funds. There was therefore an 
underlying need to demonstrate that the money was spent effectively and the service 
provided efficiently. For contracting providers there was also the need to make a 
profit, which was often their prime motivation for contracting the service. For 
instance, in two services in this group, there was a requirement of 95% accuracy when 
submitting claims for contracted services, which advisers did not seem to contest 
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much but rather accepted as part of their job. Other examples of the focus on cost 
included the need to move the service user through the programme stages, and a 
drive to get people signed-off benefits, as the quotes below highlighted: 
“So best possible results for me are people coming in and I’ve spoken to 
them and it’s given them a wake up call, having signed on for 18 months 
before coming to New Deal and they sign off, I see that as a result.” 
(Adviser, New Deal) 
“They look at what they refer to as overstayers where the main 2 stages 
within the company, stage 1 and stage 2. If we have someone who goes 
over 28 days, that’s an overstayer and they then retract any future 
money that they pay us for that client.  So we would then miss out on 
placement, retention bonus, retention payment if they are one day over 
that” (Manager, Work Area) 
This fed then into adviser behaviour when interacting with the service user. 
Often, the requirements to move the user on to the next stage and to stick to the rule 
book were considered superior to the needs of the service user if there was potential 
financial harm to the organisation. This created one of the key tensions that advisers 
had to negotiate. There appeared to be a conflict of interest for the adviser even with 
the proposed organisational methodology to support service users. It was indeed 
surprising to hear advisers in the Work Area and Working Estate services speak of 
supporting the user into their dream job and to find sustainable employment, and yet 
being required to adhere to strict time frames and to avoid overstayers. There was a 
clear discrepancy between the methodological approach of the provider to work with 
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service users and the financial focus of the organisation, which made their 
commitment to supporting the user appear like little other than lip service. 
Time measures were the tool that impacted most on the advisers’ ability to 
interact with customers, although they were handled differently in the various 
services. In all of the case study services of this type, time measures were connected 
with work measures. All services in the mandatory-standardised group used a diary 
system. The diaries were in some services not managed by the individual advisers, but 
rather by a third party. Thus advisers were merely acting as fulfilment agents and their 
responsibility for organizing their own work day appeared to have been taken away. 
This was more pronounced in the New Deal, where advisers had to follow a strict 
regime and customer interactions were of a prescribed length. Extending a meeting 
was often impossible because the next service user was already waiting. In order to 
avoid backlog and keeping with the customer flow, the advisers were thus required to 
cut interactions short. The following extract highlights the extent to which time 
measures influenced advisers’ work: 
“A: Well, we’re entitled to spend 30 minutes for a normal, 
subsequent interviews and initial interviews are one hour.  So initial 
interview’s one hour, any other interview’s always 30 minutes. 
I: And if you see that is over the 30 minutes will you tell the client 
to come back next day for drop-in or…? 
A: Well the thing is, if I see I’m going over 30 minutes and I have my 
other customers in, I’ll just try and see if I can rebook your appointment 
for you as soon as I can... 
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I: So you will cut it short if you…? 
A: Yeah, I can cut it short, yes.”(Adviser, New Deal) 
This was closely connected with the adviser having to conduct a prescribed 
amount of interviews per week. In the New Deal, advisers reported individual 
caseloads of 35 interviews per week, plus drop-in customers and other administrative 
business that needed to be taken care of. The targets were located at the individual 
level and each adviser was responsible for fulfilling these. There was potential for 
conflict because the advisers were not in charge of their own diaries and consequently 
had no means of controlling their work flow. Thus they were fully dependent on a third 
party arranging their schedules while they were personally held responsible for 
achieving a pre-set target. How advisers were controlled and held responsible is 
discussed below. 
Similarly to advisers in the New Deal, those in the Work Area and Working 
Estate services had little control over their initial interviews with customers. They 
talked of a scheduling system where the adviser with the lowest caseload was given a 
number of new customers. While this system helped to avoid customer creaming by 
individual advisers, it did not take into account whether the current caseload of the 
adviser had a high number of hard-to-help service users who required extra attention. 
This would suggest that, despite the focus on supporting service users individually and 
a promise to respond to their specific needs, the service user could be considered a 
standardised unit that could be helped in a fixed measure of time (both in the short 
term and the long term), with a constant product through put and a fixed cost per unit 
(the cost of the service or the potential maximum reward that could be gained from 
moving the service user into work). While this might appear to be a dramatic 
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exaggeration, advisers in the New Deal expressed feeling like robots on a conveyor belt 
which reinforced the image of unit production measures and time and cost 
considerations in achieving the production requirements. 
Indeed advisers followed checklists to ensure they had covered all items on 
their lists, as this adviser pointed out: 
“We have a checklist to ensure that we’ve done or set all the relevant 
markers, yes, and see that we’ve asked the person about the necessary 
requirements. We do have a checklist.” (Adviser, New Deal) 
In order to ensure the advisers’ compliance with the prescribed time frames 
and interview formats, individual advisers in the New Deal were monitored using a 
‘Red-Amber-Green’ system. The system was an effect measure which put advisers into 
three categories, Red, Amber and Green, depending on how they performed against 
certain benchmarks. If the performance fell within certain boundaries, a green ’light’ 
was given, if there was a perceived cause for concern an ’amber’ rating was applied, 
and if targets were missed, the marking was ‘red’. The line manager portrayed the tool 
as a support tool, to help advisers improve their work: 
“It’s not about disciplinary or things. Obviously, you know, if you are 
giving that feedback to the adviser month in, month out and after 3 or 4 
months they’re still doing the same thing, you know, it will lead to 
inefficiency action in the end anyway but initially it’s supposed to be a 
tool to help and support the adviser.  And that’s what we use it as.  It’s 
not being used just for inefficiency.” (Manager, New Deal) 
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On closer inspection, however, it was more a tool to direct and correct adviser 
behaviour. The advisers perceived the tool as rather threatening and there had been 
many complaints about it. Advisers believed that the tool did not adequately reflect 
their activities and interactions with the service users and, more importantly, was 
indeed counterproductive to providing good customer service. As this adviser 
explained: 
“Things are not really done properly because it’s as if you’re working 
more for the organisation rather than offering appropriate customer 
service, but you’re just trying to do things just to satisfy the 
management.” (Adviser, New Deal) 
This statement summarised the frustration that advisers often experienced at 
the limitations the service imposed on them. Even though they might want to provide 
a good service to the customer and tried to circumvent some of the measures, they 
appeared severely bound by the managerial requirements. In the end, advisers in the 
New Deal seemed simply to adhere to the rules in order not to disadvantage 
themselves or simply to secure their job.  
A similar picture developed in the other mandatory-standardised services. 
Advisers in these services found that the evaluation system did not adequately account 
for the actual work that had been carried out to help a customer. The focus on moving 
a service user into employment overshadowed the help and support an adviser could 
provide in an attempt to fulfil the company methodology of moving people into their 
dream job. An adviser in the Work Area service commented: 
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“Because a lot of the time … they don’t take into account … the amount 
of work that can be involved … with a member. So it might take you 6 
months to place that person but look at all the work you’ve done in 6 
months or … you might not place that person but you’ve still done a lot 
of work with them and maybe just as much as get them a bank account, 
building up their self confidence, *...+ But that isn’t really taken into 
consideration” (Adviser, Work Area) 
This quote pointed towards an inadequacy of the performance measures. The 
adviser suggested that performance measurement focused mainly on quantitative 
achievements and did not take into account the qualitative improvements for service 
users. The number of people moved into work was prioritised over the ‘distance 
travelled’ in the users’ journey towards the labour market. Ironically, the management 
information system that was used to record and assess advisers’ work was called 
“Discovery” suggesting that the journey should take precedence over the destination.  
Within the individual performance measurement system, there was a strong 
focus on sustainable employment. One adviser described the management’s attitude:  
“Our operations manager assesses us on caseload management and 
placements and then how many of those placements ultimately stay in 
work. I think [our line manager] and our current ops [operations] 
manager are the same in that they would rather we got the quality of 
placement as in someone’s gonna have sustainable employment instead 
of getting 50 placements a month and it only lasts 2 or 3 weeks sort of 
thing. They would rather it was less placements and they lasted beyond 
the 13 weeks or were permanent.” (Adviser, Work Area) 
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The focus on moving people into employment strongly overlapped with the 
prioritisation of work as the solution to many social problems as portrayed by New 
Labour. The overlap became particularly apparent when considering the target groups 
for Work Area who mostly consisted of people with multiple barriers to employment. 
The same adviser continued to outline which elements exactly were targeted to 
measure their performance  
“Well, there’s a team target and there’s an individual target as well.  So 
basically we say if everybody hits their individual, they should hit the 
team target ... so everything’s targeted … you know, even down to how 
many people have a bank account.” (Adviser, Work Area) 
The overarching focus on a team target on top of the individual target was 
potentially a very powerful tool to direct adviser behaviour. While it might have 
appeared that due to the team focus, the pressure on the individual was reduced if 
underperforming in a given time period (taking into account seasonal fluctuations of 
the labour market, etc.), there appeared to be a moral element of letting the team 
down if the targets were not fully achieved. One adviser pointed out: 
“I think personally … I know myself there’s been more months I’ve 
achieved or over achieved target than I’ve under achieved. If there are 
months where I underachieve, I think I know myself it’s due to the 
caseload I have or the time of year. I tend not to beat myself up about it 
because I know there’s nothing much I can do about it. But then at the 
same time there is that disappointment if it impacts the team.” (Adviser, 
Work Area) 
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Even though advisers were fully aware that their work was highly subject to 
external influences rather than their own ability, managers were able consciously to 
apply peer pressure to motivate advisers. It was a ‘good cop, bad cop’ approach, 
where in fact the manager portrayed himself as the good cop offering help and 
support if the adviser faced problems. The team represented the ‘bad cop’ who would 
lose respect for the failing individual. A manager described his approach as follows: 
“That’s the best way, to be honest, because all of us are going to fail if 
one person fails an element of our business, it has a knock-on effect. 
And everyone’s very clear about that. I try to get people to take 
accountability, not only for themselves but for the programme that 
they’re in and I think it’s one of my methods that’s always worked for 
me as a manager because I can sit there and say to you “that’s not 
working” and you feel to me, you feel that you’re letting your manager 
down, and that’s not a good thing. However, when you feel like you’re 
letting your colleagues down, and your colleagues feel like we’re failing 
because of this, I’m here to help you, if you don’t ask me I can’t. And 
that makes me frustrated because we’re not doing what we should be. 
That’s even worse feeling because letting me down is an element of 
fear, in a way, because I’m your line manager who can go to HR, you 
can do a number of things, even though that’s not the kind of person I 
am. When you sit with your colleagues and you’re losing respect, and 
the self respect element gets questioned, it gives that bigger drive to 
really move forward and what we try to do as individuals is give 
everyone guidance on how to achieve.” (Manager, Working Estate) 
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The impact of this approach on the individual adviser was potentially immense 
because it questioned the value of the individual to the team. While on the surface, 
the manager made his method appear to take pressure off the individual because 
goals and targets were spread across the team, each individual was in fact put on the 
spot and had to ‘fight’ for the respect of their co-workers. This strategy had the 
potential to put psychological pressure on the individual adviser because of the 
negative impact on self-esteem and self-respect that the manager outlined if advisers 
failed to achieve. Conversely, this method potentially caused a lot of strain between 
advisers because the manager presented himself as the one person able to help, as 
opposed to gaining help from understanding colleagues. 
The work environment these measures created in the mandatory-standardised 
services were not to everyone’s liking, and advisers in both services commented on the 
considerable frustration and churn this brought about. All services in this type had a 
substantial turnover of advisers. This could be observed even over the short period of 
time over which the fieldwork for this project took place. One adviser commented that 
over a period of two years since their service had existed, out of a team of 10 advisers, 
only two were left from the team that started out. The management team in this 
service had also changed completely over this period of time.  
In mandatory-standardised case study services, there appeared to be a strong 
focus on hard performance measures fixed on money and quantity. Both of them were 
strictly accounted for and the responsibility for achieving them was almost completely 
devolved to the individual. In some of the services, the added psychological pressure 
of letting the team down might also have had an impact on the self-esteem and self-
respect of the advisers. Overall, it seemed to contribute to an environment where the 
 198 
service user might easily be reduced to a factor of production while the main focus was 
on achieving business standards. This view was supported by advisers who thought of 
themselves as robots. The job satisfaction that could be gained in such an environment 
was questionable, and indeed was questioned by many advisers as the high turnover in 
these services suggests. 
Voluntary-standardised type services 
In voluntary-standardised services performance measurement was also quite 
highly developed, although with less emphasis on monetary measures. This might have 
partially been due to the fact that service access was voluntary and thus to a large 
extent driven by the service user. However, this did not mean that there were no 
targets. Quite the opposite was true; there were extensive, quantitative targets. One 
manager pointed out that there were targets for individual advisers consisting of 
various age groups and client sectors, and that essentially there were targets for 
everything. These were used to establish an evidence base to justify the service’s 
existence and secure continued funding through the government. 
According to some advisers, there had been a dispute over the individual 
targets and they were supposed to be abandoned. However, some advisers reported 
that they were still applied: 
“She [manager] emailed us … these are the current targets.  We’ve got 
individual targets but we shouldn’t have … they came to an agreement 
that there would be no individual targets.  So myself and [colleague] 
obviously will be taking this to a functional manager to discuss this cos 
this has been agreed that there will be no personal targets.  However, 
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they use the phrase … contribution to the team. *…+ but again 
[manager] emailed us with something that these are the current team 
targets, green is good, red is bad … (Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
This suggested that the evaluation of advisers’ work based on quantitative 
targets was hotly contested. There appeared to be similarities to the Red-Amber-
Green tool used in one of the mandatory-standardised services. Work measures, 
outlining the quantity and the quality of advisers’ work, appeared to be of particular 
importance in this service in terms of the quantity of users seen and the social groups 
they belonged to. But advisers strongly disagreed with the focus on numerical targets 
because they felt it had a negative impact on their ability to deliver quality. This 
discrepancy was also reflected in a somewhat paradoxical approach to evaluating 
advisers through the use of targets as well as monitoring and support approaches.  
Advisers were supported in regular group meetings in what was called 
‘reflective practice’. It provided advisers with a forum to discuss cases they found 
interesting or wanted to ask a colleague’s advice about a problem.  
“… we do this what they call kind of self reflection. … I think that’s the 
only way you can do it effectively … to reflect on, just say the interview 
went just horribly wrong or bad or something … you’re then like, is this 
me, is this something I did, was it something out of my control, is there 
something I can change here … that would come from yourself. I think 
somebody who’s experienced and is maybe good at their job and maybe 
is caring and committed would do that anyway.… So there’s no point in 
trying to have some sort of endless bureaucracy …” (Adviser, Careers 
Scotland) 
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This indicated that while advisers appreciated this kind of support, in their view 
reflective practice should be an integral part of their professional practice and not 
something that needed to be imposed by management and used as a managerial tool. 
This contrasted strongly with the manager’s point of view that presented reflective 
practice as a development tool for the adviser leading to continuous improvement and 
thus an increase in service quality. The manager also used observations to ensure 
service quality combined with the provision of feedback. She described her evaluation 
work as follows: 
 “The internal standards would be, you know, things like … we use quite 
a lot of observation.  So, you know, for example, as a team leader, I 
observe career … all the careers advisers in my team carrying out 
interviews with clients and I write written reports about all of them, so 
not just those that are new or those that are still training but all of them 
in the team and that allows us to compare quality and for me to share 
good quality with others in the team or to make suggestions to people 
on how the quality of their interviews could be improved.” (Manager, 
Careers Scotland) 
The interesting point to note is that while this did provide support for the 
advisers when talking through cases and receiving feedback, the manager used these 
reports also to ‘compare quality’, which implied that these observations were part of 
their performance evaluation. The observations could therefore be seen as a double 
edged sword. On the one hand, they were a support tool and used as a reactive 
measure, while on the other hand they provided management information that would 
impact on the adviser’s evaluation and in the end on their bonus pay. Ultimately, even, 
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the manager pointed out that continuous failure to act on recommendations and 
accept support would lead to dismissal. So, there was a clear indication that support 
for advisers had a double function. 
This contradiction was perceived quite critically by advisers, particularly the 
more experienced ones. They felt that these kinds of methods, and especially 
observations, infringed on their professional identity and came close to insulting their 
professional capacity. At the same time, they were very aware that the observations 
were used to assess their work and their performance. One adviser explained his 
frustration: 
“I mean, I’ve been doing this job for quite a number of years, for good or 
bad, I think you always kind of maybe self develop or whatever.  
However, if somebody’s sitting in a corner assessing your interview … it’s 
ludicrous that they’re doing that to experienced people who’ve been 
here 20 years plus.  I think that’s quite … something.” (Adviser, Careers 
Scotland) 
Overall, the service presented quite a contradictory picture in terms of the use 
of performance evaluation methods. The methods appeared to clearly focus on work 
measures to assess quality and quantity, but their combination with adviser support 
tools seemed to produce some tensions. Advisers were quite aware of this ambiguity 
of control and support. While the management view was one of providing support and 
thus reactively responding to advisers’ needs, from the advisers’ perspective there was 
a strong sense of control and infringement on their professional knowledge. Thus, the 
service seemed to be a somewhat uncomfortable combination of the focus on cost and 
targets seen in the mandatory-standardised services, and a focus on support and 
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development of both the adviser and the service user. This produced a tension-filled 
work environment which got intensified by the way the organisation was constantly 
evolving and changing.  
Voluntary-user-defined type services 
The performance evaluation tools used in this service type were quite diverse. 
Systems ranged from quite complex ones at the larger service providers (Redundancy 
Help and Telephone Guidance) to loosely framed formats of performance evaluation at 
smaller ones (Move On and Lone Parent Advice).  
While work measures were applied in most services of the voluntary-user 
defined type, their focus was on service quality rather than on the quantity of service 
users. This might appear somewhat contradictory because the services that had 
contracted targets (Move On and Redundancy Help) were paid based on target 
achievement and should have a clear interest in securing the contractual payments. 
However, as the example below highlights, the quality as well as the focus on 
individual needs was rated higher than potential financial gains: 
I: The only thing you could do is, like, base it on the number of calls 
that… 
M: You could do, but then what that then influences is people have 
quicker calls and push the call through, and that’s something we 
absolutely don’t want.  And we don’t measure call length, we have it as 
a benchmark, but that’s not a target.  We would not target them on call 
length because, to me, that’s about compromising quality.  And just 
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before you think, oh God, I’ve got another three calls to get before I get 
my target, it becomes about how many calls you’ve answered rather 
than the richness of service that you’ve offered.” (Manager, Redundancy 
Help) 
This exchange highlighted some other factors in connection with targets that 
some advisers, particularly in the voluntary-standardised service, had pointed out. 
There appeared to be a perception that targets lead to a decline in service quality, and 
therefore the service users and their needs became subordinated to fulfilling targets.  
In some services, arrangements with regards to targets seemed disjointed 
between the specific service’s goal and the greater organisation’s goals placing 
advisers in a difficult position. In the Redundancy Advice Service, the advisers did not 
have personal targets because their provision of service was dependent on 
redundancies. The manager explained that while targets had been set on an 
organisational level, they were not passed on to advisers. Rather managers would 
review what they wanted the service to achieve and adjust the reporting targets in 
compliance with the funder’s requirements. The manager described the process as 
follows: 
“M: No.  When the project was set up, it was done on kind of best 
guesstimates and so, you know, what research was available appeared 
to indicate that it would be sensible to have a training target because 
part of what we wanted to do was encourage people to get into 
training, take training to help them get back into employment. Over the 
first 2 years of the project we realised that a lot of the time, people … go 
back into similar type of employment and therefore will not need any 
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training. So our original kind of assumption was not as appropriate as 
we thought it was. *…+ We do still record training but it’s just not a 
target anymore [...] so we changed the targets in the third year. [...] We 
just did our best at guessing at what proportion […+ we thought they 
would be and we try to meet that and we monitor whether we’re 
meeting them.” (Manager, Redundancy Advice Service) 
At the same time, advisers in the Redundancy Advice Service often did not 
exclusively cover this kind of service. They were also involved in delivering the Careers 
Scotland service, which subjected them to the performance evaluation for that service. 
However, to an extent, they were detached from the targets their adviser colleagues 
had to achieve. They conceded that their work as redundancy advisers allowed them 
to count the service users against targets the mainstream provision needed to meet. 
This effectively meant double counting. As one adviser highlighted: 
“I: So but that… then your work counts towards the targets of your 
team that you would normally work with? 
A1: It counts towards the targets of the team but it also counts 
towards the number of beneficiaries that we… that we were projected 
to meet in each quarter for ESF funding finance. 
A2: I mean there are targets, kind of national targets for [the 
Telephone Guidance], the sort of numbers, yeah, the targets were 
agreed with, you know, the bids… [...] and there were targets for the 
project, demanding targets and numbers into employment and numbers 
into training, and such like. 
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I: So in a way it’s kind of double counting them? 
A2: Yeah. ” (Advisers, Telephone Guidance) 
In other cases, targets did not seem to carry great importance. For instance, in 
the Lone Parent Advice service there were no targets because advisers were 
contracted in house to deliver employment advice and support, while the Move On 
service was relying on the fact that over the contracted period the number of service 
users they were supposed to consult would even out; thus they would comply with 
their contract. This suggests that in the voluntary-user defined case study services 
advisers were not exposed to the same kinds of pressure to fulfil contracted targets as 
their counterparts in the other service types. They could focus more on the actual 
delivery of the service and the needs of the service user. 
However, the lack of targets did not mean that advisers were not subject to 
individual evaluations. These often consisted of reaction measures and were based on 
peer evaluation, personal support and development. A prime example was the Lone 
Parent Advice service, where advisers would train and support each other and get 
together on a regular basis to develop the materials they used in delivering the service. 
“So when we came together, we thought, that is the most important 
part of the service we should be offering is consistency. So we started off 
with the Personal Development Workshops and we’ve got the 5 of them 
together now and they’re the ones we’ll be evaluating in November to 
look at what went right, what went wrong, what’s the evaluation 
saying, how did we feel it went because that’s important as well, you 
know, that whatever your gut feeling is and your instinct about how 
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that day went and if something really wasn’t right, what was it. *…+ but 
we do try and sorta meet regularly and evaluate what we’re doing.” 
(Manager, Lone Parent Advice) 
This suggested that the focus on support and consistency were seen as 
influencing service quality with the service user in mind. 
While this way of peer evaluation appeared rather basic, the Telephone 
Guidance service had a much more complex and sophisticated system of supporting 
their advisers. This included a monthly meeting with their manager where they would 
review phone calls that the adviser had selected, as well as regular reviews with a 
randomly assigned peer. Advisers highlighted that the process was seen as welcomed 
and educational: 
“*...+ we actually get call monitored, [...] all of our calls are recorded. *…+ 
Our team support, which is our co-ordinators and the team support 
advisers as well will listen to a range of our calls *...+ as to how we’ve 
sustained the interview, [...] have we empowered the client for instance, 
*...+ this is all actually measured and marked.  *...+ you’re not getting 
grades for it but … always open to discussion, it’s always open to 
suggestion from either colleagues or from our team support as well. [...] 
It’s usually 8 a month, but at least 4 a month that I’m getting *...+ , my 
line manager will discuss 4 of my calls with me every month *...+… we 
actually have what we call peer mentoring as well where … *…+ I would 
be paired with a colleague and one of us would be designated as the 
person to have their call listened to and we would … so if I had 
particularly call that I’d like somebody to listen to because I felt there 
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was a difficult moment in there or that I wasn’t handling it too well … 
*...+ so I’ve got an hour, right, to talk with a colleague about it, give the 
colleague the call so that they can listen to it [...] our reflective approach 
is actively encouraged here.  
I: So you don’t actually experience … the peer reviews and the support … 
you don’t experience that as sort of pressure or anything?   
A1: No.  We’ve actually been calling out for it … most advisers have been 
asking for this and more and more and more … (Adviser, Telephone 
Guidance) 
Overall, performance evaluation in the voluntary-user defined services focused 
much more on reactive measures to support advisers to ensure service quality. 
Although the individual services had quite diverse ways of assessing adviser’s 
performance, a mere focus on work measures based on quantitative evaluation did not 
seem of primary concern. Rather advisers were given the freedom to react to service 
users’ needs.  
While a multitude of evaluation methods were used across the case study 
services, there were some that seemed to be applied predominantly in each service 
type. Table 8 (see p. 208) summarises these findings. 
Performance measurement often fed into incentive payments and rewards. The 
use of incentive pay in the service types will be examined more closely in the next 
section. 
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Table 8: Performance evaluation measures according to service type 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Focus of performance 
measurement 
Money measures 
Time measures 
Work measures 
Reaction measures 
Effect measures 
Reaction measures 
Effect measures 
 
Reward systems 
Performance evaluation often formed the basis for rewards. These were often 
monetary, although there were potentially other ways to reward employees. Rewards 
could be seen as motivators to encourage certain behaviours or to achieve certain 
targets. Behavioural psychology distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivators, with the underlying assumption that a behaviour that is intrinsically 
motivated (a desire to perform a task for its own sake) is much more sustainable than 
extrinsically motivated behaviour (motivated by the receipt of a contingent reward, i.e. 
money) (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). For some individuals, incentive payments may be 
a powerful extrinsic motivator to make them behave in a certain way. However, 
advisers in the various organisations might not only be motivated by extrinsic factors 
but also by intrinsic motivators such as the freedom to apply discretion and develop 
their skills and abilities, or even by a certain degree of altruism (Armstrong, 2009). The 
following sections examine what reward systems were used in the various service 
types and whether they favoured intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. 
Mandatory-standardised services 
In mandatory-standardised service types, incentive payments were the 
predominant reward method. The incentive payments were closely linked to 
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achievement of targets and outcomes of performance evaluation. For instance, in the 
New Deal, the Red-Amber-Green system was one of the major factors to determine 
whether an adviser would receive a bonus payment or not. This was seen as highly 
controversial by the advisers, particularly with regards to the fairness of the 
assessment of their work. Advisers felt the evaluation of their work did not follow a 
holistic approach and was focused strongly on numbers rather than providing a good 
service. The close connection of hard indicators to incentive payments indeed 
appeared to encourage a focus on target achievement rather than individuals. This was 
not surprising given the nature of the provider organisation and its need to prove that 
money was spent efficiently and effectively. The reward system was focused on 
individual adviser achievement and as provided incentives for compliance with 
expected or explicitly rewarded behaviour. This conforms to the definitions of a mainly 
extrinsic reward as outlined by Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Deci and Ryan (1985). 
The picture was similar in the Work Area and Working Estate services. 
However, monetary rewards were not focused on individual achievement but rather 
had a team focus. If the team performed well, then advisers were offered rewards. 
These bonuses were connected to different categories and the team needed to fulfil all 
targets to be eligible for a bonus payment. A manager described the make-up of 
indicators to determine incentive pay as follows: 
“M: Any bonus structure that’s arisen within the company is paid out 
on various issues with placements, quality and retentions. If we don’t 
meet all three of those categories, then we don’t get any bonus.   
I: Is that a bonus for the whole team or just for a specific 
individual? 
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M: They’re not individual, it’s just the whole team.“ (Manager, 
Working Estate) 
This exacerbated the pressure on the individual to achieve their targets for the 
team. While on the surface, this method of linking rewards with team targets seemed 
to address more intrinsic factors such as self-respect and community, these very values 
are also called into question. This was due to the link of the whole team’s performance 
with the incentive payment. As one manager pointed out above, if one link failed the 
whole team was going to fail. This externalised motivation by directing it to 
maintaining colleagues’ respect. As mentioned earlier, managers actively made use of 
this moral obligation to contribute to the team and not to let colleagues down and 
thus held quite a strong tool in their hands to steer adviser behaviour. While the 
service’s focus as a whole was slightly more targeted towards the individual user, the 
high degree of standardisation still maintained a strong focus on hard indicators. The 
rewards system combined both numerical targets as well as moral pressures and thus 
also had a coercive nature and was mainly focused on extrinsic motivation. 
Not unexpectedly, the reward systems in the mandatory-standardised case 
study services appeared to subject the advisers to a similar ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
that the service user was subjected to. The carrot consisted of the potential bonus 
payment and sometimes also simply to keep one’s job, while the stick was represented 
by performance evaluation and failure to receive a reward.  
 211 
Voluntary-standardised services 
The rewards system in Careers Scotland appeared to send a very mixed 
message to advisers. The support system in place functioned also as a management 
information system which ultimately influenced monetary rewards for advisers. 
However, this was controversial among advisers because of a perceived lack of fairness 
in assessment:  
“But I just think there are some people more aware of it all the time … 
you know, that there is this performance … somebody got a 1 and a big 
bonus and, you know, why did I not get a 1? Why are they better than 
me … and things like that. So I don’t think it’s a very good system. It’s all 
so … it’s a forced … enforced distribution as well, so there are only so 
many percent can get a 1, so many percent a 2, so many percent a 3.” 
(Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
The existence of a distribution curve for the reward payments might be the 
cause for difficulties in itself because it allowed arbitrariness in determining bonus 
payments when advisers were close in their individual performance. Even though basic 
guidelines were set out, there was room for the service manager to assign someone to 
a higher or lower reward group based on distribution requirements, which potentially 
would be limited if the reward system was based on fixed criteria. Although the 
manager might be somewhat flexible with the distribution percentages, the room for 
arbitrariness was undisputable. 
This caused some insecurity among advisers and may even have 
disenfranchised them from the service aims and the purpose of the support and 
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evaluation system. Indeed, some advisers trusted more in their personal judgement 
and ability than relying on performance evaluations. Thus some advisers were highly 
critical of incentive payments, particularly also in connection with their view of their 
own experience and professionalism. One adviser described this dilemma: 
“I: How much of an impact does like the performance related pay 
have on say how big of a difference does it make? 
A: I don’t know. Well … (PAUSE) … for me personally, it makes a 
difference but I mean, obviously if people are getting benchmarked… 
there’s 3 benchmarks if people know the benchmark system … 1, 2 and 
3. I got a 3. The reason I got a 3 was I think it was said that I don’t cover 
the breadth of work that other people cover but then I’m a specialist 
adviser but it’s probably cos I’m a bit of a dinosaur and don’t quite fit 
the … you know, I don’t dot the Is and cross the Ts on that system sort of 
thing. In theory, the people who do dot the Is and cross the Ts will 
maybe get a benchmark 1 or if they go the extra mile, they get the 1. I 
think they would hope that any kind of … if they got a benchmark 3, 
then they’d say, well, I need to change my … you know … 
I: My approach. 
A: Or I need to follow more the career planning journey to the Nth 
degree and have to do X, Y and Z and hopefully next year they’ll get a 
benchmark 2 or benchmark 1.   
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I: So for you it’s more like your standard is your personal 
expectation and not what the company tries to impose on you.   
A: That’s not a bad thing … honestly “ (Adviser, Careers Scotland) 
This also hinted at issues on how advisers behaved and reacted to pressures to 
make them adhere to the standardised model the service was in the process of 
implementing. There also seemed to be a sense of being discriminated against in the 
adviser’s comments due to the fact that the adviser did not want to adapt to the 
increasingly standardised provision requirements.  
Due to the ranking system that reward payments were based on, the system 
carried a coercive undertone while the support measures in place seemed to highlight 
more the satisfaction of helping ‘a difficult case’. Some advisers in the organisation 
seemed to place a higher value on this more intrinsically motivated approach and thus 
exhibited more resistance towards the increasing standardisation of the service as the 
example above showed. However, overall, the service seemed to move more to 
extrinsically motivated rewards which were controlled through both targets as well as 
support functions. 
Voluntary-user defined services 
The overarching commonality across the voluntary-user defined services was 
the complete absence of incentive payments. One manager summarised quite 
poignantly a view that many advisers and managers in this service type expressed: 
“I: Do Advisors get performance related pay or do they just get a flat 
amount of money? 
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M: No, flat rate yeah. 
I: Okay, so there’s no additional incentive or potential frictions 
because I’m working so much better than you are? 
M: No. And there’s an argument that says that works well, 
sometimes it doesn’t. I mean, I’ve come from places where performance 
related pay was used and some competition is good, but it can become 
as unhealthy as it is healthy. But I think what works here, is the advisers’ 
commitment to their calls and because every call is so different, I don’t 
know how you could introduce performance related pay.” (Manager, 
Telephone Guidance) 
This kind of approach to rewards seemed to put the individuals and their needs 
before numerical targets, allowing the advisers to focus on the service user without 
the pressure of having to achieve targets. Certainly, any extrinsic motivator appeared 
to be removed and the commitment of the adviser, as the manager above put it, was 
channelled into each customer. The reward seemed to be more intrinsically focused on 
gaining satisfaction from helping an individual or seeing an individual progress towards 
employment. Any numerical target setting would undermine this focus on the service 
user and therefore lead to a lack of commitment on the part of the adviser to achieve 
a positive outcome for the service user. 
This was also apparent in other services of this type, for instance when advisers 
in the Lone Parent Advice service spoke enthusiastically of small successes they had 
achieved with service users and could recall in detail the steps the individual had 
 215 
taken. Another example of an intrinsic motivation was an adviser who explained how 
he enjoyed his job by giving people information: 
“I do enjoy giving them the more information they have … because I 
have more books, I have more information, specific information that 
they can’t find on the internet. … So if I give them more than they have 
they’re oh, they are happy. And I’m really happy, it’s like, yeah, you see, 
that’s my job.” (Adviser, Move On) 
The Redundancy Help service, again, was an exception because advisers were 
subject to the performance evaluation according to the Careers Scotland service. 
However, advisers felt that their work with people at the brink of redundancy carried 
quite some importance, and they gained satisfaction from helping an individual cope 
with the thought process of redundancy; this could be considered more intrinsically 
focused. 
In summary, monetary rewards were used to different extents in the service 
types. At one end of the spectrum, there were somewhat coercive systems that 
seemed to favour extrinsic motivations in the mandatory-standardised service types. 
At the other end, there were services that were characterised by a complete absence 
of monetary rewards and that seemed to favour intrinsic motivations gained through 
job satisfaction and an altruistic viewpoint. Table 9 (see p. 216) summarises the 
outcome of analysis over the various service-types:  
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Table 9: Rewards and favoured motivation in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Reward system Coercive system based  
on monetary rewards 
Increasingly coercive 
system based on 
monetary rewards  
Support based system 
with no monetary 
rewards 
Favoured motivation Extrinsic motivation Increasingly extrinsic 
motivation 
Intrinsic motivation 
 
This leads now to the discussion of how these performance measurement and 
rewards systems encouraged or discouraged certain adviser behaviour. The way these 
systems were used indicates the extent to which the service providers trusted their 
advisers to deliver the intended outcome.  
Trust and enforcing behaviour 
Performance evaluation and rewards were used to steer adviser behaviour 
much in the same way that advisers tried to influence user behaviour, although in this 
case it did not so much concern life changing choices but rather adapting, steering and 
enforcing an organisational service template. In the same way that trust and 
trustworthiness could be established between the adviser and the service user, the 
management systems applied to steer and control advisers could be seen as measures 
to establish trust between the adviser and the service provider.  
The potential of performance evaluation and rewards as proxies for trust and 
trustworthiness has been confirmed by Creed et. al. (1996): 
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“*...+ whatever level of trust or mistrust is evident in their *managers’+ 
actions may well be reciprocated. Moreover, managers design reward 
and control systems that are visible displays of base levels of trust or 
mistrust within departments or the organization as a whole.” (p. 19) 
The following sections examine how performance evaluation and reward 
systems encouraged or discouraged a trusting relationship between the adviser and 
the service as a whole. This will help to further highlight tensions that advisers 
mediated in the various service types. 
Mandatory-standardised type services 
The performance evaluation measures in mandatory-standardised services 
were very much process focused. The strict attention to cost and profit measures and 
fulfilment of targets as well as the rigorous assessment of advisers using the ‘Red-
Amber-Green’ tool were testament to that. Advisers expressed their concern with this 
mode of evaluation, highlighting issues such as the fairness of the assessment 
methods, and expressing a feeling that they were mainly working towards the 
managerial aspects and not for the customer. One adviser complained:  
“… like the practical side of it rather than just looking at paperwork or … 
you know, how many customers didn’t attend their interviews, why 
didn’t they attend them, what action did you take. We know what 
action we’re supposed to take but I don’t know … I feel at times you’re 
sort of like marked down unnecessarily.” (Adviser, New Deal) 
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Indeed measures such as the ‘Red-Amber-Green’ tool highlighted a level of 
distrust among colleagues; advisers did not want to take on service users from a 
colleague’s caseload for fear it could impact on their own rating due to errors in the 
case file processing. An adviser summarised the main concerns as follows: 
“We think it’s unfair because what happens is … for instance if there 
was a previous adviser that maybe … hadn’t set the customer’s cues to 
certain weeks once on the New Deal and then they saw that customer 
the following week, if the manager went in and checked my work and 
saw that the cues weren’t set … I would then be marked down.  So I said, 
well hold on, no, no, no … that’s not fair because I didn’t see that 
customer initially so why am I being penalised for that?  So they said … 
well, basically, as the adviser you have to check that everything is 
correct for the customer.” (Adviser, New Deal) 
The adviser was held completely responsible for fulfilling the procedural 
aspects of dealing with the service user while the performance evaluation tools 
appeared to coerce the adviser into following these procedures. One of the advisers 
highlighted a somewhat vicious cycle that these methods created: 
“Cos I mean, if the advisers aren’t measured, they could be coming in 
here and doing exactly as they please, you know, what they’re offering 
the customer may not actually be relevant to them.” (Adviser, New 
Deal) 
The adviser highlighted a detachment and lack of relevance from what they 
were doing which then meant there needed to be measures that enforced the adviser 
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to behave in a certain way. Consequently, there needed to be an evaluation system to 
ensure that these procedures were followed. Due to the nature of the system, advisers 
felt treated unfairly and seemed to be moving further away from caring about the 
service and concentrating primarily on the process. This concurs with the findings of 
Benabou and Tirole (2003) who report that monetary incentives might lead to a feeling 
of dehumanisation in workers.  
The adviser’s comments could also be interpreted differently. A lack of trust in 
the adviser’s abilities from a managerial point of view limited what advisers would be 
allowed to do, as the reference to “knowing what they are supposed to do” pointed 
out. While it needed to be recognized that the data collected by the provider was also 
used to establish evidence for the funders, it was not necessarily perceived this way by 
advisers who only felt the personal consequences of not complying with what was 
asked of them. 
This was a particularly good example of managerial methods limiting 
professional discretion (McDonald and Marston, 2006). From the adviser’s point of 
view, performance evaluation was not necessarily considered a negative influence. 
However, due to the strong focus on performance, the chance to exercise professional 
discretion to achieve a positive outcome for the service user was completely removed. 
Evaluation measures in the Work Area and Working Estate services focused less 
on a rating system, but the introduction of peer pressure to make advisers comply with 
processes and to achieve their targets fulfilled a similar function. While in the New 
Deal control was moved to the managerial realm, in these two services the control was 
to some extent devolved to the advisers. One manager described this process: 
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“I: Right. So they’re basically checking on each other? 
A: That’s right. That’s the best way, to be honest, because all of us 
are going to fail. If one person fails an element of our business, it has a 
knock-on effect. And everyone’s very clear about that. I try to get people 
to take accountability, not only for themselves but for the programme 
that they’re in…” (Manager, Work Area) 
Clearly, this devolution of controlling vital aspects of the service, while 
portrayed as ‘looking out for each other’ by the manager, had more of a ‘spying on 
each other’ quality to it. On the surface the controlling mechanisms appeared to be 
supportive, however they potentially created some opportunity for distrust among 
colleagues due to peer pressure. Advisers reported there was constant checking - for 
instance in morning meetings - if anyone was having problems with fulfilling their 
targets and if the team was on target. This was enhanced by the quality manager 
ensuring the procedural margin of error for submitting claims was achieved because 
only submitted claims were the ultimate proof that a target had been achieved.  
In the mandatory-standardised services, rewards such as performance pay 
followed along similar lines and appeared to act as a strong factor to direct adviser 
behaviour. In all services, achievement of targets either individually or collectively had 
a direct impact on the receipt of a bonus payment. Conversely, if targets were not 
achieved then the reward would either be reduced or not issued at all. 
The case study services under this type appeared to use rather strict measures 
to ensure advisers complied with service procedures. They were closely related to the 
coercive persuasion approach (Schein, 1999). As the examples above show, there was 
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consistent pressure to adhere to the procedures under threat of punishment (i.e. a low 
rating, loss of respect from peers). This pressure was continuously enforced through 
the ongoing evaluation and measurement processes. Advisers were, however, offered 
a carrot for changing their behaviour and complying with what was asked of them in 
the form of incentive payments.  
It was questionable though to what extent this reward and control system 
worked effectively considering the high attrition rates in these services. Indeed, there 
was evidence from advisers who had switched to other services (for instance 
voluntary-user defined services) because they could not be motivated by monetary 
rewards or disliked the high pressure environment. One adviser talked about her 
discomfort working in a high pressured environment: 
“I found that [Work Area] was a bit too much like commercial 
recruitment. *…+ I moved there because it was more money and my son 
has got a learning difficulty and he had left school, so I was then able to 
get a full time job cos I’d only been working round about his school 
hours. So I went to [Work Area] because I thought that was an extension 
of what I was doing except with a different client group, but it wasn’t 
and I wasn’t completely happy. It was very fast paced. So when this job 
came up, which it is like a step back again to do the actual hands on 
vocational guidance, I jumped at it.” (Adviser, Lone Parent Advice) 
The findings suggested that the environment in mandatory-standardised case 
study services was more conducive to applying similar methods to steering advisers as 
they applied to service users. As with the users, it was questionable to what extent 
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advisers would adhere to processes and procedures if the coercive measures were 
removed.  
Voluntary-standardised type services 
The service in this category took a split approach to building trust with advisers. 
On the one hand, there were coercive measures such as the rating system that 
influenced incentive payments. The systems in place appeared to enforce a growing 
standardisation and rewarded compliance. Thus it was a very calculus-based approach 
to building trust between the two parties through a focus on procedures. There were 
set rules that advisers and service provider were expected to adhere to. On the other 
hand, the service valued the professional knowledge of qualified advisers. This sent a 
rather mixed message to advisers, which as earlier quotes highlighted might create 
some tensions between the professional identity of the advisers and the procedural 
requirements the service set out. However, there also seemed to be an issue with 
organisational change. Schein (1999) highlights that coercive measures are frequently 
used to bring about organisational change. 
This was quite an interesting juxtaposition, because the service would only 
allow qualified advisers to interact with service users. The organisation placed a high 
emphasis on the adviser’s competency and knowledge, which added to the credibility 
of the service. Thus the service focused on knowledge based trust in the adviser. 
Conversely though, the service was sending out a constant message of control and 
standardisation by enforcing the use of a standardised tool, which completely negated 
the trust in the professional competencies of the adviser and seemed to build more on 
calculus-based approaches to trust. Additionally, the use of supportive tools in adviser 
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evaluation which were then used to determine incentive payments enhanced the 
potential for conflict even more. 
The way advisers coped with this situation varied widely among those 
interviewed. Some were happily complying, because they thought there had to be a 
good reason for it. One adviser commented on her reasoning:  
“You’re a qualified careers adviser … (PAUSE) … I suppose after that, it’s 
just ongoing training and self development to make sure that you keep 
up to date with what’s going on and everything and … it’s all about 
accepting change because we’ve gone through an awful lot of change 
and, you know, there are some people probably who just don’t want to 
change and they just want to do things the way they do things and have 
always done things … (LAUGHTER) … whereas my view is … well, if 
Careers Scotland are telling me to do it this way because they have a 
good reason for that, then I’ll do it that way (LAUGHS)” (Adviser, 
Careers Scotland)  
In contrast, others were more or less actively resisting change and placed 
rather high emphasis on their competencies and professional identity. This often led 
them into conflict with the performance evaluation system. This situation, too, 
overlapped somewhat with how the service conceptualised the service user and tried 
to change the user’s behaviour. The service focused on educating willing individuals to 
steer their own future in the work place using a pre-approved methodology and 
providing additional support where necessary. Similarly, this view could be applied to 
advisers. On the one hand, the performance evaluation system rated advisers and tried 
to create individuals that adhered to a pre-approved methodology to steer and 
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support a service ideal. On the other hand, it provided support to the individual adviser 
via observations and reflective practice. However, there was a key difference. While 
the change in the user was completely self-motivated and there was no means for the 
advisers to enforce this change, the advisers were subject to enforcement via 
performance evaluation systems. Thus the trust that was built between the adviser 
and the service provider appeared to be oscillating between knowledge-based trust 
based on the adviser’s professional knowledge, and calculus-based trust based on 
enforced adherence to the new standardised methodology and constant 
organisational change. 
Voluntary-user-defined type services 
The complete lack of incentive payments, the somewhat lose focus on targets 
as well as the more support focused functions of performance evaluation suggested 
that the voluntary-user defined services took a wholly different approach to building 
trust. Trust was based on knowledge and identification with the service based on an 
overarching aim to enhance and maintain a focus on the service user and the quality of 
service provided to them. 
This could be seen, for instance, in the continuous support and improvement of 
the adviser’s own qualifications in the Telephone Guidance service. The service actively 
supported and encouraged advisers to expand their knowledge base in the work place 
by, for instance, offering work-based NVQ assessments at various levels. A similar 
approach could be seen in the Move On service, where advisers were concurrently 
attending courses to improve their skill base, although this might have been a 
requirement of the contract. Nevertheless, the focus on adviser’s knowledge ensured 
an interest in the personal development of the individual. Personal support was 
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provided through management and peers when dealing with difficult cases. This 
enhanced service quality and the individual’s confidence in interacting independently 
and flexibly with service users. 
This support and encouragement, combined with the discretion awarded to the 
adviser to react to service users’ needs, displayed a strong commitment by the service 
to the individual. Expanding knowledge was considered a form of empowerment, and 
thus by placing trust in advisers’ knowledge and helping them to expand their 
competency, the organisations appeared to focus very much on empowering the 
individual. 
The Redundancy Help service targeted the adviser’s knowledge as well, relying 
on their ability to deal with crisis situations and providing support. However, there was 
also the influence of their general attachment to Careers Scotland, which introduced 
somewhat coercive measures, even though advisers pointed out that the effect was 
minimal. Also, there was some slight element of standardisation in the service 
provision (the information packs put together by advisers and the standardised 
presentations). But advisers needed to be able to respond flexibly to the individual 
service user’s needs within the, sometimes extremely short, time frame available to 
them. Thus there was a much higher emphasis on the knowledge of the individual 
adviser, and their professional identity as a qualified adviser became much more 
important to the service’s image over all. 
The Move On and Lone Parent Advice service had a more identification-based 
approach to building trust. Advisers in these two services often shared a similar 
background with the target audience of the service. Thus they could relate to the aim 
of the service on a personal level, due to being a lone parent or a migrant worker for 
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instance. Some of the advisers had, in fact, used the respective service themselves and 
therefore completely bought in to the service’s goals. Similarly, the service 
management placed a certain amount of trust in the adviser’s personal experience, 
making their ability to motivate and support peers in a similar situation much more 
credible. Professional knowledge was not necessarily integral to the service provision. 
Advisers were rather considered role models and ambassadors of how the service had 
empowered them to, for instance, return to work as a lone parent. To the service user, 
the experience of being a lone parent themselves, also lent a certain credibility as well 
as knowledge to the adviser which was recognised by the service managers. 
As such the services relied very much on the advisers’ knowledge and personal 
experience. These provided the basis for the advisers having the freedom to react 
flexibly to user needs while providing them with sufficient credibility that they were 
capable of dealing successfully with a service user. The supportive character of peer 
evaluations empowered advisers to improve and adapt their practices all with a view 
to enhancing the experience for the service user. Thus changing behaviour did not 
become an enforced exercise but it was rather a view to self-improvement and taking 
charge of one’s own development. 
Overall, the various service types appeared to use different approaches to build 
trust and ensure compliance with service procedures. The analysis showed that these 
ranged from highly coercive and calculus-based methods in mandatory-standardised 
services to those that focused on knowledge and identity-based forms of trust and 
individual empowerment in voluntary-user focused services. The result of the analysis 
is summarised in Table 10 (see p. 227). 
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Table 10: Types of trust and compliance in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Type of trust Calculus-based trust Calculus-based trust 
and knowledge-based 
trust 
Knowledge-based trust 
and Identification-
based trust 
Methods to ensure 
compliance 
Coercive methods Coercive and 
supportive methods 
Supportive and 
empowering methods 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter applied the services typology developed in Chapter 6 to the 
examination of the ways in which managerial practices were enacted to govern adviser 
behaviour in the case study services. The use of performance evaluation and reward 
systems were examined to establish similarities and differences in the various service 
types. They also served as proxies to determine what type of trust could be established 
between the adviser and the provider organisation and how this was used to direct 
adviser compliance towards intended behaviours, similarly to the methods used to 
steer service user behaviour.  
The results of the analysis showed that the different concepts covered a 
continuum across the service types. For instance, performance evaluation systems in 
the types of services ranged from highly sophisticated and complex systems to more 
loosely formulated approaches. Reward systems, motivations, trust and methods to 
ensure compliance followed a similar pattern. The extremes were occupied by 
mandatory-standardised services on the one end, and voluntary-user defined services 
on the other. Voluntary-standardised services covered a middle ground and seemed to 
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be somewhat of a hybrid in terms of the methods used to govern adviser behaviour. 
Table 11 summarises the results of the findings. 
 
Table 11: Overview of concepts governing the adviser-management relationship in the service types 
 Mandatory-
standardised type 
Voluntary-
standardised type 
Voluntary-user 
defined type 
Focus of performance 
measurement 
Money measures 
Time measures 
Work measures 
Reaction measures 
Effect measures 
Reaction measures 
Effect measures 
Type of trust Calculus-based trust Calculus-based trust 
and knowledge-based 
trust 
Knowledge-based trust 
and Identification-
based trust 
Methods to ensure 
compliance 
Coercive methods Coercive and 
supportive methods 
Supportive and 
empowering methods 
Reward system Coercive system based  
on monetary rewards 
Increasingly coercive 
system based on 
monetary rewards  
Support based system 
with no monetary 
rewards 
Favoured motivation Extrinsic motivation Increasingly extrinsic 
motivation 
Intrinsic motivation 
 
There appeared to be consistency in the managerial measures used to steer 
adviser behaviour, how these were applied, and the kind of trust that might be 
established between the adviser and the service provider. The consistency was 
particularly striking in mandatory-standardised services where, despite supposedly 
different methodological approaches to helping the customer, the methods used to 
control adviser behaviour and achieve outcomes were remarkably similar. In the 
mandatory-standardised case study services, the work environment of the advisers 
was often influenced by a notable presence of pressure on the individual to perform 
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according to requirements and an underlying level of distrust and peer pressure. 
Compliance was enforced through monetary reward systems that were based mainly 
on numerical targets. 
In contrast was the situation in the voluntary-user defined services with their 
dispersed forms of target setting and performance evaluation. However, in all these 
case study services, there was a strong underlying current to support individual 
advisers in their work to allow them to do a ‘better’ job, which would ultimately 
facilitate the service user’s transition into work. These services seemed to be able to 
build more on knowledge-based trust as well as identification-based trust, which 
appeared to build a stronger commitment of the adviser to deliver the service. This 
commitment could be based on advisers gaining satisfaction and motivation out of 
doing their work as such. Many advisers in this service type commented on the 
satisfaction they gained from small progress their service users made. 
Careers Scotland provided mixed picture, where advisers were supported in 
their roles as professionals through peer review and other measures. However, the 
managerial methods used, such as individual target setting and a strong focus on 
monetary incentives, seemed to direct adviser behaviour in a much more generic and 
standardised way and thus detracted from their role as professionals. This seemed to 
indicate that the provider organisation only placed a limited extent of knowledge-
based trust in the adviser with a strong undercurrent of calculus-based trust. The 
resulting mix of intrinsic motivation gained through the satisfaction of delivering 
qualified advice and the extrinsic motivation through incentive payments and 
standardisation created additional tensions for advisers. The responses of advisers to 
these tensions were equally mixed. This might also factor in the constant change the 
service provider underwent. Coercive measures have been linked with continuous 
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organisational change (Schein, 1999) which might be another reason why these 
tensions for advisers arose. 
Interestingly, the way the provider organisations in mandatory-standardised 
services tried to enforce advisers’ compliance with procedures bore striking similarities 
with the way the advisers conceptualised and interacted with the service user. The 
mandatory-standardised services showed strong coercive tendencies, with an outright 
carrot and stick approach to make advisers comply with the service methodology. The 
sustainability of such an approach has been questioned by the advisers themselves and 
there appeared to be strong tendencies among advisers to depersonalise their service 
provision from their own personal attitudes. This concurs with findings by Deci and 
Ryan (1985) who found that workers became bored and reactive instead of proactive 
when offered monetary incentives, and thus a depersonalisation of the task occurred. 
Even though advisers did not speak of boredom in their work, they referred to 
mechanical processes and robotic task performance, which bears strong similarities to 
Deci and Ryan’s conceptualisation. 
The voluntary-standardised service again covered a peculiar middle ground, by 
trying to focus on the adviser’s competence as a professional while at the same time 
enforcing a predetermined service methodology. This was similar to the user 
relationship in that the individual was supported to make independent decisions 
through the application of a standardised tool. However, in contrast to the service 
user, the adviser was subject to coercive measures via a rating system and the 
connected incentive pay.  
This could strongly be distinguished from the voluntary-user defined services 
that focused on empowering the individual adviser to react to the service users’ needs 
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flexibly using their own personal experience as a knowledge base as well as a source of 
credibility. The focus was very much on developing the individual through providing 
additional knowledge (qualifications) and peer interactions. This allowed advisers to 
take charge of the interaction with the users with confidence, without being subjected 
to the coercive pressure of target achievement. This was similar to the focus on 
empowering the service users to take charge of their lives, with advisers sometimes 
going out of their way to provide the necessary support. As suggested earlier, this 
approach may have a much more lasting effect in ensuring advisers’ compliance 
because there was personal identification and engagement with the service goal.  
The findings from the previous chapter combined with this chapter appear to 
mirror each other. Within the case studies, there seemed to be a tendency that in 
more standardised services coercive measures were used to steer the service user as 
well as the adviser. Conversely, in services that allowed the advisers discretion to focus 
on service user needs, the steering methods for adviser behaviour appeared much 
more supportive. The ability to apply discretion seems to be a vital pivot point in how 
advisers mediated the tensions between service user needs and service demands to 
achieve a positive outcome for the service user. 
The positive outcome, could take different forms in the various services. In the 
mandatory-standardised services, the main focus was on the take up of employment 
whereas in the other service types, a positive outcome could be that the user made 
first steps and approaches to returning to the labour market. Newman (2001) 
highlights the instable character of outcomes produced by the application of coercive 
measures. Indeed, more recent research suggested that while more coercive services 
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are successful in moving people off employment benefits, the employment outcomes 
are less stable and often accompanied by negative wage effects (Petrongolo, 2009).  
This mismatch of policy and practice presents a potential problem. The work 
focus of current policies was undoubtedly clearly addressed in mandatory-
standardised services. However, the aim of advisers to reintegrate service users into 
sustainable employment that allowed them to take on their role as working citizens 
continuously and to ‘make work pay’ was difficult to achieve. The policies seemed 
rather more geared to support short-term changes in and out of employment as 
Petrongolo’s (2009) study outlined. Additionally, with the focus on money and time 
measures in these services, advisers did not appear to have much capacity to aim for 
sustainable outcomes. Their focus was to move a user into employment as quickly as 
possible to fulfil their targets and maximise financial profit for their provider 
organisations (see p. 138 ff).  
This was not a completely surprising finding. Struyven and Verhoest (2005) 
have found that in systems that are highly focused on performance evaluation, 
advisers are more likely to let their work be dominated by these process controls, 
which leaves less room to focus on user needs. This mismatch then forms the basis for 
a continuation of the cycle where users are coerced into low pay and unstable 
employment, taking wage cuts in the process (Petrongolo, 2009). This in turn affects 
their families through the increased possibility of in-work poverty (Millar and Gardiner, 
2004).  
This would suggest that a focus on the specific needs of service users could 
produce much more stable and sustainable employment outcomes, which in the long-
run would have the potential to address the low pay, in-work poverty cycle. However, 
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a complete shift to only supportive policies would be unlikely and from a political 
viewpoint could not be combined with the predominant ideology of activating people. 
A possible solution to break this dilemma could be the creation of services in the 
mandatory-user defined quadrant of service types, which in the UK was not populated.  
Services of this kind would combine the mandatory elements such as actively 
searching for employment, with the targeted personal support that was delivered by 
voluntary-user defined services allowing the service user active participation in their 
support measures. A first attempt to move service provision towards this quadrant has 
been made with the introduction of the Jobseekers Regime Flexible New Deal in 2009, 
which contained elements of increasing conditionality combined with access to 
additional support measures and the handover to intensive support services after 12 
months of unemployment. The programme was still in its initial implementation, but 
first evaluation findings indicated that, if advisers were given the discretion and 
flexibility envisaged in the programme, positive sustainable outcomes could be 
achieved (see Knight et al., 2010). 
This chapter concludes the series of analysis chapter. Chapter 6 introduced the 
case study services and a typology to facilitate the analysis the similarities and 
differences across service types was developed. Chapters 7 and 8 analysed in detail the 
mechanisms how advisers governed service users and how adviser behaviour was 
steered in service delivery. The following chapter discusses the findings of these three 
chapters in relation to the wider theoretical context of the governance literature by 
focussing on the mechanisms that advisers use to mediate the field of tension between 
service user needs and managerial demands. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion 
 235 
Introduction 
The study set out to examine how employment advisers mediated tensions 
between managerial demands and service user needs. In order to facilitate the analysis 
and to compare and contrast the services a typology was developed. The previous 
chapters presented the application of the typology to the case study services, 
focussing on how advisers mediated tensions between service user needs and 
managerial demands. When applied to the case studies, the findings showed that 
advisers applied a wide variety of strategies to achieve the specific outcomes of their 
services within the contractual and organisational parameters. However, these 
strategies were similar within each type.  
This chapter discusses these findings in relation to the wider governance 
literature. Firstly, it discusses the lack of mandatory-user defined services in the UK 
context, which became apparent in the development of the typology. Secondly, it 
contends that discretion is a vital pivot point in how advisers mediate tensions 
between service user needs and managerial demands and that how advisers apply 
their discretion has implications for the personalisation of services. Thirdly, the 
findings, and particularly the typology, are discussed in the context of currently 
existing governance typologies by Newman (2001) and Considine (2001) and suggests 
that hybrid types are more and more prevalent. Lastly, the discussion focuses on the 
mechanisms that front-line advisers apply when mediating the fields of tension 
between service users and managerial demands. 
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The lack of mandatory-user defined services 
When constructing the services typology it appeared that in the UK context 
there were no services covering the mandatory-user defined quadrant (see Table 3,    
p. 131). If this service were developed within the welfare-to-work tradition, it would be 
provided within a policy area that was centrally steered by the UK government, where 
programme provision was highly standardised and controlled. In contrast, a 
mandatory-user defined service would require the devolution of decision-making and 
programme design power to the lower levels. Decentralising this kind of decision-
making power would mean the end of a unified service under equity principles. It 
would require a shift from mere rhetorical partnership working to actual joined-up 
governing at the local level (Rummery, 2002) if such an approach was to work. 
While the hope for this kind of service would be more sustainable employment 
outcomes with the prospect for progression, several problems would require 
consideration. The first problem is how to ensure and measure successful 
implementation. The creation of meaningful performance measures for the services 
available in the UK was a difficult and complex affair (Holloway, 1999). A localised 
service that provided individualised solutions, as opposed to the personalised services 
that appear to be mainly a rhetorical construct in the welfare-to-work context, would 
require a locally adapted set of indicators to allow this kind of measurement, making 
the task of performance measurement infinitely more complex and benchmarking 
against other localities difficult. The second problem, and possibly the more important 
one, lies in how to avoid potential inequality, not only in personal treatment, but also 
geographically. For example, areas that already suffered from high levels of 
deprivation might not have sufficient funding available to provide individualised 
solutions. Crucially, on a more structural level, there might not be sufficient work or 
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training opportunities available in these geographical areas to cater for the individual’s 
needs (Theodore and Peck, 1999). These would be issues that needed careful 
consideration, if such a service type should be created.  
Discretion and the illusion of personalisation 
The findings showed that advisers in mandatory-standardised services, and 
particularly in the New Deal, would have appreciated more flexibility to respond to 
users’ needs. In some cases advisers had to resort to creative tactics at street-level to 
circumvent programme restrictions and accommodate for instance a service user’s 
own efforts in skills improvement. However, adviser rule-breaking was not always in 
the best interest of the user because, for example, if it involved ‘signing off’, which 
meant forgoing ‘passported’ benefits. Advisers often attributed these practices to the 
restrictions placed on them through the task standardisation of their work enforced by 
performance monitoring tools. Advisers talked about ‘robot-like’ work suggesting a 
depersonalisation of their tasks and detachment from service user needs, which 
prevented them from providing a high ‘quality service’. This was an observation shared 
by Bowman and Horne (2010) who concluded that the focus on procedural aspects 
effectively prevented advisers from delivering a personalised service. This was a very 
important point given the policy focus on ‘personalisation’. The introduction of 
mandatory-user defined advice could thus not only be beneficial to the user, but there 
might also be benefits to advisers’ working conditions due to wider opportunities for 
fulfilling user needs and more interesting and enjoyable work tasks. 
There have been attempts at allowing front-line advisers more discretion, for 
instance, the ‘adviser flex’ pilots within the new Jobseekers Regime Flexible New Deal 
introduced in 2009. These programmes showed great success initially; however, over 
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time advisers there reported more and more restrictions in what they were allowed to 
do within their ‘flexibilities’, effectively restricting and standardising what could be 
done (Knight et al., 2010). This raised questions over whether the government would 
actually allow the true personalisation of services within the mandatory welfare-to-
work programmes, and particularly within the public employment service. Early 
indications of the new coalition government’s Work Programme indicated that help for 
individuals requiring more intensive and personalised support to break down barriers 
to work would be contracted to the private and voluntary sectors (Finn, 2010), making 
a decline in standardisation in the adviser’s work in the public agencies unlikely.  
Examples from Nordic countries have shown that this type of service could be 
implemented and produce successful results. However, in the Nordic countries the 
orientation of newer activation policies did not follow the ‘coercive’ model, but were 
rather built on an ‘enabling’ model of building human capital (van Aerschot, 2008, 
Bonvin, 2007, Julkunen and Heikkilä, 2007, van Berkel, 2007). Therefore, for these 
policies to work successfully a re-orientation of activation and detachment from the 
image of the ‘worker citizen’ would be necessary, towards policies that capture 
individual needs and individuality and reflect this in the citizenship image.  
Governance typologies 
While the services were provided within a managerial governance framework 
overall, at street-level a wider set of governance types appeared at work. Newman’s 
(2001) four governance types could be applied to the service types and the ways in 
which advisers mediated their relationships between programme demands and user 
needs. In the mandatory-standardised case study services, the structured use of the 
‘carrot and stick approach’, albeit in a somewhat hierarchical fashion, combined with 
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contractualism with the service user in the form of Action Plans, for instance, could be 
most closely linked to the managerial governance type. The incentive system used for 
advisers assumes an interest in profit maximisation which also tied in with this type. 
There was also an influence of hierarchical governance through performance 
evaluation. Self-governance, based on the professional values of advisers as well as the 
drive to educate the service user to be a self-reliant active citizen, could be linked to 
voluntary-standardised service. However, this type also showed some features of the 
managerial type (the use of financial rewards for advisers, for instance) as well as 
hierarchical governance in the form of performance evaluation. Lastly, the overall 
influence on voluntary-user defined case studies could be determined as network 
governance, where advisers and users as well as advisers and management 
collaborated to produce an outcome. However, there were also strong influences of 
organisational and group values found in the self-governance type. These outcomes 
would suggest an amendment of Newman’s governance types in terms of their 
applicability to street-level governance. 
An alternative way to examine the findings would be a mapping exercise of the 
service types with Considine’s (2001) governance typology (see also Considine and 
Lewis, 2003). When mapped onto Considine’s most closely matching governance 
types, an ambiguous picture developed because the two typologies did not produce 
consistent results. Table 12 (see p. 240) shows how the services typology would map 
onto Considine’s and Newman’s typologies, with the most prevalent type listed first. 
The mapping exercise of the study findings to Considine’s (2001) typology 
produced an outcome similar to the exercise with Newman’s (2001) governance types. 
In both cases, pure cases of the stipulated types did not exist. However, this does not 
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mean that one or the other typology should be discounted. It would rather suggest 
that due to the rapid change in this policy area, governance mechanisms and types 
might have evolved and thus created new hybrid types of governance, as also 
suggested by van Berkel (2010).  
 
Table 12: Mapping the services typology onto the Considine and Newman typologies 
Services typology Service Considine typology Newman typology 
Mandatory-
standardised services 
New Deal Procedural/Corporate 
Managerial/ 
Hierarchical 
 
Work Area Corporate/Market 
Working Estate Corporate/Market 
Voluntary-
standardised services 
Careers Scotland Corporate/Network Self-governance/ 
Managerial 
governance/ 
Hierarchical 
governance 
Voluntary-user 
focused services 
Move On Network/Corporate 
Network governance/ 
Self-governance 
Redundancy Help Corporate/Network 
Telephone Guidance Network 
Lone Parent Advice Network 
 
This overlapped with findings from a recent study by Considine and Lewis 
(2010), where they found that a hybrid of the corporate-market type (target and 
competition focused) was the most consistent across the study, with network 
governance (relationship focused) the least stable. Unsurprisingly, the majority of their 
UK adviser participants identified the corporate type as their main influence, where 
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target fulfilment dominated front-line work. However, Considine and Lewis (ibid) also 
suggested that network types possibly served as a transitional strategy to cope with 
organisational change and were more context dependent. Findings from this study, 
however, could add another explanation to the instability of this type. While the 
influence of private sector management methods in contractual relationships affected 
advisers’ work and their organisational value sets, particularly in the voluntary-
standardised and voluntary-user defined services (Carmel and Harlock, 2008), advisers 
sometimes gave greater value to their personal experience and the particular needs of 
the service user than to compliance with managerial methods. However, they were 
exposed to a continuous struggle and therefore the balance between compliance with 
managerial methods and attending to user needs was constantly shifting. 
Caught in the middle 
This study applied a governance perspective, where governance was 
understood as a set of steering mechanisms to change or maintain behaviours or the 
status quo (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003). Advisers occupied a middle ground 
because they were governed by their organisations through managerial demands and 
programme specifications, while also governing service users by making decisions, 
using discretion and building trust. Advisers had to mediate the demands of being 
steered towards compliance while also being responsive to user needs to achieve 
behavioural changes in service users. 
Managerialism versus discretion 
McDonald and Marston (2006) concluded that managerial governance 
mechanisms restricted the use of discretion. Similarly, Taylor and Kelly (2006) argued 
that in quasi-market environments rule bound behaviour overruled discretion due to 
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the emphasis on control and steering mechanisms. The results of this study confirmed 
these results, however, only for some service types. 
For the mandatory-standardised case study services, the findings from 
McDonald and Marston (2006) and Taylor and Kelly (2006) appeared applicable. 
However, in some of the cases study services, for instance the New Deal, advisers 
applied street-level tactics to circumvent these restrictions and exercise some 
discretion, giving credibility to Lipsky’s (1980) findings. In other services of the same 
type, for instance Working Estate, advisers had more opportunity to act flexibly, but 
even they pointed out that managerial requirements would always take precedence 
over specific user needs, if a choice between the two was required. This suggested that 
advisers hardly mediated the tensions between managerial demands and service user 
needs in the mandatory-standardised case study services. If they did attempt to 
mediate them, the findings showed that the most likely way of doing this appeared to 
be creative tactics at street-level, which potentially produced outcomes that the 
original policy did not intend (such as users entering precarious employment and 
benefit situations to remain on courses). 
The findings from the voluntary-standardised case study services suggested a 
mix of mediating methods. Some advisers happily complied with steering the user 
towards standardised tools thus adhering with managerial demands. However, some 
advisers actively resisted this drive towards standardisation, based on their self-
perception as a guidance professional. These individuals seemed prone to apply street-
level tactics in an effort to continue to provide a user-focused service, by for instance 
delivering a 1:1 interaction when the user should have been directed towards a self-
help tool. However, the increasing standardisation of the service hinted at a slow 
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deskilling of the adviser’s task, which could effectively lead to deprofessionalisation. 
This concurs with findings from a study with nursing professionals working on 
telephone helplines (Fältholm and Jansson, 2008), which in its task complexity and 
professional ethos bore strong similarities to careers guidance. The advisers were 
therefore constantly battling between maintaining “old hierarchies of work and 
knowledge, as well as new economies” of service delivery (Charles-Jones et al., 2003: 
72). In this context, some advisers also raised the problem of ‘McDonaldisation’ 
(Bourgeault et al., 2001), where people were made to fit the service and the same 
service offered to all. Advisers in this type of service were thus constantly mediating 
between professionalism as defined by the service and professionalism as defined by 
their occupation. Their mediation between managerialism and discretion was 
therefore also a mediation process to maintain their professional identity. 
In stark contrast, advisers in voluntary-user defined case study services had a 
considerable amount of freedom to provide a service targeted to the individual’s 
needs. Managerial steering mechanisms hardly impacted on their work; in some 
services (for instance Lone Parent Advice), there was no performance measurement. In 
those case studies where performance measurement existed, advisers often 
disregarded the restrictions these applied to the service due to a perceived moral 
obligation to the service user. They thus behaved ‘knightish’ (Le Grand, 2003) because 
they did not necessarily take the financial implications for themselves or the provider 
into consideration, but were motivated by their personal or a shared experience to 
help the individual. The mediation process between managerial demands and service 
user needs appeared to be dominated to a large extent by advisers’ intrinsic 
motivation. 
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These findings suggested two dominant views in the steering and 
conceptualising of front-line advisers in the case study types. On the one hand, they 
can be understood very much in the tradition of street-level bureaucrats. Their main 
task was the application of rules and regulations with the ability to apply narrowly 
defined discretion, which in turn required careful management (Brodkin, 2007, Lipsky, 
1980). On the other hand, front-line advisers could be seen as professionals who 
required autonomy to apply their professional skills and capabilities in an effective way 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2005). It is worth keeping in mind though, that the extent of 
advisers’ professionalism differed strongly between the services and was often 
connected with a qualification in the substantive field of advice and guidance. 
Trust and compliance 
The type of trust between adviser and service user appeared to exert great 
influence in the way advisers could achieve compliance from the service user, and thus 
work towards a behavioural change. Goddard and Mannion (1998) asserted that long-
term relationships built on trust and cooperation were an attempt to solve the 
principal-agent problem in contractual relationships. Chapter 4 highlighted the 
different types of trust that could be established in adviser-user relationships based on 
the extent of discretion available to the adviser. Findings confirmed Goddart and 
Mannion’s (1998) assertion. The voluntary-user defined services focused on 
establishing a relationship with the service user, which appeared to build on 
identification-based trust. The cooperative nature of the service allowed the user to 
make the transition into employment at their own pace with the hope of creating 
more sustainable employment outcomes. More importantly, the interaction of the 
adviser with the managerial requirements mirrored the trust relationship with the 
user. In highly standardised services, trust relationships were merely calculus-based, 
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influenced by the underlying threat of punishment. In contrast, the cooperative 
evaluation methods of more user-focused services allowed knowledge-based trust to 
be built. Thus, the nature of the trust relationship could be seen as supportive of 
solving the principal-agent problem, particularly in the face of multiple principals. It 
could be argued that the type of trust that could be established either forced the 
adviser to make a cut-throat choice between principals or allowed the balancing 
between the competing demands of managerial requirements and service users, 
confirming findings by Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995). There was also an economic 
rationale to endorse balanced principal-agent relationships. Gilson (2006) for instance, 
considered them more cost effective due to the lack of a requirement for expensive 
monitoring and auditing systems. A more balanced approach would contribute to cost 
savings, which were vital considering the large-scale budget cuts being implemented 
from 2010 onwards. 
Moreover, recent findings by Bowman and Horne (2010) from an Australian 
study and by Sainsbury (2010) from a UK study confirmed the findings of this study 
concerning compliance and process-focus, respectively. Bowman and Horne (2010) 
outlined that services that enforced compliance, as practised in the mandatory-
standardised service type, made the successful delivery of user-focused services nearly 
impossible, particularly in a quasi-market environment where control and performance 
evaluation were prevalent. Sainsbury (2010), in turn, concluded that the process-focus 
prevalent in mandatory-standardised services hindered the personalisation of service 
delivery. Essentially, these findings questioned the capability of these policy 
interventions to deliver sustainable employment outcomes. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the findings relative to conceptual literature as well as 
empirical research findings. It established that the implementation of a mandatory-
user defined service within the welfare-to-work tradition would require a re-
orientation of the approach to welfare-to-work policies from ‘coercion’ policies to 
‘enabling’ policies. This would also require the full decentralisation of decision-making 
power to the local level, which would require a re-consideration of partnership 
working. It also examined the congruence of the services typology to the governance 
typologies of Newman (2001), Considine (2001, 2010) and Considine and Lewis (2003) 
and found that the service types led to the assumption that advisers operated within 
hybrid forms of these governance models. Lastly, the chapter discussed how advisers 
mediated the tensions between managerial demands and service users’ needs and 
concluded that there are strongly differing mechanisms at work in the service types. 
Essentially, the mediation processes could be located within the street-level 
bureaucracy literature for the mandatory-standardised case study services. Advisers 
were seen as administrators that applied discretion in a narrowly defined margin that 
needed to be carefully managed. In contrast, in the two other service types advisers 
were governed as professionals who needed autonomy to apply their skills. However, 
particularly in the voluntary-standardised case study service, advisers operated in a 
context of constant struggle to maintain their professional identity.  
Chapter 10 draws together the main points of the study and outlines its 
contribution to academic knowledge. It also provides an overview of the more recent 
developments in the policy fields of welfare-to-work and education and skills since the 
fieldwork for this study was conducted and proposes areas for future research that 
emerged from the study. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
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This study set out to examine qualitatively how employment advisers in 
different services mediated tensions between managerial demands and service user 
needs. These employment advice services were delivered within two policy 
frameworks, welfare-to-work and education and skills, which each have their distinct 
policy making processes, institutions, legal contexts, delivery structures and research 
traditions. The study’s unique contribution is in the integrated exploration of services 
in both delivery frameworks as they were available to those out of work or at risk of 
unemployment. Conceptually, the study adopted a governance perspective instead of 
the more traditional street-level perspective. In doing so, it offered a unique insight 
into how governance mechanisms operate at street-level in different service types. 
These types were developed based on 38 semi-structured interviews in eight case 
study services. The findings showed that advisers applied similar steering mechanisms 
to achieve compliance from service users as were applied to steer their own 
behaviour. When mediating tensions, advisers’ in coercively orientated service types 
appeared likely to apply street-level tactics to support user needs. In other service 
types advisers seemed to not only mediate between managerial demands and user 
needs, but were also engaged in a mediation process to maintain their identity as 
guidance professionals. In the context of the wider governance literature, the study 
confirmed findings of recent studies by Considine and Lewis (2010) and van Berkel 
(2010) which suggested that governance types in employment services have moved 
towards more hybridised forms.  
This chapter provides a more detailed summary of the study outlining the 
research questions and conceptual basis, methodology and findings. Since the 
completion of data collection in 2007, the policy fields of welfare-to-work and 
education and skills have developed substantially, including a change in government. 
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The resulting policy changes and potential policy developments under the new 
government are considered. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future 
research.  
Summary 
The study examined advisers’ work from two angles to understand how they 
mediated competing demands. Firstly, it investigated how advisers interacted with 
service users and how they were able to use discretion. This was then connected to 
building trust and influencing people’s behaviour. Secondly, it examined how 
performance measurement and incentives influenced advisers’ work and how they 
acted to steer adviser behaviour. These two pressures constantly interacted and 
advisers responded to these competing demands differently in the case study services.  
Advisers in the mandatory-standardised case studies had relatively small 
margins of discretion when interacting with service users, although there were slight 
variances within this type. Their ability to use discretion was often limited by the 
service structure and tools that ensured standardisation. Even though advisers tried to 
work around limiting programme requirements, they did not seem to take wider 
implications for the user into consideration, such as the loss of ‘passported’ benefit 
payments (e.g. housing benefit, council tax benefit). This implied a stronger focus on 
compliance with managerial demands than on user needs. In voluntary-standardised 
services, advisers used their discretion proactively, despite increasing attempts to 
standardise and channel their interactions. In some instances, advisers even actively 
resisted the increasing pressure of performance measurement based on their 
perception as a professional. In contrast, advisers in voluntary-user defined services 
faced very few restrictions in their ability to use discretion. They could focus on user 
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needs and make ‘judgement calls’ regarding their actions, with managerial pressures 
having little influence on their decision making. 
Service structures and the extent to which discretion was used allowed 
different kinds of trust to be established. This seemed strongly linked to programme 
standardisation. Those services that had limited scope to apply discretion operated in 
an environment that appeared more conducive to establishing calculus-based trust, 
which used the threat of sanctions to enforce compliance, rather than higher forms of 
trust. The voluntary-standardised case study service established knowledge-based 
trust relationships. This enabled advisers to respond flexibly to service user needs 
because their judgement as professionals and the recognition of their qualification had 
strong credibility with service users. Through continuous interaction to build a 
relationship with the service user, responding flexibly to their needs as well as 
personal experience (in some cases), advisers established knowledge-based trust and 
sometimes even identification-based trust in the voluntary-user defined services. 
These different kinds of trust relationships formed the basis for influencing the service 
users’ behaviour. 
The methods to change service users’ behaviour varied from highly coercive 
treatment to empowering strategies that encouraged individuals to be independent. 
The nature of the service as well as the extent of discretion and trust available to the 
adviser had a strong influence on the available method. In the mandatory-standardised 
services users were coerced into compliance with programme requirements. Even 
though coercive persuasion may seem a rather strong approach in the context of 
employment advice services, the elements of producing guilt through the emphasis of 
paid work as a means to full citizenship as well as the carrot and stick approach 
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warranted a comparison to this method. The education towards self-responsibility and 
independence that was the main method of voluntary-standardised services had high 
congruence with New Labour’s conception of the self-responsible worker citizen. 
These services also exhibited a close connection with New Labour’s self-conception of 
the enabling state that is providing the support for transitions into the labour market. 
This suggested that the underlying aim of the service followed a deliberate policy 
design given that the creation of this particular case study service was based on a 
conscious political decision by a Labour government. Empowerment was one of New 
Labour’s focal elements, again within the construct of the enabling state. In voluntary-
user defined services, this meant supporting the individual so they could take charge of 
changing their lives. Empowerment in the adviser-user relationship was enacted in a 
sharing of power when determining the course of action to improve the service users’ 
personal situation, in most cases through a transition into work or sometimes 
education. However, in these case study services, the outcome was not solely based 
on policy considerations, but a result of the combination of organisational context and 
advisers’ personal experiences and attitudes towards supporting the user. 
A set of focal measures helped to assess the methods used to evaluate adviser 
behaviour. In mandatory-standardised services, the assessment tools focused on cost 
and profit as well as time measures. These performance measures were highly output 
focused and could be determined via clearly measurable targets. Measures focused on 
the quantity and quality of work, changes in behaviour or attainment of standards, as 
well as peer evaluation, dominated performance measurement in voluntary-
standardised services. While there was some focus on measurable outputs through the 
inclusion of quantity measures, softer evaluation methods including peer assessment 
or self-reflection were a common feature in this case study service. The studied 
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services in the voluntary-user defined services exhibited a similar set of performance 
measures, but lacked the quantity-orientated measures.  
These performance measures fed into the reward systems operational within 
the service types. These reward systems carried with them assumptions about how 
individuals could be motivated. A coercive reward system based on monetary rewards 
operated mainly in mandatory-standardised services and was closely linked to target 
fulfilment. It also contained the potential threat of job loss in case of 
underperformance and in some cases peer pressure to fulfil a target. These systems 
assumed that individuals were mainly extrinsically motivated through money. In 
voluntary-standardised services, extrinsically focused monetary rewards replaced 
more and more the intrinsically focused satisfaction gained by fulfilment of the 
adviser’s professional role. Even though performance measures that determined 
rewards included support-based features, such as reflective practice, the emphasis on 
target fulfilment appeared to grow steadily. In contrast, voluntary-user defined 
services operated support-based systems that offered no financial reward. Reward 
systems in these services relied on advisers’ motivation to help the service user or that 
they gained motivation through providing a quality service.  
The combination of performance evaluation methods and reward systems 
allowed the trust placed in advisers to comply with service demands and their ability to 
deliver the desired outcome to be analysed. Output focused measures and clearly 
defined targets, the fulfilment of which determined a financial reward, indicated a 
calculus-based trust relationship with advisers. The offer of financial reward for target 
fulfilment was a coercive method to enforce compliance with service procedures. 
Calculus-based trust and knowledge-based trust were prevalent in voluntary-
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standardised services. This was determined through the use of output measures in 
combination with financial rewards to coerce advisers into compliance. However, the 
use of measures focusing on service quality and the application of professional 
knowledge counteracted the coercive methods to a certain extent. Lastly, knowledge-
based trust and to a certain extent identification-based trust were extended to 
advisers in voluntary-user defined services. This was based on the supportive measures 
applied to ensure compliance with service outcomes.  
Overall, advisers in the different service types experienced similar pressures to 
enforce compliance with service requirements that they applied to the service user. 
Advisers in mandatory-standardised case studies had little room to mediate the 
tensions between managerial demands and service user needs due to the coercive 
nature of the service and the highly standardised steering methods. In contrast, 
advisers in voluntary-user defined services experienced decision-making freedom and 
could thus adjust their focus to the most important areas that would benefit the 
service user. The lack of coercive methods allowed them to work with service users 
towards service’s aims thus potentially achieving much more sustainable transitions 
into work or training due to the voluntary compliance of the user. Advisers in 
voluntary-standardised services were in a peculiar situation. Some of them applied 
their discretion based on their professional knowledge and actively resisted the 
increasing standardisation and the associated coercive strategies. Others happily 
complied with the managerial demands and coercive measures, even though they 
questioned this approach from a professional perspective. 
Concerning the typology, the findings showed consistency of the strategic 
approaches within each type. The consistency of the outcomes added to the reliability 
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of the analysis and the suitability of the typology for the analysis of the case study 
services.  
Recent policy developments 
The policy areas within which employment advice services operated were fast 
changing environments. Since the fieldwork was conducted in 2005/2006, there have 
been substantial developments in both frameworks. Following, these developments 
are briefly discussed and their potential implications are considered, particularly with a 
view to newer developments under the coalition government. 
Developments in welfare-to-work policies 
In 2007, David Freud, investment banker by trade, reported to the government 
on his vision for the future of welfare-to-work (Freud, 2007). His findings and 
recommendations included: 
- Contracting support for the hardest to help on an outcome-based model 
via prime contractors. Jobcentre Plus would retain ‘ownership’ of the 
benefit recipients and provide a baseline service, while “there would be 
freedom between the provider and the individual to do what works for 
them” (Freud, 2007: 6). Rewards for contractors were supposed to be 
commensurate with the ‘value to society’ of the person who entered 
the workplace in terms of benefit expenditure saved. Prime contractors 
would be responsible for ‘marshalling’ a suitable set of subcontractors. 
- Highlighting fiscal gains, boosting Gross National Product and decreasing 
benefit spending in working towards an 80 percent employment rate. 
This was supposed to be achieved by up-front investment in longer term 
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prime provider contracts, which were supplemented by outcome-based 
payment mechanisms that would focus incentives on those hardest to 
help. 
- Increasing conditionality for lone parents with progressively younger 
children and introducing conditionality for other groups, for instance 
people with a disability. 
- Introducing a single working age benefit to eliminate unemployment 
and poverty traps due to benefit system complexity. 
The report continued the strong emphasis supply-side economics and the 
‘worker citizen’ based on increasing conditionality in exchange for benefit rights, for 
which it was highly criticised (Grover, 2007). Following the recommendations of the 
Freud report, conditionality for lone parents, for instance, was increased with the age 
of the youngest child triggering the requirement to actively search for work gradually 
moving down to 7 years by October 2010. The new coalition government has 
announced that this will be lowered even further to the age of 5 by 2012 (DWP, 
2010b).  
Furthermore, there was an expansion of quasi-market contracting. The 2008 
‘Commissioning Strategy’ outlined changes in the welfare delivery market over the 
coming years, which focused on improving performance. The expectation was that up 
to 80 percent of DWP business would be conducted by ‘a stable core’ of providers 
(DWP, 2008a). Following the report recommendations, a ‘prime provider’ model was 
implemented which invited large, ‘successful’ private companies (including multi-
national corporations) to bid for area-based service delivery contracts (Piggott and 
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Grover, 2009) where they were encouraged to further sub-contract to local public, 
private and voluntary, and community sector organisations (DWP, 2007c). However, 
the way this increased marketisation has progressed has been categorised by some 
commentators as increased privatisation because the market for employment services 
has quickly been covered by a small number of prime contractors with smaller roles for 
other providers (Grover, 2009). 
Subsequently, the Flexible New Deal (FND) was introduced in April 2009, which 
replaced the New Deal for Young Persons, New Deal 25+ and Employment Zones. It 
was based on a stronger framework of rights and responsibilities to activate people by 
offering personalised and responsive support (DWP, 2008b). This approach combined 
the baseline support with intensive support by private providers as recommended by 
Freud. However, in contrast to Freud’s recommendation, support was not front-loaded 
at the start of the claim, but was rather intensified over the duration of the claim 
through progressively increasing conditionality. After 12 months of unemployment, 
benefit recipients were then handed over to a private provider, a prime contractor, 
who was operating a ‘black box’ approach to supporting the individual back into work. 
Early evaluations (Knight et al., 2010) of the FND showed that the programme suffered 
substantially from the adverse effects of the recession with greater amounts of people 
signing on requiring a wider range of support needs. As a response, additional support 
services were introduced (Support for Newly Unemployed and the 6 Month Offer) at 
short notice. The first customers were moved on to private providers in October 2010. 
First evaluation findings (Vegeris et al., 2010) showed that the implementation was 
accompanied by some problems specifically surrounding the introduction of software 
tools and communications with the providers. The assessment of service user 
experiences was in progress. 
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Shortly after coming to power in May 2010, the new coalition government 
published its ‘Work Programme’ (DWP, 2010a). The new proposals for benefit 
eligibility stipulated maintaining, if not increasing, the level of conditionality applied to 
jobseekers. This represented to a large extent the continuation of the activation 
strategy the New Labour government had set out, highlighting the importance of 
labour market participation within a rights and responsibilities framework. However, 
there were strong deviations from the old policy direction in terms of programme 
delivery. The current range of programmes was to be replaced by the single integrated 
‘Work Programme’ based on a single working age benefit. The delivery of the new 
benefit was to be based on a decentralisation of administration powers to the local 
level (ibid). For the delivery of the ‘Work Programme’, a marketised system was 
envisioned which would focus more strongly on outcomes of ‘getting people back into 
work’ (Finn, 2010). The biggest change was concerning people facing multiple barriers, 
who would be referred directly to private contractors, effectively shifting responsibility 
for this group of people completely away from the state. This could be seen as either a 
refocusing of Jobcentre Plus resources on those they are best placed to help and 
capitalisation on the capacities of, for instance, private or voluntary sector 
organisations. Conversely, it could also be seen as an abandonment of those hardest to 
help by the state in a continuation of Thatcherite views that were reinforced under 
New Labour (Clarke, 2005). 
The concept of abandonment gains further strength when the contextual 
parameters within which these policies were conceived are taken into consideration. 
The new coalition government was under pressure to achieve cost savings and 
departments were asked to reduce expenditure by 25 percent on average with 
particular pressure being placed on the Department for Work and Pensions to reduce 
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the ‘welfare bill’ (Curtis, 2010). Throughout their proposals for the ‘Work Programme’, 
policy makers highlighted the need for cost savings and efficiencies, for instance 
through the increased use of ICT systems (DWP, 2010a). The likely impact of this new 
age of austerity could be a cut in the amount of benefit payments as well as further 
increases in the pressure to find work and conditionality in an effort to reduce 
expenditure on benefit payments. This development has already taken place with 
changes to the annual up rating formula for Jobseekers’ Allowance (McKay, 2010). On 
the delivery side, it would be imaginable that provisions that were covered by 
Jobcentre Plus could be completely devolved to local authorities as has been the case 
in Denmark (Bredgaard and Larsen 2009). This would allow the government to devolve 
financial risk and unpopular policy choices to the local level, while maintaining central 
control over the general direction of policy. For the adviser’s role, it could possibly 
mean a further increase in their responsibilities through a wider margin of discretion, if 
responsibility is indeed localised and local solutions found. 
Developments in the learning and skills framework 
Shortly after fieldwork was finalised, Careers Scotland was uncoupled from 
Scottish Enterprise and for a short time became an independent, non-governmental 
body. However, this independence was short-lived, because in 2008, there was a 
further amalgamation of four major providers of advice, guidance and skills 
development services: Careers Scotland, University for Industry Scotland, and the skills 
intervention branches of Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise. 
These organisations formed a new non-departmental public body called ‘Skills 
Development Scotland’, which was responsible for “catalysing real and positive change 
in Scotland's skills performance by linking skills supply and demand more effectively 
and helping people and organisations learn, develop and utilise these skills to greater 
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effect” to stay competitive in the global economy (SDS, 2010: 1). Thus the strong link 
to Scottish economic development persisted and was further emphasised. A direct link 
into employment policy under the welfare-to-work agenda was, however, still omitted.  
In England, the Learning and Skills Council was dissolved in 2008 and replaced 
by two separate agencies: the Young People's Learning Agency and the Skills Funding 
Agency. Thus, the age division in service delivery in England would persist. Services for 
adults (19 years and older) were going to be delivered within the new ‘Next Step – 
Adult Careers and Advancement Service’ which was launched in August 2010. Its main 
aim was “not just to help people into jobs, but to help break the cycle of low skills, 
short-term jobs and low wages” (IAG Review, 2010: 1). The service was going to be 
demand-led focused on both individuals and employers with the aim of closely linking 
employment and skills. Provision was contracted to a variety of providers who 
delivered the service online, face-to-face and over the phone on area-based contracts 
(SFA, 2010).  
Future Research 
Based on the findings of this study and building on international evidence 
(Considine and Lewis, 2010, Van Berkel, 2010) that new hybrid-forms of governance at 
street-level could have developed due to the changing policy environment, it would be 
useful to study to what extent these hybrid forms are indeed manifested within the UK 
context and how they influenced policy implementation. This would provide further 
insight into the changing landscape of service governance in quasi-market 
environments, particularly under the new coalition government. 
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The new government proposals (DWP, 2010a) for benefit eligibility stipulated 
maintaining, if not increasing, the level of conditionality applied to jobseekers in 
combination with a decentralisation of programme design and administration powers 
to the local level. It would be extremely interesting to examine how advisers mediated 
these changes. There was also an outright stipulation towards behavioural changes 
that this new policy pursued. It could be assumed that local adaptations allow advisers 
greater discretion and thus would produce more sustainable outcomes, as the findings 
from this study suggest. 
Given this potential decentralisation of service design powers under the new 
‘Work Programme’, it would be pertinent to investigate to what extent the devolution 
of this capability would be conducive to the creation of mandatory-user defined 
services, which were non-existent in the UK context. A comparative case study with a 
service in one of the Nordic countries that operate such services could compare and 
contrast the contextual, political and ideological pre-requisites. 
Within this new policy environment, the provider landscape was changing 
substantially. The prime provider model, where a small group of large organisations 
dominated the contracts and further sub-contract delivery to local organisations, 
including for instance local councils, voluntary and community sector organisations, or 
self-employed consultants, was particularly bound to influence the challenges that 
front-line advisers faced substantially. It would therefore be interesting to examine 
how advisers in the sub-contracted organisations mediated tensions between their 
organisational goals, contractor goals and service user needs, particularly with respect 
to the findings from Carmel and Harlock (2008) on the impact on values in the 
voluntary sector in a climate of increased contracting. Within this context, it would 
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also be interesting to study the adviser-user relationship in more detail to determine 
how the further increasing conditionality stipulated in the Work Programme impacts 
on the advisers’ ability to influence user behaviour. 
Not only could it be stipulated that the prime contractor model changed front-
line delivery, it also impacted on the dynamics between the main contractor and local 
sub-contractors. An investigation with regards to changing conceptions of partnership 
working would be of particular use to determine whether there has been substantial 
change from the predominantly rhetorical partnership that Rummery (2002) suggested 
to more joint working and cooperation. 
This study examined how advisers mediated tensions between managerial 
demands and service user needs in employment advice services in the UK. Advisers 
were the executive agents of government policies. Even though this study was 
conducted in a different political context, the basic premises of conditionality, 
personalisation and quasi-market provision continued to be an issue in this quickly 
changing policy field which was supported by a strong cross-party consensus. Thus 
examining how advisers were governed and how they governed service users remains 
a pressing research topic for some time to come. 
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Tranche 1 
Question Schedule: Service Manager 
Overall picture about the organisation 
Could you just briefly outline, when your organisation was founded and by whom?  
What is the legal status of your organisation? 
Who are the main stakeholders? 
What’s the organisational structure (how many layers)? 
Could you describe the main activity of your organisation?  
On what legal basis do you provide your services (own offer, contract?)? 
Who develops the frameworks within which you are working? Who controls what you 
are doing? 
Do you have a specific strategy to differentiate yourself from your competitors in 
terms of users, staff profiles? Expand. 
Do you follow a specific strategy on how to attract a specific group of users?  
If so, what is that strategy? 
What is the ratio between direct provision and contracting? 
Could you expand on future development plans of your organisation? 
Could you tell a bit about your relation with competitors? Is there any co-operation? 
What is the position of the stakeholders in your organisation? How are they involved in 
the development and daily business of your organisation? 
How do the stakeholders see the future development of the guidance market? How do 
they think it should evolve? How do you position your organisation in this market? 
Specific programme 
Is the guidance service subcontracted from another agency (PES etc.)? 
What are the conditions and how is your work controlled? 
Is part of the guidance service subcontracted to another agency? 
If yes, what are the conditions; what are the modes of control? 
How is the service funded? Who provides funding and where do you see key-
problems? 
Who is the service aimed at? (target groups) 
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How do you approach the target groups and recruit them to your service? 
How do you differentiate the different needs of your client group? Do you employ a 
triage system? 
What does a typical cycle the user goes through look like? 
Where are they referred from (and with what documents), what does the first 
interview consist in, in the provider organisation, how are they referred to this 
programme, again with what document etc. 
How many users do you have per year/month? Are there seasonal differences?  
Information in relation to staff 
Which professional groups do your staff fall into? 
What qualification levels do they typically hold? 
Could you describe their role in the guidance service? 
What are the contractual agreements with staff (employment status, payment…)? 
Do you assess your staff on a regular basis? How is that done? How often? What are 
the outcomes of such an assessment? 
What kind of dynamics do you think this creates among staff? 
How many users does a staff member on average advise? 
What is the degree of specialization of counsellors (information versus guidance; a mix 
of services; some specific targets versus all publics)? 
Quality assurance and controlling 
Are there any obligations you need to fulfil in relation to your funders? If so, what are 
they and how are they enforced? 
Do you work towards any quality standards? How are they controlled for and 
evaluated? 
Outcomes 
What are the intended outcomes of the guidance service? 
What is considered a positive outcome according to your funder’s criteria? 
What would you or your staff consider a “positive outcome”? 
How do you evaluate positive outcomes in terms of quality criteria? 
Within that framework do you aim for a particular client group? 
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What has the biggest impact on the quality of the outcomes e.g. costs, time per 
client…? 
Background information from the point of view of the provider 
Major change in the regional/local provision of guidance services (all services or only 
service under review) between 2000 and 2005 
Assessment of change (improvement/deterioration) 
Main elements of necessary improvement for the future with regard to  
- regional/local context  
- legal/institution framework 
- profession aspects 
- users perspective 
 
Tranche 1 
Question Schedule: Staff Members 
Could you just briefly state your name, job title and the organisation you are working 
for? 
What is your academic and professional background? 
How would you define “careers guidance”? 
Could you describe a “normal” work day? (Check on distribution of admin/ 
counselling/ controlling) 
What are the main elements of the service you are providing (profiling, advising…)? 
Do you follow strict guidelines on how to provide guidance? (i.e. a work plan, check 
list) 
Who decides on guidance services and activation measures in individual cases 
(standardized rules or discretionary decisions?) 
Are you free to select certain measures over others? 
What is the relationship between guidance and activation measures? 
How is lifelong learning reflected in the service you are providing? 
Who assesses the need for guidance services? Or do most of the clients come to you 
on their own terms? 
So, there are (no) sanctions or incentives for non-participation and participation? 
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Are you able to select clients with a specific profile or are they assigned to you? 
How would you describe your role and purpose as a careers adviser? 
Do you mostly provide individual guidance or do you also deliver groups sessions? 
How long does a guidance session take on average? 
How often does a customer return? 
How do you monitor a client’s progress? Do you monitor clients at all? (contract/ 
integration plan) 
What happens, if a client is not making an effort to work towards the goals of the 
guidance process? 
How crucial is guidance in the process of finding a job? 
From your perspective: how would you define a positive outcome of the service you 
are providing? 
How do you evaluate outcomes? Are there certain indicators or measurements that 
you apply? 
Which quality criteria are applied within your organisation?  
How does that affect your work? 
If there was an opportunity, how would you improve or change the service provided? 
 
Tranche 2 
Question Schedule: Managers 
Quality of service 
What are key components of a good quality service? 
What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the service? How would you 
change it? 
Users 
What do you count as a good quality outcome for users? 
Which factors influence the outcomes that your users experience? 
What do you think your customers need most when joining your programme/service? 
Does this change over time? 
What do you think users expect from the service? 
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To what extent do you think your service meets those needs? 
Is there a way for you to determine a change in user’s behaviour/ situation? If yes, how 
do you recognise it? 
User input 
How do you collect feedback from your users about the quality of the 
service/programme and its outcomes for them? What do you do with this 
information? 
Please provide a specific example of something that has been changed as a result of 
input from service users. 
Are the users involved in the design of your service? Should they be? How? 
Ensuring Quality: accreditation, professional standards, monitoring 
Which quality assurance frameworks does your organisation operate within? Are these 
internal (organisation/ programme specific) or external (accreditation) frameworks? 
Do internal and external quality standards complement each other or are there 
tensions between them? 
How clearly are internal/ external quality standards defined and communicated (both 
from and within your own organisation and from external contractors, if applicable)? 
Do you apply indicators strictly or is there some room for your own interpretation? 
Do you have any input into the design of quality standards or the indicator measures? 
Evaluation 
How is the success/ performance of your programme currently measured? 
Who determines how success/ performance is measured? 
What are the consequences of favourable/ unfavourable evaluation of the 
programme? 
If the method of evaluation was to change, which parts of the system would you retain 
and which would you change (and why)? 
Are quantitative indicators sufficient or should they be supplemented/ replaced by 
qualitative indicators? Do you have any suggestions which? 
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Tranche 2 
Question Schedule: Advisers 
Quality of service 
What are key components of a good quality service? 
What do you personally do to ensure that you provide a good service? 
What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the service? How would you 
change it? 
Does the assessment of your own work have an impact on the service you are 
delivering? If so, how? 
Users 
What do you count as a good quality outcome for users? 
Which factors influence the outcomes that your users experience? 
What do you think your users need most when joining your programme? Does this 
change over time? 
What do you think users expect from the service? 
To what extent do you think your service meets those needs? 
Is there a way for you to determine a change in user’s behaviour/ situation? If yes, how 
do you recognise it? 
User input 
How do you collect feedback from your users about the quality of the 
service/programme and its outcomes for them? What do you do with this 
information? 
Please provide a specific example of something that has been changed as a result of 
input from service users. 
Are the users involved in the design of your service? Should they be? How? 
Ensuring Quality: accreditation, professional standards, monitoring 
Which quality assurance frameworks does your organisation operate within? Are these 
internal (organisation/ programme specific) or external (accreditation) frameworks? 
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Do internal and external quality standards complement each other or are there 
tensions between them? 
How clearly are internal/ external quality standards defined and communicated (both 
from and within your own organisation and from external contractors, if applicable)? 
Do you apply indicators strictly or is there some room for your own interpretation? 
Do you have any input into the design of quality standards or the indicator measures? 
How does compliance to those quality assurance frameworks impact on your work? 
(i.e. more paper work, less time with clients) 
Evaluation 
How is the success/ performance of your programme currently measured? 
Who determines how success/ performance is measured? 
What are the consequences of favourable/ unfavourable evaluation of your 
programme? 
If the method of evaluation was to change, which parts of the system would you retain 
and which would you change (and why)? 
Are quantitative indicators sufficient or should they be supplemented/ replaced by 
qualitative indicators? Do you have any suggestions which? 
